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ABSTRACT

Even before Its Independence from Spain, Panama
had been developing what later Intellectuals were to call
a "transit" personality, for Panamanians realized that
their most obvious resource was their geographic advan
tage as an isthmus in the center of the New World.

The

Isthmus has prospered materially (though perhaps not
spiritually) when it has been able to exploit its possi
bilities as a route of transit.

The tragedy of the eco

nomic life of the Isthmus has been that while providing
the resource, it has reaped only crumbs of the wealth
that the Isthmians expected would flow from such accom
plishments as the railroad;

gains have been meager in

comparison with the political and spiritual consequences
they have suffered

in terms of respect from both Colom

bia and the United States.
The successful completion of the railroad by for
eigners seemed a promise of success to come.

Justo Aro-

semena and others in search of a national identity as free
men tried to raise the level of culture and education as
well as the level of economic prosperity.

For some

Panamanian enterprises at least, the railroad created
material wealth, but it also created racial and cultural
clashes between Panamanians and North Americans;
the invitation of the Bogota
tions by the United States.

and, at

government, many interven
Panamanians felt that they
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had been sacrificed, that the price they had paid m s
too great.
The many so-called "revolutions11 In Colombia
in the second half of the Nineteenth Century resulted In
the cultural desolation of Panama.
f
Panamanians want to cut

These revolutions made

themselves completely from the

horrors of Colombia's civil wars.

Panamanians continued

to consider themselves as Justo Arosemena had seen them,
as a people apart.

It Is true that they had some goals

and traditions In common with the rest of Colombia, but
not enough to Justify their dependency on Bogota and their
Involvement with her wars.

Rafael Ntifiez, the Liberal-

turned- Conservative, dealt a death-blow to the sover
eignty of Panama as a state within a federation when he
reduced Panama to a suppressed dependency whose gover
nors were appointed from Bogota.

Thus crippled, Panama

suffered during fatal clashes between Liberals and
Conservatives through the period of French canal cons
truction and the bloody Thousand Days' Civil War.
Added to the humiliations that any civil war
brings, m s the knowledge that Isthmians— and even
Colombians— could not forge the destiny of their own land
without interference from the United States.

A "Black

Legend" to the effect that it would have been impossible
for Panama to gain its independence from Colombia without
the aid of the United States sprang up in Panama and the
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United States In 1903 and has survived for many years*
yet the opposite had been true toward the end of the
Thousand Days* War on the Isthmus,

If the United States

had not Intervened, the Independence that many men of
the Liberal Party were dreaming about would have been
possible and probable.

Liberals on the Isthmus did attain

an unquestionably secure military position under General
Benjamin Herrera during the Thousand Days* War, and
American Interference at a crucial moment In their cam
paign squelched any possibility of final success for the
Liberals.

Many Liberals were already hinting and talking

about a movement for independence from Colombia which
would establish nLa Repfibllca Andlna" and which would
also include the Cauca area of Colombia, suiother Liberal
stronghold.
From Its first rather emotional attachment to
Nueva Granada under the banner of the hero, Bolfvar, until
Its final Independence in 1903* Panama has struggled to
identify and proclaim itself an entity with Its own set
of problems, peoples, and even culture.

The disputes

that prompted Justo Arosemena to publish his Estado
Federal de Panam£ (1855) were often related to this par
ticular desire to verify what Panamanians sensed was their
own peculiarly Isthmian way of life and philosophy.
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INTRODUCTION
" . . . porque si hay un
pueblo que ha sufrldo su
historia es el nuestro."
Juan Materno VSsquez

As we survey the history of Panama from Its
independence from Spain In 1821 (when Panama chose to be
part of Colombia) until we leave it before its final
Independence from Colombia In 1903* we are struck by
the continual suffering, economical and spiritual, of
Panamanians at the hands of extraneous political elements.
The main highlights of the history of the Isthmus seem
to relate either to desires for self-government (usually
in the direction of commercial aspirations) or to regrets
and disappointments at the outcome of such enterprises.
Bitterness directed at the restricting shackles imposed
from BogotS sours into resentments against intervention
policies of the United States.

The patterns that echo

from the Nineteenth Century into the Twentieth Century
can lead us to a better understanding of the formation
of the national outlook of Panama today.

In other words,

a study of the Nineteenth Century is an essential pre
requisite for the understanding of modern Panama.

One

who starts out with the premise that Panama as an entity
did not exist before 1903 but that Panama owes its
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identity to the United States will find that bias and
prejudice limit his comprehension of the feelings. Ideals,
philosophies, desires, wants and aspirations of the
Panamanians today.

Moreover, the excitement of the

Nineteenth Century makes it worthy of a history of its
own.
The purpose of the author in writing this history
of the Isthmus during the Nineteenth Century is to
demonstrate to the reader that Panamanian leaders have
always felt that their isthmus was a separate entity
with its own political, social and economic philosophies.
Panama, in reality, was not a natural but an artificial
part of Colombia.

This history will allow the English-

speaking student to observe Nineteenth Century Panama
from the point of view of original sources and contempo
rary Panamanian opinions and Interpretations as well as
the traditional English-language books.

The author hopes

that his study will stimulate not only himself but others
to further research.
In dealing with historical surveys written by
Panamanian historians, the author has cross-checked as
frequently as possible (especially when information
appeared to be misleading or incomplete) with the ori
ginal sources (cited either in footnotes or in the
bibliographies of said history books) or with more
traditional histories available in Panama, Colombia and
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the United States.

Several errors in dates were disco

vered, not only in Panamanian sources but also in North
American books which were based on certain less reliable
Panamanian histories.

The perpetuation of such errors

has been avoided in this dissertation, though verification
with original documents has not been possible for all
statements made.

As incongruencies or contradictions

were found, these have been exposed in the footnotes or
resolved by using other sources and additional information
within the text.
In searching for material, the author has been
generously aided by historians in Panama who donated
either books or the use of their libraries, as for example,
RubSn Darfo Carles.

The staff of the National Library

in Panama, that of the University of Panama, and Mrs.
Evelyn Price of the Canal Zone Library were most coopera
tive and courteous in allowing the author the use of their
facilities.

Members of the author*s family and friends

in Panama provided many new books which have been impor
tant in assessing the modern interpretations of Panamanian
historians and intellectuals.

Several old and valuable

memoirs and biographies which; because of the limited
editions in Spanish are no longer readily available, were
donated to the author through the years and form an impor
tant source of information for parts of this work.

Many

old articles and books relating to events on the Isthmus
were available in the Louisiana State University Library
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and the author found these Items very useful In cross
checking more recently-published sources.

This writer

was surprised at the wealth of material that he found
In the Louisiana State University Library and Archives.
The bibliography, though selective, represents
material accumulated during the last seven or eight
years and Includes many Panamanian and Colombian sources
difficult to obtain In the United States.

The knowledge

of their existence, as well as their use as sources for
the text, will. It Is hoped, enlighten, guide and
stimulate more exhaustive research concerning specific
subjects and events related to Panama.
The author Is deeply grateful, not only to those
who helped provide sources, but also to Dr. Jane
DeGrummond, Dr. Paul Hoffman and Dr. Leonard Cardenas for
their constructive criticisms and valuable suggestions
which clarified the text.

Many thanks are also due to

Dr. Herman Daly, who encouraged

and supported this work.

The author most sincerely thanks his mother,
Pauline Strange, and his father, Alejandro Pfirez-Venero,
M.D., for the patience, understanding and cooperation
which made this work possible.
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CHAPTER I
INDEPENDENCE AND AFTERMATH

While the major areas of Latin America were
signing declarations of independence from Spain* Panama*
within the Jurisdiction of the viceroyalty of Nueva
Granada,1 remained loyal to the Spanish crown and
refused to second these movements for independence.

It

is not strange, then, that Panama served as a strong
base for the loyalist supporters in their expeditions
against the rebels (patriots) in South America, and
that because of upheavals in other areas of Nueva Granada,
Panama would serve as capital of that viceroyalty for a
2
time.
Due not only to their loyalist support but also
*1
•‘■What is known today as Colombia was also known as
the State of Nueva Granada after Independence from Spain.
Nueva Granada was part of Bolivar*s Republic of Colombia
(referred to by many historians as Gran Colombia), .
together with Ecuador and Venezuela until the disintegra
tion of that union. In 1858 Nueva Granada was named the
Granadlne Confederacy; in 1861 it was known as the United
States of Colombia, and in 1886, it was named the Republic
of Colombia. Sees E. Taylor Parks, Colombia and the
United States. 1765-193** (Durham, N. C., 1935), ^81.
2

Ernesto Castlllero R. and Juan A. Susto, Rlncfin
hlstflrlco (Vol. I) (Panama, 19**7). 97.
In 1812, Brigadier Benito P6rez, appointed by the
regency as Viceroy of Nueva Granada, was forced to esta
blish his base of authority in Panama due to the state of
cpnfuslon and revolt in SantafS de Bogota, the viceregal
capital. The Tribunal of the Real Audencla thus func
tioned in Panama until about the middle ot 1813 when
P6rez's successor, Don Francisco Montalvo, established
1

to their strategic positions on the Isthmus, Panama (on
the Pacific) and Porotbelo (on the Atlantic) became
royalist strongholds and depositories of war machinery,
and consequently they also became targets of rebel
aggression during the wars for Independence,
The Isthmians,

as was the case In other areas

of Latin America, were divided among themselves.

For

economic reasons many former loyalists were flung Into
the arms of the rebel cause.
Spain ha

While Ferdinand VII of

allowed free commercial aotlvity on the

Isthmus (ca. 1813) the Panamanians had prospered, and
such cities as Panama and Portobelo had again become
warehouses for merchandise bound from foreign ports to

the government in Santa Marta, Juan B, Sosa and Enrique
J. Arce, Compendlo de hlstorla de Panama. 2nd ed,
(Panama, 1971), 18^, hereafter cited Sosa and Arce,
Compendlo.
Under the rule of Spain, the General Comandancla
de Panama was composed of three provinces— Portobelo,
Veraguas, Darldn; and two districts— Nat^t and Alanje.
The provinces were ruled by a Governor and a Commandant
(Military) and the districts by an Alcalde Mayor (Mayor).
Panama, the capital, was ruled by a high official in
charge of the military (Comandancla General) and also
of the supreme civil government (Goblerno Superior
Politico).
.The military garrisons statlones in Panama consisted of an artillery company and an infantry battalion.
There were also militias in many places throughout the
rest of the Isthmus. For example, In Nata there was a
battalion of whites and a battalion of Pardos: in
Veraguas there was white infantry battalion, and in other
places there were single companies of infantry and
artillery. Rubdn D. Carles, A 150 aflos de la lndependenola de Panama de Espaflh. 1B2I-1971 (Panama, 19^1)• v,
hereafter cited Carles, A 150 aflos.

3

Central and South America.

But the greed of the merchants

of Cadiz and their successful lobbying for exclusive
franchises on the Isthmus were to count among the final
blows to the prosperity of Panama and, consequently, to
the royalist cause there.^
Unfortunately for the relatively few Panamanian
rebel colonists, Spain had regained much of the military
strength which she had lost under the Napoleonic regime.
By 1815 (after retaking Venezuela) Spain reconquered
Nueva Granada, quickly avenging herself on many of the
L
leaders of the liberation movement there.
Furthermore,
In 1817, Don Alejandro Hore became governor of Panama,
ruling the Isthmus despotically while trying to retain
the Isthmus for the Crown at all cost.

Under his rule,

the patriots had difficulty controlling their military
conquests for any length of time.

One of their unfor

tunate expeditions was against Portobelo and was led by
the Scottish noble. General Gregor MacGregor, who was

^Castlllero and Susto, Rlnc6n hlstdrlco. 93-97;
Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 184-167.
^It was at this time that Bolivar fled to Jamaica
where he wrote his famous Letter from Jamaica.

successful at first, but ultimately was crushed by Hore.-*
This victory was to bring grave consequences to the
monarchists In their struggle against the patriots.
The death of Hore In 1820 and the economic losses the
Isthmus had been suffering somewhat reduced the ranks of
the royalist following, which nevertheless remained In
the

majority.^
In 1820, Fernando VII was forced to uphold the

Constitution of 1812 (which he had scorned since 181*0.
The new Constitutional Government adversely affected

% l r Gregca* MacGregor managed to escape the counter
attack by the Spanish (commanded by Governor Hore) by
throwing a mattress out of the window from his bedroom
and jumping Into the sea to swim to his ship. Hero. An
Officer Who Miraculously Escaped, Narrative of~TKe
Expedition under General MacGregor against Porto Bello
(London, 1820), 51-5^* Jane Lucas DeGrummond, Caracas
Diary (Baton Rouge, 195*0* 307-308, 313; Niles Weekly
Register. XVI (1819), 55* 128, 158, 318, 335. 385.
W. D. Weatherhead, An Account of the Late Expedition
Against the Isthmus of Darien. Under the Command of Sir
Gregor McGregor (London, 1821), 22-68.
For a short biography of MacGregor sees The
Dictionary of National Biography, ed. Leslie Stephens,
XII (London, 1959), 539.
Stanley Faye states that ". . .pending the
arrival of other vessels he / M a c G r e g o r / had proposed to
unresponsive officers a privateering campaign, and also
another capture of the Isthmus and the digging of a
Panama Canal.11 "Commodore Aury," The Louisiana His
torical Quarterly. XXIV (July, 195l)i 55*
Another expedition, this one against the Island of
Taboga, was led by Juan Illingworth In 1819. For a
description of this naval maneuver sees Camilo Destruge,
Blograffa del General Don Juan Illingworth (Guayaquil,
91*0, 7-337"
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the movement for Independence on the Isthmus by removing
many of the reasons for loyalists to convert to the
patriot cause.

The new governments In Spain appointed

Brigadier Pedro Ruiz de Forras to succeeed Hore as
governor of Panama.

Porras and his followers created a

favorable Image of constitutional government under Spain
through political clubs, newspaper articles about the
Government and free elections of Cabildo members and
representatives of the provinces.

With regard to the

patriots, however, this taste of freedom only reinforced
their aspirations for complete separation from Spain.
Unfortunately for all the Isthmians, Spain became
concerned about these comparatively liberal manifesta
tions under Porras in Panama and decided to replace him
with the last Viceroy of Nueva Granada, Juan de S&mano
y Urribarry.

Sfimano had found refuge in Jamaica when the

patriots recovered Nueva Granada.

He arrived in Panama

in December of 1820/ and turned the political tide back

Manuel Marla Alba C., Cronologla de los gobern
nantes de Panamg. 1510-1967 (Panama, 19677* 133* here
after cited Alba, Cronologla: Castillero and Susto,
Rlnofln hlstfirlco, 9°; Ernesto J. Nlcolau, Ei grlto de la
Villa (10— Novlembre— 1821) (Panama, 1961), 15, 55; Sosa
and Arce. Compendlo. 185. 189-192. 19^.
^Castillero and Susto, Rlnc6n hlstdrlco. 98; Boni
facio Pereira JimSnez, Hlstorla de Panama. 3rd ed. (Panama,
1969), 215; Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 19^-196. Sfimano
came with the idea of separating Panama from the domain of
Nueva Granada and renaming Panama Tlerra Flrme (Captancy
General of Tlerra Flrme). Alba, Cronologla. 13^-135; Naris
L. Correa D., Apuntea de hlstorla patrla(Panama.n.d.),11^.
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to the oppressive type of rule that the Panamanians had
had to endure under Hore, and thus, undermined the loyalty
of many an Isthmian toward the Crown.

Samano's govern

ment was characterized as cruel and bloody, full of per
secutions, fallings, terror and heavy censorship.

For

tunately for the Isthmians at that time, his rule was
o
short-lived, for he died soon after taking power.
By 1821, the Spanish Crown was so Intensely
worried about the emancipation struggle In America, that
It reinforced the defensive position of the Isthmus and
sent Field Marshall Juan de la Cruz Murgefin y Achet, the
last governor of Panama named by the King of Spain, to
try to reconquer the areas of Quito and Nueva Granada,
promising him the vlce-royalty If he should recapture at
least two-thirds of those territories.

Impelled by this

promise, Murgedn weakened the Isthmian defenses while
forming his own military expedition.

Finding that the

treasury was depleted, he exhausted the funds of the
cofradfas and of the church in the form of "loans", and
finally left on his Ill-fated expedition to the coast
Q

Alba, Cronologla. 13^-135; Correa, Apuntes de
hlstorla patrla. 1 1 4 ; Nlcolau, El grlto de la Villa.
3; Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 19^7
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of Esmeralda In October of 1821.^
PANAMA DECLARES ITS INDEPENDENCE FBOM SPAIN
Before leaving, Murgedn had been foroed to find a
replacement to occupy the governorship.

Unable to find

well-known Spanish loyalists to leave In charge of the
Isthmus, he settled for the Isthmian-born governor of the
Province of Veraguas In Panama, Colonel Josd de Ffibrega.'*'0
F£brega was the first native Isthmian to hold such high
office.

Although he understood why many of his fellow

countrymen were so embittered by the apparent hopeless
ness of their positions as second class citizens In their

^When Murgedn received the news of Panama*s
declaration of Independence, he decided to change the
commands of two of his ships, but the commanders had
already begun talks with the patriots to turn the ships
over to them with the stipulation that the salaries of
the crews would be apld retroactively. By this time,
MurgeOn was gravely 111 In Quito. His Illness was appar
ently the result of a serious fall he had had In the moun
tains of Esmeralda. The difficult situation In which he
found himself, and the final news that his ships had been
turned over to the patriots proved too much for Murgedn.
He died April 3, 1822. Nicolau, El grlto de la Villa.

98-100.

The spelling of Murgedn*s name fluctuates even
within the same book (El grlto de la Villa) between Mourgedn and Murgedn. This last spelling would represent the
Spanish version of the French ou sound, and It would be
the tendency among Spanish-speaking writers to spell It
thusly.
^®Alba, Cronologla. 135-136; Carles, A 150 affos.
vll; Correa, Apuntes de hlstorla patrla. 115-Ho; Sosa
and Arce, Compendlo. 197-198.

own land, ha was loyal to the Crown and particularly
affiliated to the Constitutional party of Spain,

Thus,

he represented a certain type of security to the royal
ists and simultaneously, a hope for the patriots;
over, he was a guarantee of peace to both.

more

Therefore he

was selected by Murgefin to head the Government,"^
However, Ffibrega took command at a time when the
whole of Hlspano-Amerlca was breaking away from Spain,
Central America had just declared Itself Independent;
royalists in Venezuela found themselves restricted to
the plaza In Puerto Cabello;

and Cartagena had ended

the siege by opening its doors to the army of Montilia, ^
In Panama, where taxations imposed by the need-to pay for
Murgeon's expedition had plunged the Isthmus further Into
economic misery, soldiers in the interior abused and
Jailed many innocent victims of these forced contribu
tions j and patriots in the city of Panama, taking into
consideration the probable reluctance of Fabrega to shed
the blood of fellow countrymen, prepared to gain

"^Nlcolau, El grlto de la Villa. 9. 15*
12

Alba, Cronologfa. 135; Correa, Apuntes de
hlstorla patrla. 115; Nlcolau, El grlto de la Villa.
9; Pereira, Hlstorla de Panamg. 216; Sosa and Arce,
Compendlo. 198-199.

liberation.

To undermine resistance from the garrison,

patriots decided to foment desertion In the ranks of the
military with bribes from various prominent citizens
distributed through probable collusion among patriots and
a high-ranking military chief In the city.*^
Such was the state of affairs when on November
10, 1821, an uprising In Villa de los Santos supporting
the Independence movement touched off a series of similar
events In towns like Pesfi and Natfi.

These sponataneous

movements were soon supported ardently by many Isthmians,
and the outburst of the revolution initiated at Villa de
los Santos soon advanced to the very walls of the forti
fied, city of Panama.

The Government there responded to

the ultimatums of the interior towns by cutting off all
communication with them and even, with other towns in the
Province of Panama itself.

Within the city arrests were

made and persecutions ensued;

a show of force was

attempted with mobilization of remaining troops at stra
tegic spots in the city.
were taken.
Ffibrega.

Other precautionary measures

All this musthave deeply concerned Colonel

He was charged wtih the delicate duty of pre

serving the Isthmus for the Crown.

He had to prepare to

•^Alba, Cronologfa. 136-137; Nicolau, El grlto
de la Villa, 25, 6 0 ; Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 198-199•
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defend It from Colombian liberators who could swoop
down upon the Isthmus at any time.

These were In a

vengeful mood over the Imprisonment and penalties still
being suffered by MacGregor*s men who had been captured
at Portobelo and Chagres In 1819 and by other patriots
of similar fates.

And now within the Isthmus Itself, at

Ffibrega*s very door, Panamanians were clamoring for
ih
emancipation.
Among other recourses, F6brega turned for advice
to the Asamblea Provincial (Provincial Congress) which
advised him to call together a council composed of civil
ecclesiastical, commercial, military and other high pub
lic elements.

This Ffibrega did, and the meeting was

held November 20 in his own home.

It was agreed that

representatives from all the Interior towns would meet
on December 20, a measure that F&brega approved because
it would halt all aggression (the outcome of which he
could not be certain), and it would delay any punitive
measures against the rebels.

Then too, Ffibrega was

actually more worried about attack from the sea by expe
ditions sent to Panama than he was by the local uprisings.
The Irony of his faulty judgment

in this case was that

l^Nicolau, El grlto de 1& Villa. 27-28, 55;
and Arce, Compendlo. 199.

Sosa

the ones at home proved to be more dangerous than the
attackers from abroad.
The meeting planned by F&brega never materialized.
Panamanians of the Interior were too inflamed over the
prospect of freedom to wait, and many towns reinforced
the determination which first had exploded at Villa de
los Santos.
In the meantime, troops continued to desert In
the city of Panama In such proportions that there were
hardly enough men left to guard the cells and man the
barracks.

On the night of the 27th of November some

60 soldiers deserted with their arms;

and the Government,

faced with apparently unsurmountable troubles, began
taking last minute steps to oppose the rebellion that
was seething.

Remaining loyalist forces were assigned

to strategic places throughout the city, but ignoring
their rather passive efforts, the people invaded the
principal plaza and the barracks, and asked for a meeting
of the Cabildo to decide the future of their Isthmus.
The next day, at the invitation of the members of the

■^Nlcolau, El grlto

de la Villa. 56-66.
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Cabildo, a meeting took place at the Casa Conslstorlal.
Long discussions ensued concerning the cause of republic
anism on the Isthmus and whether to join Colombia.

This

last measure was agreed upon in part because of the
worship of their hero, Si'mdn Bolivar.

Finally, the

delegates approved the motion to declare the Isthmus free
and independent of Spanish domination, and to unite it to
Gran Colombia.

The Declaration was announced on the

28 of November, 1821, from the balcony of the townhall
to the waiting multitude in the plaza, and was received
with cheers. ^
The Declaration that was heard in Panama City was
soon imitated in the Province of Veraguas where the
*■ »

insurrections of Los Santos and of Nata had taken place.
The Bishop of that area supported the Declaration not
only morally but materially, even offering to mortgage
church property for the cause.1®

^ Ibld.. 67; Sosa and Arce, Coinpendlo. 199-201.
Some of the important officials who attended the
meetings at the Casa Conslstorlal were: the Governor,
the Captain General, the Bishop, the Vicar General,
provincial representatives, military chiefs and several
other memebers of the administration. Sosa and Arce,
Compendlo. 200.
^Nicolau, Ei grlto de la Villa. 6?-68;
Arce, Compendlo. 200.

Sosa and

1®Correa, Aountes de hlstorla patrla. 118.
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When Bolivar received the news of the Isthmian
declarations In January of 1822 In his headquarters In
Popayfin, he sent one of his aides de camp to present to
the people of the Isthmus the congratulations he felt
they deserved on liberating their c o u n t r y . ^
THE UNION WITH COLOMBIA
The decision to Incorporate themselves with Gran
Colombia was the beginning of a great period of turmoil
for the Isthmians, for Bolivar and his government were
going to have to face not only the disorder that had
reigned during the revolution against Spain, but also
the anarchy and turmoil which were to rack the liberated
countries for years to come.

Nevertheless, the Isthmians

were Inflamed with patriotic zeal and were willing to
support Bolfvar*s continuing campaigns against the Span
ish until the battle of Ayacucho which, led by Marshall An
tonio Jos6 de Sucre In 1826 was to prove the final and
20
decisive blow to the Spaniards.

■^Ernesto Castillero R., Hlstorla de Panama. 7th ed.
(Panama, 1962), 78.
20

With the words, "I admit that the existing
Republic cannot be governed except by the sword," Simdn
Bolrvar prophesied the future history of Colombia— a his
tory of the constant struggle and bloody strife between
liberalism and conservatism for control of the government.
When either of these two schools of thought was in power,
its governmental measures were annulled and reversed by
the succeeding administration. Aggravating this constant
political strife were the bitter religious and regional

I**

Immediately after declaring its Independence in
1821, Panama continued to be governed by Colonel Ffibrega
until formal recognition by Colombia when, because of
his personal wishes, he was reinstated as governor of the
' province of Veraguas, a position he had held before the
independence of Panama.

The Department of the Isthmus

was created by a decree on February 9. 1822, with the
same boundaries that the provinces had had when known
as the Comandancia General de Panama under Spanish rule.
Colonel Josfi

Marfa Carreffo, a Venezuelan, was appointed

as Intendant General of the new department and Governor
of the province of P a n a m a . U p o n his arrival on the
Isthmus in 1822, the constitution ratified the previous
year by the Congress of Cficuta was proclaimed.

22

Soon

disputes. In no other American country did the Church
have such a hold on the people. Liberals constantly
harrassed the Roman Catholic Church and the Jesuits while
Conservatives defended both. These struggles, both poli
tical and religious, were and still are predominant Issues
in Colombian history. Selected Writings of Bolfvar. 18231830. ed. Harold A. Blerck, Jr., trans. Lewis Bertran,
2 vols. (New York, 1951). I. 7^0; Tom B. Jones, An
Introduction to Hispanic American History (New York, 1938),
360-301; "The Struggle in Colombia," The Saturday
Review. XCII (September 1^, 1901), 326; F. A. Kirkpatrick,
Latin Americas A Brief History (New York, 1939). 253,
hereafter cited Kirkpatrick, Latin America.
21
Alba, Cronologfa. 141; Sosa and Arce, Compendlo.
202

.

pp

66In 1821, an assembly had been held in Cficuta for the purpose of writing a constitution. The leader of the
revolutionaries, Simfin Bolfvar, had previously argued for
a centralized government, for without, he claimed, the
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the authority of the Colombian Government extended Itself
to all the territorial boundaries of the Isthmus, even
to the Islands of San Bias where the Indians recognized
Carreflo In compliance with the desires of their own
Capitfin Culpana, principal caclaue of the region. ^3
The military problems In areas of Spanish South
America permitted only military matters on the Isthmus
to be uppermost In Carreflo*s mind#

In order to protect

the Isthmus and at the same time not to Interfere with
or use the troops that marched regularly through the
Isthmus on their way south to fight against Spain,
Carreflo, upon the advice of Bolfvar, organized a locallymanned cavalry regiment and a body of 700 Infantrymen.
Although this battalion known as Istmo was principally
organized for guarding the Isthmus, Bolfvar ordered It
to participate In liberating activities In Peru against
General Jos € de Canterac In June of 182*1-.

Istmo was

enemies of Colombia would have a strong advantage. At
the time of the Cticuta assembly, Bolfvar's popularity was
at Its peak. Under his leadership, the Spaniards had been
driven a second time from New Granada and a third time
from Venezuela after the failure of federation In both
countries. A centralized government was therefore favored
by the assembly, and on August 30, 1821, the second of
Colombla*s constitutions was adopted. By Its terms
Bolfvar was elected President and Francisco Paula de San
tander, Vice-President. Selected Writings of Bolfvar.
I, 22; William Marlon Gibson, The Constitutions of
Colombia. (Durham, 19^8), xi-xil, 37; Jestls Marfa Henao
and Gerardo Arrubla, History of Colombia. Trans, and ed.
J. Fred Hippy (Chapel_&ill, 1938), 519.
23Perelra, Hlstorla de Pangmtf, 228; Compendlo. 202.
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Incorporated Into veteran battalions In South America
and took part in the famous battle of Junfn where the
enemy's cavalry was almost destroyed, and In the battle
of Ayacucho where General Antonio JosS de Sucre destroyed
the last Spanish force of any consequence and ended
Spanish rule In the New World,^
During the course of the Peruvian Campaign,2-* the
ports of Panama on the Atlantic and on the Pacific were
In constant movement with the arrival and departure of
Colombian battalions headed for the war In South America.
Consequently, the public treasury was faced with diffi
culties, because It had become totally depleted In fur
nishing provisions and transportation for troops to
Peruvian ports. The victory at Ayacucho actually worsened

2^Alba, Cronologfa. 1*H, 1^3*
Compendlo. 203-20^.

Sosa and Arce,

25The years from 1822 to 1827 found Bolivar In
Ecuador and Peru, continuing the fight to drive Spain
from South America. During the five-year absence of
Bolivar, his vice-president, Francisco de Paula Santander,
acted as president of the republic. At first, Colombia
was able to make progress toward Its development as a
nation, especially In the field of education. In 1822,
President Santander ordered the establishment of normal
schools, and schools for the female population. Even
some Indians were to have educational privileges. These
advances, plus Santander's attention to the development
of agriculture, trade and mining, were soon ended by
Internal problems— conflicting ambitions among various
leaders, the desire to give the masses more education,
the clergy's opposition to liberalism, the long absence
of Bolfvar, financial chaos, and In 1826, rebellion In
Venezuela led by Josfi Antonio Pfiez. Henao and Arrubla,
History of Colombia, 369; Parks, Colombia and the United
States. 110-111, 117-118.
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the economic capacity of the Isthmians because of the
continuous Influx of defeated Spaniards for whom It was
necessary to furnish transportation to Havana?

then too,

as time progressed, troops of the liberating army began
to return to the Isthmus,

Some of them were sent to La

Ghorrera, a short distance from Panama City, to restore
their strength.
The methods that Carreflo adopted to remedy these
problems, Including exacting almost doubled taxes,
resulted In opposition against him.

Carreflo (a man of

little talent, accustomed to the arbitrary ways of the
military camp) used force when necessary to carry out
his plans.

Due to Carreflo's methods, the Colombian

cause was beginning to be unpopular on the Isthmus, but
his power was dlmlnuished at the beginning of 1826 when
the command of the Isthmus was divided for administrative
purposes between civil and military authorities.

Carreflo

kept the military command as Commandant General (he had
been promoted to Brigadier General) and Juan Josd Argote,
a man of principle who did try to stabilize administrative
matters, was given civil command with the title of Intendant, a post he held until late in 1826.

Argote was

well-llked on the Isthmus and had worked for Panama's
Independence from Spain.

He was a man of tact, educated

and firm In his political opinions, yet he was the first
of a series of leaders to suffer the turbulence of the era

18

and Its continual stigma of plays for power.

26

It was during this period that Bolfvar was able to
hold his long-planned Latin American Congress on the
27
Isthmus. ' The Idea of an alliance among the recently
emancipated people of America was conceived by Bolfvar
at least as early as 1816, but the meeting to discuss
such an Idea could not be held until after independence
had been won.

On June 22, 1826, delegates from Colombia,

Mexico, Peru and the United Provinces of Central America
met In Panama.

Chile, Bolivia, Brazil and the provinces

of Hfo de la Plata declined to attend the Congress.
England and Low Countries sent representatives as obser
vers only.

One of the delegates from the United States

died on the way and the other arrived when the Congress
had already adjourned.

As Bolfvar had foreseen, the

results of the Congress of Panama were not promising.^®
26
Alba, Cronologfa. 1*1-1, 1*1-3; Sosa and Arce,
Compendlo de hlstorla de Panama. 20*J— 205.
^Bolfvar himself did not attend. Moisds Chong M..
Hlstorla de Pansunft (Panama, 1968), 13^; Mariano Arosemena,
Apuntamlentos hlst6rlcos (1801-18*1-0). (Panama, 19*1-9). 168lo9, hereafter cited Apuntamlentos.
28
Pereira, Hlstorla de Panama. 228-230; Sosa and
Arce, Compendlo. 205-206.
The only transcendental result of this meeting was
the Inspiration to consider the countries of the Americas
as a brotherhood, the basis on which pan-amerlcanlsm stands
even today. Alba, Cronologfa. I*l4.
In the opinion of Mariano Arosemena,who lived at that
time on the Isthmus, the enemies of Panama were Intimidated
by the apparent mutual Interest and desire for protection
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It was about this time, also, that Bolivar was
alarmed by the anarchy that was threatening the various
Latin American countries.

As a measure against such

anarchy, Bolivar elaborated for Bolivia a constitution In
which the term of the president was for life arid In which
the president could choose his successor.

After having

been approved by the Bolivian Congress, this constitution
was also adopted by Peru.

In search of supporters for

this constitutional measure, various agents and friends
of Bolfvar were traveling through the provinces of
Colombia. Thus, In September of 1826, Antonio Leocadlo
Guzm&n arrived In Panama and succeeded In getting the
support of

Carreflo who In turn put pressure on a Junta

de Notables (which he himself had hurriedly promoted and
which was composed of public employees and private
citizens) to approve an act asking for the “dictatorship"
of Bolfvar and the adoption of the Bolivian code in
Colombia.

At first, the Junta brazenly refused to consi

der the Bolivian constitution, and changed the agenda of
the proceedings to seek Instead public approval for an
interoceanlc railroad and Bolfvar*s support for It.
Carreflo was upset by this arrogant action and stirred up

which the American nations seemed to hold In regard to
one another, thereby giving the meeting still another
positive result. Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 170.

passions with public displays and parades favoring
Bolfvar*s dictatorship.

The result was that at its next

meeting the Junta did proclaim Its support of Bolivar.^
Nevertheless, reslstence to the Bolivarian program
continued even though Carreffo was able to secure this
formal support. A newspaper appeared In the capital
with the title, El Cfroulo IstmefTo.3°

it voiced

passionate opinions, mostly of an economic order, against
the proposed "dictatorship."^

Argote, whose efforts to

do well were in continual clash with Carreffo, resigned
under pretext of illness from the civil government primar
ily

because of disagreements regarding the Bolivian

Constitution.

Liberate were alarmed that the granting of

absolute powers to Bolfvar would mean the destruction of
the division of powers.

They soon found a powerful ally

in Manuel Muffoz, a Venezuelan appointed in February of
182? as head of both the civil and military government

29Arosemena, Apuntamlentos hlstgrlcos. 170-171;
Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 206.
3°Theeditors of this paper were members of the
club of the same name. They were: Josd Agustfn Arango,
Josd de Obaldfa and Mariano Arosemena. Arosemena,
A puntamlentos. 178.
^The main objection to high concentration of
power In the hands of Bolivar and against the Bolivian
statues were related to the continued economic ruin
brought about by the powerful Colombian mercantile groups
so ably represented In the Bogotanlan central government.
The Isthmians wanted free trade and were eager to con
struct an interoceanlc highway, but they were thwarted and
Ignored by the aforementioned group. Chong, Hlstorla,133*
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of the I s t h m u s .M u fl oz was sympathetic to the Ideas of
SI Cfroulo Istmeffo and the political club of the same name
regarding criticism of the Bolivian statutes and even of
separation from Nueva Granada.^3

However, Muffoz was

forced to resign within a few months, apparently because
of disturbances In Los Santos related to a premature
attempt at secession for which he and the "Cfrculo
Istmeffo" were blamed. 3^

with this, the ant1-Bolivarlan

group fell temporarily silent.

Muffoz was replaced by the

Prefect of Veraguas, Colonel Pfibrega, until the following
December (1827) when Colonel JosS Domingo Esplnar, a
native of Panama, arrived as General Commandant with
civil powers.

In the view of the Isthmians Esplnar abused

32Alba, Cronologfa. 144; Castillero, Hlstorla de
Panama. 80; Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 206-207*
33Because Muffoz was related to Bolfvar, the supreme
government mistakenly considered him loyal to his cause.
But Muffoz was Instead an avid republican who did not
agree with such concentration of power as Bolfvar proposed.
Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 178-179.
The desire for a decentralized government was only
a manifestation of the Liberal philosophy. The Liberals
of the nineteenth cenrury based their beliefs on the idea
of having freedom from any unnecessary restrictions or
policies imposed by government. Liberals all over Colom
bia were not necessarily in accord as to looal regulations,
but they all shared the hope that the government and the
Church would not interfere and Impose the religion, moral
ity and views of a governing few on the entire population.
3^Alba, Cronologfa. 145; Arosemena, Apuntamlentos.
177; Chong, Hlstorla de Panama. 133; Sosa and Arce,
Compendlo. 206-207.
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his powers by his censorship and despotic rule.

In

March of 1828, the civil part of the government was
placed under the command of General Jose Sarda, a native
of Spain, who assumed those duties as Intendant of the
Department, and whose rule from 1828 to the end of 1829.
though not productive for the Isthmians, was at least
more peaceful than It had been under Esplnar alone.35
Both Esplnar and Sarda were In favor of the Boli
vian Statutes;

the first because he had served loyally

under Bolivar, and the second because he was partial to
presidency for life and to a monarchy, principles for
which he later lost his life.

The only hope left for the

Liberals In Panama under the rule of Esplnar and Sarda
was the convention of Ocafla

which was to be held In

March of 1828, the same month SardS came Into power.
This convention had been arranged by the various poli
tical factions to discuss and decide on reforms of the
existing government..
As If these problems were not enough, Spain was

-^Alba, Cronologfa. 146-148; Arosemena, A£untamlentos.179.184; Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 206wr.

J Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 179, 184, 192. Sardfi
was sentenced to death In Bogota for plotting against San
tander. He escaped, continued his opposition, was dis
covered and shot. Carles, A 160 affos. 8-9.

23

apparently making one final effort to reconquer her lost
colonies.

In preparation for any possible attacks from

Spnalsh forces In Cuba, SardA was forced to recruit an
army In the Interior of Panama while Esplnar was absent.
Zulla, Magdalena and Panama were combined Into one
military department under the command of General Mariano
Montilla.

Fortunately for Gran Colombia, the efforts of

Spain were directed at Mexico.37

Furthermore, the

political horizons of Colombia were becoming more and more
clouded.

General PAez had revolted in 1826 In Venezuela,

partly in reaction to the seemingly over-ambitious designs
of Bolivar, and had thus Initiated the dissolution of
Colombia.3®During the year 1827 revolts in Peru and even
in Bolivia had led to the abjuration of the Bolivian
constitution which supported the presidency of Bolfvar
for life.

Nevertheless, Bolfvar continued his proposal

to be declared president for life as stipulated in the
Bolivian constitution.

At the Convention of Ocaffa. in

April of 1828, antagonisms flared between the Liberals

37Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 182-183, 185, 199;
Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 207.
^®The PAez revolt forced Bolfvar to return to
Colombia in 1827. He immediately was given full emer
gency powers to deal with the PAez uprising. Bolfvar
managed to pacify the Venezuelan hero for the time
being; however, opposition to Bolivar developed in
Colombia. This opposition was led by Santander, Fran
cisco Soto and others. Henao and Arrubla, Hlstor.v
Colombia, 375-^26; Parks, Colombia and the United
States.~120-123.
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and the Conservatives of Colombia.

The Liberals, suppor

ters of General Francisco Paula de Santander, had a major
ity among the delegates and were making efforts to pre
vent the reform of the constitution that would give
Bolfvar what In their opinion was excessive power.

Sardd

in Panama, backed Bolfvar*s decision to rule for life,
and this outraged Liberals there.
In spite of Liberal protests, Bolfvar assumed
the dictatorship in August.

On September 25, 1828,

conspirators assaulted the Presidential Palace In Bogota
with the intention of killing the Liberator, whom they
accused of attempting to crown himself monarch of
Colombia.

The conspirators were captured and sentenced:

some were executed but this did not deter protest in all
parts of Colombia against dictatorial government.39
Other events and complications were affecting
Bolfvar's postion as "dictator".

A Peruvian army of

8,000 men under the command of General JosS de la Mar
invaded Colombia, bombarded Guayaquil and then took

39Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 181, 185-187, 189;
Bonifacio Pereira Jlmgnez. Blograffa del Rfo Chagres
(Panama, 196*0, 237; Pereira, Hlstorla de Panama. 237;
Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 207-208.
Actually, there was simultaneous support of
various forms of government: parties in favor of monar
chy, presidency for life within a centralized system of
government, dictatorship, for republican democracy, for
federation, and for separation of Colombia into three
sovereign republics, Venezuela, Ecuador and Nueva Grana
da. Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 195.
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possession of It.

Peruvians also blockaded the coast

of Panama and took some merchant ships from the port of
Panama whose defensive forces had been Increased to
1,000 men.

Bolivar wisely gave command of the forces

against the Peruvians in Guayaquil to the hero of Aya
cucho, General Sucre, who defeated the enemy In Ecuador
near Loja on February 27, 1829.^
Having thus ended the war with Peru, and having
put down revolts In the Cauca and Antioquia, Bolivar
convened a congress in Bogota In January of I830 before
which he gave up his supreme rule. The Congress accepted
his resignation and named as President and Vice-President
of the Republic, Doctor Joaquin Mosquera and General
Domingo Calcedo respectively.

A few days later Bolivar

in
retlr -1 to his quinta, Fucha.
TWO ATTEMPTS TO SECEDE FROM NUEVA GRANADA
The new vice-president took over the duties of
president In the absence of Mosquera.

He renamed as

Military Commandant of the Isthmus the man who had al
ready held that post from 1827 to 1829, General Jos6
Domingo Esplnar.

Esplnar remained again In Panama from

kn

^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 190-191, 197-199•

iii

Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 206-207;
Arce, Compendlo. 208-209#

Sosa and
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I83O to 1831, during which time much turmoil beset the
Isthmus, not only from local Internal sources but also

p

it

from troubles In the central government of Colombia# ^

Ffibrega, now a general, had again taken over the
Province of Panama as prefect, a post equivalent to the
lntendencla held by Sardfi.

Esplnar arrived again as

head of the military, but he became outraged when Mos
quera, now In full power as President, transferred him
Instead to Veraguas.

Mosquera named as Military commmand-

ant of Panama one of his own Liberals, Colonel JosS
Hllarlo L6pez and as civil head, JosS Vallarlno JimSnez.^3
Esplnar*s reaction, Including exiling Vallarlno and
refusing to accept his authority, only brought about
criticisms from the Liberal wing on the Isthmus.

Esplnar,

however, had the backing of the garrison and the masses
who still Idolized Bolivar, whose loyal supporter he had
been.

Hoping to give further support to Bolivar, Esplnar

^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 192; Chong, Hlstorla
de Panamg. 131; Pereira, Hlstorla de Panamg. 21+3.
The date quoted by Sosa and Arce of Esplnar*s arrival on
the Isthmus Is I83I and It does not mesh correctly with
other dates they use for other occurences. It is either
printing errors or carelessness on the part of the authors
that their dates are sometimes not consistent or accurate.
^Alba, Cronologfa. 150; Sosa and Arce, Compendlo.
209. Apparently, one of the reasons that the central
government had become suspicious of Esplnar was his arro
gant refusal to take the oath of loyalty when he took
charge of his duties the second time. Also, President
Mosquera was not In aocord with some of Esplnar*s ideas
/and of course, Esplnar was an avid admirer of Bolivar/.
Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 200-201.
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asked for a formal act favoring Independence from the
government of Bogot&, but he was snubbed by several
prominent men who had the moral support of F&brega
himself.

Further enraged, Esplnar jailed and finally

exiled several Important figures of the Isthmus.

The

Inevitable occurred when on the 10 of September, 1830,
a riot In Panama between the two factions gave Esplnar
the opportunity to seize complete governing

powers

even those of Ftfbrega whom he had confined to Veraguas.^
In spite of the apparent support of the masses, Esplnar
had actually lost the respect of many Isthmians because
he exiled many leaders, persecuted other, closed the
presses, and attempted to rule In such a manner that the
glories he had won during the struggle for emancipation
from Spain were dimmed in the eyes of the people.
Meanwhile, in the interior of Nueva Granada a
counter-revolution broke out in which Sucre was murdered.
In Bogotfi, leaders of the

coup

d*etat against the Consti

tution of I830 sought the renewed leadership of Bolivar,
who refused the offer.
IlIl

The rebels forced President

Alba, Cronologfa. 148; Arosemena, Apuntamlentos
201-206; Chong, Hlstorla de Panama. 131-132.
Esplnar had received advice from Caicedo on one
occasion, while Caicedo still backed Esplnar, to get rid
of Ftfbrega's interference, for he was aware of the innate
discord between those two Isthmians. Alba, Cronologfa.
1^9.
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Joaquin Mosquera to appoint General Rafael Urdaneta as
Secretary of War.

When Mosquera could not stabilize the

situation* the municipal council of Bogota called on
Urdaneta to head the government.^5
The anarchy that was seemingly rampant throughout
Nueva Granada was encouraged In Panama by Esplnar*s
grudges against the government of Mosquera.

This pro

duced desires on the Isthmus to become a fourth state
(along with Venezuela, Ecuador and Nueva Granada) In a
federation, or to secede entirely from Nueva Granada and
seek protection from some European power.^

Finally,

on September 26, 1830, the Junta called by Esplnar to
declare Panama Independent from Nueva Granada,justified
this action by explaining that the Isthmus was neither

^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 208-209? Sosa and
Arce, Compendlo. 210; Gibson, The Constitutions of
Colombia. 109-110.
^ S o intent were several factions of rich and
powerful men of the Isthmus in seceding from Colombia
that Esplnar found it necessary to prevent them from
successfully acquiring the protection they were soli
citing from Great Britain. Chong, Hlstorla de Panama. 133*
However, according to Mariano Arosemena, such a
solicitude was simply a lie that give Esplnar Just ano
ther excuse to take over the entire Isthmian government
and cover up his own desires to secede as a fourth state
within Gran Colombia. Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 132-133*
The United States representatives in Bogota reminded
Washington of the danger of British aggression both at
Panama and the Mosquito Coast. These representatives
were relieved that the rebellion of 1830 on the Isthmus
was crushed, since there was a rumor that Panama had
offered to surrender Its sovereignty to Great Britain for
protection against Bogota. Parks, Colombia and the United
States. I83.
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economically nor morally bound to Nueva G r a n a d a . T h e
appearance of this Justllcatlon this early In the history
of Panama after Its independence from Spain, marked the
beginning of what was to become a trend in the thinking
of various factions and groups on the Isthmus.

Succeeding

attempts to separate the Isthmus from Nueva Granada were
to bear the mark of this justification as a witness to a
growing sense of belonging apart.

Nevertheless, as the

use of this Justification was in its enbryonic stage at
this time, the Junta expressed its desire that Bolivar
himself would come to the Isthmus and be supreme ruler
and being there to put his Colombia together again.

In

other words, the separation was to be temporary until such
time as the Liberator accepted the duties as head of the
Isthmus.
The Province of Panama accepted these conditions,
but not so Veraguas, where Ffibrega had been opposing
Esplnar since his confinement there.

Bolfvar, however,

^Historical sources do not clarify the formation
of this .junta: however, previous examples show that this
type of junta was formed to perform specific and temporary
duties, and was usually composed of leading members of
the community.
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advised Esplnar to relncorporate the Panamanian territory
to Nueva Granada, for the government of Urdaneta, who had
Bolfvar's support, had been recognized by most of the
provinces of Colombia anyway.

The death of Bolfvar in

December of I830 occurred only six days after the mutual
decree that formally reunited the Isthmus with Nueva
kft
Granada. Mosquera and Caicedo resumed power on May 3*
I83I, but only after having signed a previous agreement
with Urdaneta who had lost support with the death of
Bolfvar a few months earlier.^
In the meantime, Esplnar had continued to govern
in Panama.

To assure his strength there he embarked

upon a plan that was to be his undoing.

He decided to

force Fabrega, who continued to oppose his government,
into exile.

Fabrega agreed to leave rather than plunge

his province into bloodshed. 5°

Esplnar also embarked

^®Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 20^, 206, 209; Carles,
A 150 aflos. 11; Pereira, Hlstorla de PanamS. 2bkt Sosa
and Arce, Compendlo. 211-212. Bolfvar died on December
17» I830, on the eleventh anniversary of the creation of
Gran Colombia. His death marked the beginning of the
first open struggles between liberalism and conservatism.
Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia. 375-^26; Parks,
Colombia and the United States. 120- 123.
^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 228; Sosa and Arce,
Compendlo. 211-212; Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia.
110

.

Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 205; Sosa and Arce,
Compendlo. 212.
A letter claimed to be written by Fdbrega to Pablo
Ldpez of Santiago was intercepted and published in the form
of loose sheets. The letter stated Fabrega*s fears of
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upon a military tour of the country to gain more military
and economic support to protect his government.

But Espi-

nar had not counted on betrayal from the officer he had
left in charge while he went to Veraguas.

The Venezuelan

Colonel Juan Eligio Alzuru had been convinced by Espinar*s
enemies in the capital city of Panama to turn against him,
As Esplnar apprached the capital, he was arrested and put
on board a ship that took him to Guayaquil. 51
As the choice between Esplnar and Alzuru turned
out, it was a case of Scylla versus Charybdis, for Alzuru*s
regime was to hatch another attempt at Independence from
Nueva Granada and make another play for power.

Alzuru

first restored all the rights taken away by Esplnar,
maintained some semblance of order and managed to find many
sympathizers on the Isthmus;

but he was afraid that he

might be made to answer for the death of two officers whom
he had executed as spies.

Furthermore, the central govern

ment, already under Mosquera, insisted on the recognition
of the authority of JosS Vallarlno whom Esplnar had not
permitted to take civil command.

Alzuru distrusted Valla

rlno, and wanted to keep military power at all cost.

Esplnar*s ambition and also his pledge for support of any
acts against Esplnar*s rule. Arosemena, Apuntamlentos.

.

206

^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 21^, Pereira, Hlstorla
de Panam£, 2^; Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 212.
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Besides, he had been Influenced by the many exiled offi
cials on the Isthmus, most of them Venezuelans like
Alzuru, who had recently taken part In uprisings in
Ecuador.

For these reasons, Alzuru agitated and Inspired

the more obvious supporters of Independence on the Isthmus
Isthmus, using the same rationalization for such actions
that Esplnar had used— that the Isthmus had no natural or
economic ties with Nueva Granada.

Alzuru's argument

seemed even more reasonable to the poeple of the Isthmus
now that Ecuador and Venezuela had broken away also.^2
Alzuru knew that he could not convert Vallarlno
to this point of view.

Therefore, he relieved him of all

power so that the Junta that he (Alzuru) had called
together to declare Independence could do so unhindered
by Vallarlno.

Thus, on the 9th of July, I83I, another

declaration of Independence from Nueva Granada was read.
One of the Junta's provisions was that Mbrega would take
over the civil government and Alzuru would remain In
charge of the military.

Although Alzuru at first seemed

to comply with this and other provisions, when Ftfbrega
came to the capital to take charge, he found that Alzuru
was Instead going to reserve for himself total power on

^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos, 214- 215? Pereira,
Hlstorla de PanamS. 244; Bosa and Arce, Compendlo. 212213
Venezuela declared herself Independent from
Colombia In 1829; Quito did the same In I83O.

.
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the Isthmus.

Apparently, Alzuru was angered and fright

ened with the arrival In Chagres of a new military command
ant, Colonel Tom&s Herrera, whom the Bogotfi. government had
appointed in June.

The Declaration of Independence had

already been read when Herrera reached Panama, and this
made Alzuru even more anxious to seek full independence,
for he feared retaliation from the central government.
Under the pressures he was experiencing, he overreacted
toward the Liberals in the city of Panama by confiscating
property and exiling prominent individuals;

thus, he

brought upon himself the wrath of many citizens there.
In the meantime, Herrera, who had been provided with
about 160 men of an experienced battalion, decided to
ask for reinforcements from Cartagena.

Prom Chagres he

went to Portobelo to set up protective measures and
reinforcements in case of attack by Alzuru.

He found

that the commissioners that Alzuru had sent to Portobelo
to negotiate a peace settlement were themselves distraught
when they heard the news of Alzuru's rampaging despotism.
Herrera actually felt that Independence from Colombia
was in the best interests of Panama, but he did not think
the country would prosper under the foreign and destructive
elements in power.

Alzuru had created such ill will with

his forced draft and persecution, and by exiling Ftfbrega,
Vallarlno and many other prominent citizens with such lack
of respect for constitutional government, that Josfc de

3^

0baldla and Francisco Pic6n, the delegates he had sent
to Portobelo, abandoned all support of the tyrant and
instead embraced the oause of Herrera. 53
The campaign that Herrera began against the mili
tary forces of Alzuru was to be later reinforced by the
simultaneous campaigns of the exiled F&brega and others
who managed to land in Veraguas with the aid of the very
ship in which they were bound for their exile.

Herrera,

whose army consisted of volunteers from Portobelo and
Palenque in addition to his original force of 160 men,
now counted nearly 700 men.

They sailed up the Chagres

as far as Gorgona, then marched near Panama City at
Farffin, hoping to engage the enemy there.

Only three

days later, Ffibrega reached Chorrera with about 1500 men
whose ranks had been addltionallly reinforced with the
men whom the despot kept at Nat£ under the command of
Colonel JosS Antonio Mird.

Alzuru, on the other hand,

had advanced to La Boca, across the Rfo Grande, and with
the aid of a flotilla of bongos and canoes, had entered
the lands adjacent to Farffin.

Alzuru planned to march

behind Herrera to force him against the river.

Then he

intended to retrace his steps to march to La Chorrera and

-^Arosemena, Apuntftmlentos. 218, 215-220, 222-223*
Pereira, Hlstorla de Panamfl, 2^9; Sosa and Arce,
Compendlo. 213-^15.

dispose of Ffibrega*s force.

But his plan failed because

the superior forced of Herrera overwhelmed him*

Alzuru

had to retreat, not all the way back to La Chorrera, but
as far as Arraign, between La Chorrera and Farfan, a
few miles from Panama City.

There, he decreed violent

death to the Mayor (Alcalde) of the place after finding
that he had prepared provisions for his enemies.
near Arraign that Alzuru
Fabrega

It was

was completely crushed, for

heard of Herrera*s victory at Farfan, and

marched upon Alzuru as he had just turned back to Rfo
Grande.

After a short fight In which Alzuru was caught

between Ffibrega and Herrera, he was captured and led to
the capital.

Herrera and his forces had entered that

city the same day of their victory near Farffin, on the
25 of August, I83I, but had left again to pursue Alzuru.
When Alzuru was brought In to the city, he was tried
before a military court, and was executed together
with some of his main chiefs before the entire army
congregated in the main Plaza on the 29 of August.
ended the second futile attempt to secede

Thus

from the

Central Government In Nueva Granada.
Although the masses were addicted to secession
at this time, rash policies of the leaders of these

-^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos, 22*1-226;
Compend? o. 216, 217,

Sosa and Arce,
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attempts to secede had only alienated

other leaders of

the Isthmus from that cause, leaders who could then only
hope for economic stability and political orderliness from
some other source— namely, Nueva Granada,

Such had been

the case of Obaldfa and Picdn in Portobelo, for example.
Fortunately for the Isthmus, a hopeful, though short-lived
reprieve of comparative progress and peace was about to
begin.

Under the guidance of Herrera the wounds that the

excesses of past administrations had inflicted upon the
little Isthmus began somewhat to heal.

CHAPTER II
THE FREE STATE AND THE FEDERAL STATE

The optimism that prevailed Immediately after
Tom£s Herrera*s victory on the Isthmus In I83I was to
become a fluctuating rather than a stable attitude,
Herrera would lead one more very serious and active
attempt at permanent separation

from Nueva Granada, and
1

Justo Arosemena would continue to work for self-government
In Panama In the struggle that would follow regarding the
recognition of Panama as a state within a federal system."*■
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF NUEVA GRANADA
AND EFFECTS ON THE ISTHMUS
The dissolution of Gran Colombia was now a fact.
At the end of 1831 a convention met at Bogota to form the
central provinces Into the political entity officially
2
known as Nueva Granada.
In I832 the convention elected

■kjusto was the son of Mariano Arosemena whose mem
oirs, Apuntamlentos hlstCrloos are so useful in studying
the Isthmian events of this period up to 18A0. Both father
and son had similar Ideas, though Justo was able to make
fruitful and carry to higher levels the seeds sown by his
father. See: Rodrigo Mir6, Mariano Arosemena (Panama,
I960), 22.
2
The convention assembled In I83I to write a consti
tution for the Republic of Nueva Granada (the present coun
tries of Colombia and Panama). Thirteen provinces, Includ
ing Panama, were represented. However, political chaos in
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Francisco de Paula Santander to be president*^

The

departments were eliminated, the territory was divided
Into provinces, the provinces into cantons, and the
cantons Into parishes.

The Isthmus continued with its

two main divisions— Panama and Veraguas— with Juan JosS
Argote as governor of Panama and General JosS de Fdbrega
as governor of Veraguas. Tomfis Herrera kept the military
Al
command of both areas.
The governors and Herrera took
great interest in trying to smother all ideas regarding
revolution, and tried to instill legal order as firmly as

the south, especially In the Cauca Valley, prevented the
provinces of Cauca, Choco, Pasto and Popayan from sending
delegates, an omission which would lead to further unrest
and political strife In Colombia. Gibson, The Constitu
tions of Colombia. 109-110; Henao and Arrubla, History
of Colombia. ^27-^39; Kirkpatrick, Latin America. 255.
^The constitutional convention elected Santander
as president of the new country and brought him home from
exile. Santander, who in modern times Is considered the
founder of the Liberal Party, was actually conservative
in philosophy. One must understand the basic differences
between the liberal and conservative ideologies to appre
ciate fully Santander*s public support of the Liberals,
while basically being conservative. The Liberals advo
cated federalism, limitation of the Church*s powers and
extension of suffrage. Conservatives, oligarchs, on the
other hand, wanted a centralized form of government, which
the clergy could help them maintain. Santander sympathized
with the Liberals only because he had disapproved of
Bolivar*s plan to unify New Granada, Venezuela and Ecuador.
Jones, Ajj Introduction to Hispanic American History. 361.

ii

Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 219-220.
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possible In order to advance In a new and prosperous
direction.

Their preoccupation regarding unrest was due

partly to demonstrations which had taken place early In
1832.

These were led by a separatist faction which be

lieved that the welfare of the Isthmus required secession
from Nueva Granada, for only then could Isthmians determine
how best to stimulate trade in their land without constant
regard for the interests of Bogotfi.

Even though indivi

duals of high esteem agreed with the separatists, many
others at this time (including Tomfis Herrera) considered
such action subversive and non-conducive to long-lasting
peaceful economic results for the Isthmians, whom they
felt would only have to struggle militarily to remain
permanently free from Colombia.
There were two groups of secessionists.

One group,

led by Mariano Arosemena, wanted Panama to unite with
Ecuador;

and the other, led by JosS de Obaldla, wanted a

Hanseatic Republic under the protection of Great Britain
and the United States.

Obaldfa tried to enlist the aid

of the consuls of these two nations, but he was unsuccess
ful.

The President of Ecuador, Genera.1 Juan JosS Flores,

encouraged the partisans of the idea regarding union with
Ecuador.

A premature attempt at secession, early in I832,

spearheaded by adherents to this particular preference,

^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 231, 232.

40

ended In the execution of two officials of the Ninth
Battalion:

Lieutenant Melchor Dur&n and a Second Lieu

tenant by the name of Casana.

In this way the voices of

discontent were silenced temporarily.^
The Isthmus was convalescent, and internal peace
and constitutional order seemed for the moment to prevail
in spite of the economic problems of the country.

When

Argote began his term, education was almost non-existent,
agriculture was in a sad condition, commerce was at a
standstill, and Panama's exploitation of its geographic
position was merely an unfulfilled desire.

Argote was

relentless in his efforts to strengthen the Panamanian
economy by various peaceful means.

He made serious

efforts to organize the tax system and saw to it that the
monies collected were properly administered.?

Argote was

able to provide new schools and upgrade old ones.

He

established the first tallow candle and straw hat factoories, but any other plans that he might have had for the
economic progress of the province were halted because of
an illness that forced him to take a leave of absence
in September of I833.®

^Castlllero H., Hlstorla de Panamg. 86.
7

fArosemena, Aountamlentos. 232-233.

^Ibld.. 244;

Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 219-220.

The Isthmians continued their struggle to Improve
commerce.

Business groups firmly believed that if the

Isthmus were a totally free port
more commercial activity.9

it would acquire much

Their petitions for free trade

were considered by the Central Government, but on June 13.
I833, it merely lowered the tax to 2%, not taking into
consideration

that the expense of examining cargo and

verifying values of merchandise was a fixed cost necessary
as long as any amount of tax continued to be exacted.
Furthermore, ships with cargo destined for other ports
continued to bypass Panama because article 2 of the law
of June, I833

reqilred them to pay a tonnage fee whenever

they docked in ports of Panama even when they did not dis
embark cargo or passengers. Isthmians continued to demand
that an interoceanic route of some kind be developed and

?Even before independence from Spain, Panamanians
had promoted free commerce through the Isthmus in one way
or another. See Chapter I which deals in part with the
Isthmian petitions to the Crown in the Courts of Cfidiz
regarding commercial franchises.
One of the greatest defenders and promulgators of
commercial improvement on the Isthmus was Mariano Arosemena
himself a businessman, he was aware of the many problems
facing economic ventures on the Isthmus. As he abandoned
his personal enterprises to become more and more active
in public affairs, he transcended his personal interests
in favor of commercial success for all of Panama« Argelia
Tello de Ugarte, ed. Hlstorla y; naclonalldad. edited and
unedited testimonies of Mariano Arosemena (Panama, 1971)»
xix-xxii.
A more cynical view may suggest that Mariano
Arosemena was primarily concerned with his personal
commercial success, though this is not to say that more
complex motivations were not also present in his actions.

42

that Panama be a free port, with no restrictions whatso10
ever.
In I834 the Bogota government at last partly
heeded the wishes of Panamanian elements In favor of
making Panama a free port.

It decreed that on most

products destined to cross the Isthmus or to be embarked
later for other ports, the only charges to be collected
were to be tonnage and warehouse charges If warehouses
were used.

Products Intended for use by the population

of the Isthmus were to be taxed, however, and certain
products such as precious metals still were to be under
duty.-1-3- As for interoceanlc communication, a new surge
of vigor and Interest became apparent In government
circles of Nueva Granada*

In I835 Portobelo and Panama

City were declared absolutely free— no tonnage fees,
anchorage fees, not even storage fees.
be Introduced freely— even liquor.
obstacle to this declaration:

All products could

But there was one big

the law was not supposed

to go Into effect until some sort of transisthmian route
was opened.12

10Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 237-238, 239.
i:LIbld.. 244-245, 251-252, 265;
Hlstorla de Panamfi, 149.

Chong,

^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 244, 251-252.
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In the period from 183*1- to I836 the governor of
Panama was Manuel J. Hurtado, author of the Aot of Inde
pendence of 1821 and former Colombian Minister In London,1^
Although modest progress continued under Hurtado, a new
wave of criticism was evolving.
of the provincial

Local representatives

government were beginning to feel that

rapid progress was checked by the rigorous centralism
Imposed from Bogotfi.

The opinion of Mariano Arosemena,

at this time a representative In the Cdmara Provincial,
seemed to express this attitude towards a centralized
government very clearly:
SI centrallsmo rlguroso de estos tiempos no
permltfa a las secclones terrltoriales emprender
cosa alguna de posltlvo progreso, 1 aun en aquello
en que al parecer se alcanzaba, se vefan burlados
en sus determinedones por el goblerno nacional
no pocas veces, El r£glmen central no satisfacfa
las ecslgenclas de las provincias en sus dlversos
lntereses en el extenso terrltorlo n e o g r a n a d l n o . 1 4
Although general peace and relative progress seemed to
hover over the provinces of Nueva Granada, they soon
vanished as political and economic crises strengthened
criticism against domination from Bogota. ^

■^•3sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 220-221,
^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 2*1-6.
■^under the centralized form of government created
by the Constitution of I832, Santander had begun his rule—
a rule of peace, stability in fiscal matters, and relative
prosperity. Again, as In the years 1822 to 1827, Santander
became a champion of education: he opened new public,
professional and scientific sohools in Colombia,
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THE RUSSELL AFFAIR
At the end of Hurtado's administration the Isthmus
was Involved In a sensational incident that almost caused
war between Nueva Granada and Great Britain.

It arose

over a personal matter between Justo Paredes and Britain's
viceconsul. Joseph Russell.

In the fight whloh followed.

Paredes was wounded by a sword cut on the left nipple and
Russell received blows on his face.

Juan A. Dlez, judge

of the second district court (juez 2° cantonal) and
cousin of Paredes, arrived at the scene, and even though
the two men were already separated, Dlez gave Russell such
a strong blow with his cane that the Briton had to spend
many months in bed.-^

The judge who considered the case

He reduced the Influence of the Church in educational
matters, but he would not pursue a strong policy against
the Church, even though he did encourage religious toler
ation and even Protestant missionaries. Among his other
reforms were the improvement of business and the ending
of the conflict with Spain.
Santander managed to lead Colombia through four
years of peace and prosperity, but he failed to achieve
peace with the followers of Bolfvar. Indeed, M s
antagonism toward them led him to exclude them from
public office and even to persecute them. T M s anta
gonism between Santander and his enemies was further
augmented by his decision to assume in the name of the
new country half of the debt created by Gran Colombia.
This situation, in part, led to the defeat of Santander's
candidate, JosS Marla Obando, in the election of 1837.
Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia. Ill; Henao and
Arrubla, History of Colombia. 435-439; Jones. An
Introduction'to Hispanic American History. 361-362;
Kirkpatrick, Latin America. £54.
•^Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 220-221.
The accounts differ, for Mariano Arosemena infers

M

condemned Hussell to six years In the stockade, assigned
him the cost of the trial, and did not penalize Dlez for
the assaults against Hussell,

Great Britain, aware of

the strange sentence, demanded the Immediate release of
Hussell, Indemnity to Russell for damages and injuries,
dismissal of the judicial authorities who had not
complied with their duties, and the re-opening of the
consular office which had been closed.
By the time that Pedro de Obarrio took office in
February, 1836, as the new governor of Panama, the
Russell Affair was worse.

Great Britain had sent a

squadron to the Atlantic to blockade the coast of Nueva
Granada and a warship to the port of Panama to enforce
British demands.

Governor Obarrio was forced to take

defense measures, for the National Government had resolved
not to give way to British pressures.

Fortunately,

General Josd Hilario Ldpez instigated peaceful measures

that Hussell continued to resist,thus provoking Dlez*s
attack. Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 263.
According to one version there was a fight between
the two men, Paredes and Russell, in the streets on the
night of November 20th. Paredes was severely wounded;
the cries of his wife attracted people and Russell was
knocked down without ceremony, after having been dis
armed; then he was hurried to prison. Niles Weekly
Register. LI (February 11, I837), 369.
The New Orleans, True American states that in
consequence of the incarceration of the British consul
by authorities of Nueva Granada, A British squadron was
blocking some of the ports. Niles Weekly Register. LI
(February 18, 1837), 385.
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to end the dispute.

Though many Panamanians expressed

disdain toward the solution, in December of I836 the
Nueva Granada Government paid an indemnity of 1000
pounds sterling and annulled the sentence given to
Hussell.17

The entire affair was apparently viewed by

Colombians as an excuse on the part of Great Britain
to gain control of the Isthmus of P a n a m a . T h i s could
possibly explain Colombia*s decision to satisfy Britaln*s
demands and thus avoid further involvement against
British force.

However, it appears that if Britain was

actually looking for an excuse to take over Panama at this
1

time, the indemnity it required of Colombia would have

^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 262-264; Castillero
H., Hlstorla de Panamd. 8 7 : Sosa and Arce, Compendlo.
221.
Some years before, Cartagena was involved in a
similar affair when an alcalde and a French colonel
(Adolfo Barrot) were at odds with each other. France
demanded apologies by storming the plaza with troops
from Martinique. The overbearing attitude of France
illiclted the following opinion from Mariano Arosemena,
who implied that this type of reaction on the part of
European governments was all too commons "Ha sldo una
prSctica en los gobiernos europeos pretender que se
prescinda en los casos de conflicto con las repttblicas
suramerlcanas, de las vfas constitucionales 1 legales
para ser satisfechos en sus ecsigencias. Un gobierno de
leyes como el de la Nueva Granada tenia que preferir en
la ocurrencia con la Francia, ver bloqueado i aun
bombardeado uno de sus puertos por marinos franceses,
a presentarse degradado 1 envilecido ante el mundo
civllizado por evitar unos cuantos golpes de caffdn."
Apuntamlentos. 242.
^®See: William R. Manning, Diplomatic Corres
pondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs.
1831-1860. Vol V (Washington, 1935). 551-552,557-558.
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been greater, to make it almost impossible for Colombia
to readily accede to its payment.

Since this was not

the case, perhaps, therefore, Colombia's fears were
actually unfounded,
POLITICAL TURMOIL
AND ECONOMIC DEPRESSION

Notwithstanding the negative publicity surrounding
the Russell incident, the administration of Pedro de
Obarrio was a dedicated one,

Obarrio was able to give

education an impulse with available resources.

On July 16,

I836, the first school for girls was opened in the dis
trict of Santa Ana, and that year schools in Chepo and
on the island of San Miguel were also established.

These

schools were to be maintained with money from the fifth
part of the revenues from

l i q u o r . 3^

While popular education made some advance, there
were serious setbacks in other areas, due in part to
the political situation within the Central Government. In
New Granada's presidential elections of I836, JosS Ignacio
Mdrquez, a moderate Liberal, won.

His victory came as

the result of a split in the Liberal Party over two other
candidates;

General Josd Marfa Obando and Vicente Azuero,

■^Castillero h ., Historla de Panamtf. 87*
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a radical Liberal.

20

government in 1837.

Mfirquez took over the reins of
The relative progress which the

Liberals had been able to achieve on the Isthmus was
21

stifled by M&rquez, according to Liberal views, A

even

though in other parts of the country he followed liberal
policies in government, such as encouraging public
education, reducing the size of the standing army and
stimulating industry.

22

He was aware that the

20

Obando was considered undesirable by many
Liberals because of his alleged role in the "crimen de
Berruecos" (the murder of Jose de Sucre), and his scarce
political talents.
Azuero represented a small group of radicals,
some of whose desired reforms were too far ahead of the
times and some too utopic. Although Azuero was one of
the leading and most vigorous intellectual and political
figures of Colombia, his advanced ideas in matters of
religion and politics had brought upon him the emnity
even of other Liberals.
Mrquez was of impeccable morality and public
reknown, with authentic political talents.
The elections brought no majority to any candidate
and the election in the Congress gave M&rquez his victory.
JosS Dolores Moscote and Enrique J. Arce, ^ vida elemplar
de Justo Arosemena (Panama, 1956), 36-38, hereafter
cited as Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena.
^Arosemena, Apuntamientos. 267.

22
Mfirquez's administration was almost overthrown
when the Congress of I838 passed a measure that suppressed
a few deserted convents in Pasto and set aside their income
and half of their property for the support of education
in Pasto. Although the measure had been suggested by the
bishop of PopaySn and supported by representatives of
the province, the people of the area Involved thought it
was an attempt to overthrow their religion. Thus, a
rebellion led by a priest followed, and the government
had to use force in bringing the revolutionists under
control. But peace was short-lived: war soon broke out
again. This time it was led by the candidate of Santander's
party. General Jos£ Marfa Obando who claimed to be fighting

representatives from the Isthmus had whole-heartedly
opposed him publicly in the Bogotfi Congress and in the
news media.

His antipathy for the Panamanians, and his

political allegiance to other political sectors who had
supported him (though according to some reports he was
notably impartial) created an air of indifference toward
Panama and thereby, a series of economic regressions.
Even the usual legal processes needed to transact serious
business were neglected and indeed ceased to exist on
the Isthmus for over a year because there was no Judi
cial machinery with final authority from the Central
Government.
Since the Isthmus still lacked good means of
communication,, the new ills compounded the misery and
ruin evident everywhere in the provinces of Panama and
Veraguas. 23

At this time the designate Minister of

for a federal system. The government, however, finally
defeated Obando in Pasto. Again, the victory was only
temporary, for uprisings continued almost all over the
country. Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia. *<40*<49» Jones, An Introduction to Hispanic American
History. 362; Kirkpatrick, Latin America. 255-256.
President Mrquez was supposed to have wanted to
sell part of the Colombian territory (probably the
Isthmus) to the British. Hob Roy MacGregor, "The Treaty
of 18*1-6 (Seventeen Years of Amerlcan-Colombian Relations)
1830-18*»-6," (Ph.D. dissertation, Clark University,
1929), 1*1*0.
2^Alba, Cronologla, 162; Arosemena, Apuntamlentos
267; Castlllero R., Hlstorla de Panamg, 87; Chong, Hlstorla de PanamS. 150; Moscote ancT Arce. Justo Arosemena. **5
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Nueva Granada to Ecuador, the well-known man of letters.
Doctor Ruflno Cuervo, arrived in Panama on his way to his
post and was so shaken by the economic decadence of
Panama City— numerous buildings in ruins, multitudes of
vagrants roaming the streets in search of Jobs, prices
sunken to unbelievable levels— that .in a famous letter
to a friend in Bogota he wrote this sentence:

"Anyone

who wishes to know Panama had better come quickly because
it is ending,
This sad situation was made even worse by the
civil war that was developing in Nueva Granada and that
threatened to engulf the Isthmus,

The political victory

of Mdrquez and his administrative policies had engene
dered much ill feeling among the Liberals who had lost
the election. Intertwined with these antipathies was the
strong desire to form a federal government.

In 1840

many provinces declared themselves states within a
federal system and armed themselves.

The resulting

fratricidal war was bloody indeed,25

2^Castlllero R,, Hlstorla de Panam£. 8?; Sosa and
Arce, Compendlo. 221-223, Translated from the Spanish,
which read: "El que quiera conocer a PanamS que venga,
porque se acaba."
25lbld.. Arosemena, Apuntamlentos, 282-284,
See footnote 22.

t
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THE FREE STATE OF THE ISTHMUS
When the civil war exploded in Nueva Granada,
Carlos de Icaza was governor of Panama and Carlos
F^Tbrega was governor of Veraguas,
still military leader.

Tomds Herrera was

The echoes of the war hastened

the union of Isthmians against active Involvement and
strengthened within them a desire to secede completely
from Nueva Granada and thus avoid the horrors of war
and the economic disasters it always brought to the
Isthmus.2^

Some leaders, however, were hesitant about

the permanent success of secession at this time.

One

of these men, Justo Arosemena, (who was later to be
greatly Instrumental in gaining legal statehood for
Panama) realized that final separation without military
strength to uphold such an entity as Herrera proposed was
a passionate but unrealistic dream, and he preferred
not to participate whole-heartedly in the venture which
was destined to end with grave consequences for the
leaders of the Isthmus.

Instead, he advocated separation

only for the duration of the war, and only as a means of
maintaining neutrality in it.

Justo Arosemena was not a

petty man, however, and in spite of his reservations, he

2^Alba, Cronologfa. 159, l6l; Pereira, Hlstorla de
Panamg, 25^; Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 223-226.
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he did assist In maintaining peaoe and order In the
bureaucratic work of the new nation, the Free State of
the Isthmus, becoming an lndlspensible aid to Tom&s
Herrera,

In the years that followed, his idea of

attaining statehood through the legislative processes,
was the idea that would predominate on the Isthmus,
Even though later Tomas Herrera was to support
such an Idea, in 18^0 he preferred to attempt irrevo
cable Independence,^ Herrera's experience on the Isthmus
had led him to consider what previously had come to his
attention when he had defeated Alzuru— that while
Panama's best Interests did not lie in its close ties
to Nueva Granada, they did not lie in the hands of
selfish and greedy leadership either.

This is why he

had not always supported independence.

But at this

moment, the turmoils of war which threatened the Isthmus
were

too strong, and Herrera perhaps felt that he was

now called to be the leader Panama needed.

His own

words testify to some of the thoughts that were assailing
him and to the reasons for his support of independence
at this time:

2?Alba, Cronologla. 159, 161; Chong, Hlstorla de
Panam£. 15^» Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena.
Pereira, Hlstorla de Panamg. 25^; Ugarte, Hlstorla £
Naclonalldad. xxvi.
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Ciertamente, la raz6n apoyada por la
experlencla tlene atestado, vosotros ciudadanos
lo sab51s, que este pafs, de una naturaleza
singular en el globo, lnfltllmente ha esperado
y esperarfa prosperar, sometldo a ser un
apSndlce Irregular de Nueva Granada, cuyos
altos poderes Jam£s conocleron nl conocer6n sus
necesldades, nl podr£n satlsfacerlas. El Istmo
debe al movlmlento mercantll del mundo clvlllzado
los servlclos para que lo ha destlnado el ser
supremo, acercando entre sf los ocdanos y
abatlendo en 51 la alta cordillera de los Andes.
Herrera accepted the request to head the new
government as president of the republic.

Because the

garrison In Panama adhered to the act of separation
upheld by the "deliberating" popular assembly of
November 18, 18^0, t

j

had formed the Free State of the

Isthmus, he found no Immediate obstacles to his new
position.

But Governor Carlos FSbrega of Veraguas

refused to second the movement until Herrera marched to
Santiago with troops.
A convention was held In June of 18^1 to proclaim
the State and ratify the popular act of November 18, to
formulate the constitution of the state, sind to elect
a Chief and Vlce-Chlef— positions unanimously conceded to
OQ
Quoted by Chong, Hlstorla de Panama, 151. This
Is part of a speech Herrera gave toThe Congress of the
new nation, as President of the Estado Libre del Istmo.
The writings of Herrera In 18^1 are very enlighten
ing with respect to his Justifications regarding Inde
pendence and his acceptance of the presidency at this
time. See; Concha Pena, Tomds Herrera (Panama, 195*0»
69-75. for copy of an allocution written by Herrera
and published In September of 18^1 In L& Gaceta del
Istmo. the official publication of his government.
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Herrera and Icaza.

However, Bogotfi did not recognize this

secession, basing Its stand on the claim that Panama had
become united with Colombia In 1821 as a federative
nation and not as an Independent entity.

The position

of the Central Government acquired strength as It defeated
the Insurgents In the central parts of Nueva Granada, and
re-established Itself In these areas.

Panama was well

aware of Its weak military defenses against a solidified
army from Nueva Granada,
Besides the obvious lack of arms to combat
Nueva Granada, the Panamanians became apprehensive about
the possibility of a military take over by the British
In Bocas del Toro and the consequent International
repercussions Involved,

The English wanted control over

lands which might be exploited for purposes of building
a canal.

They had landed in various parts of Central

America, and under the pretext of supporting the unifi
cation and the claims of the Mosquito Indians, they had
also landed In Bocas del Toro on the Isthmus,

The

question of this abuse of strong nation over weaker ones

2^Alba, Cronologfa. l6l; Chong, Hlstorla de
Panamd. 151-152. Pereira, Hlstorla de Panama.“?5^255:
Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 223-226.
Costa Hlca recognized the Isthmian State, Don
Pedro de Obarrio was named plenlpotenclarlo to Costa
Hlca. The United States did not recognize Panama even
though Panama sent a diplomatic representative to
Washington. Pereira, Hlstorla de Panama. 25**.
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was aired diplomatically.

Papers were compiled and sent

to the consul and to the Governor of Jamaica by Mariano
Arosemena, Minister of the Treasury;

but before any

military action developed between Panama and Great Britain,
the Isthmians had once again rejoined Nueva Granada.
The Free State lasted about thirteen months,
during which time the Government of Nueva Granada crushed
military uprisings in the interior of the country and
prepared a military expedition to Invade the Isthmus.
However, General Tomfis C. de Mosquera, the hero who had
stopped the uprisings, wanted to exhaust all possibilities
for a peaceful settlement with the Panamanians before
attempting force.

Realizing the military weakness of

their position, the Isthmians signed a treaty on December
31, 18*H, which re incorporated the Isthmus into Nueva
Granada.3^

3QAiba.Cronologla. 162-165; Moscote and Arce,
Justo Arosemena. 53; Ugarte, Hlstorla y naclonalldad. xxv.
The author strongly believes that fear on the part
of the Panamanians of Britain's designs had definite
influence on their decision to rejoin Nueva Granada.
3-^Pereira, Hlstorla de Panam£. 25^-255? Sosa and
Arce, Compendlo. 223-226.
At first Mosquera commissioned Julio Arboleda to
speak with the leaders of the Isthmus; when he did not get
positive results, he sent two men to negotiate reentry into
New Granada; these men were Colonel Anselmo Pineda and
Doctor Ricardo de la Parra, commissioned by Doctor Rufino
Cuervo and recommended by General Juan Jos6 Flores,
President of Ecuador,
Ibid.
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In spite of assurances to the contrary, Herrera
and Icaza were exiled,^

The Nueva Granadlnes had mis

understood the Intent and motives of Herrera and his
followers In this secession, and looked upon It as some
sort of "lesa patria".

Thus, to them, It was appropriate

to further subjugate, humiliate and control the Isthmus
with greater force than before.

The dishonesty with which

Herrera was treated only heated Panamanian passions against
the Central Government of Nueva Granada.

The new governors

from Bogot^ were not able to restore complete tranquility
in the period Immediately following reincorporation of
the Isthmus.

Lack of security, intrigues against those

who had been connected with the Free State of the Isthmus,
added to the tactics of many Isthmians who hoped to
Ingratiate themselves with the renewed centralized govern
ment, created an air of unrest and ominous ill-will.
Even young men like Justo Arosemena had to exile them
selves, at least for one or two years, after losing even
such non-political positions as that of school master.-^

32

J Herrera was stripped of his military rank until
1844, when under Mosquera's regime he. was reinstated and
promoted to general. Chong, Hlstorla de Panama. 153;
Pereira, Hlstorla de Panama. 255*
33chong, Hlstorla de Panamfi, 155;
Arce, Justo Arosemena. 58-59.

Moscote and
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ADMINISTRATIONS AFTER THE REINCORPORATION
OF THE ISTHMUS IN NUEVA GRANADA
Towards the middle of 18*4-2, the Panamanian Miguel
Chiarl came from Bogotfi to assume the governorship of
Panama.

He was a man of moderate character and high

intellect and was considered the individual most able to
govern the Isthmus and calm the unrest caused by the end
of the Free State.

He had held many important public

posts within the Central Government.

During his short

term in office, Chiarl opened a school in Portobelo, made
the capital more sanitary by constructing an aqueduot,
and campaigned vigorously against pettifoggers who
entangled and prolonged lawsuits with the idea of exploit
ing the litigants.

Though he was certainly the man for

the times, his health and pressing personal problems
forced him to resign.

Fortunately for the Isthmians,

another enlightened man came to replace him as governor
in 18^3— Colonel Anselmo Pineda from the Province of
Antloqula.

Pineda founded a philanthropic society whose

objective was to promote the betterment of the popular
masses, that is, to improve their intellectual, moral
and religious education, to eradicate vices, to improve
the economic condition of the province, to instill the
habit of saving and the love of work.

In short, these

men represented the Romantic good will which the Enlighten
ment had made possible.

It was Pineda who recalled from
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Peru the well-educated and enlightened Justo Arosemena
to establish his new school system.

With the help of men

like Arosemena, Pineda established schools on Sundays for
the Instruction of workers, and various hat-making schools
In Penonome, Los Santos and Panama.
from Tollma.

He brought teachers

In like manner, he opened shoe-making s

schools In Parlta and In Panama;
walls of the capital repaired;

he had the roads and
he built Jails, and

established a police body to deal with criminals and
vagabonds.^
It was during this period that world commercial
activities had a real Influence on the Isthmus of
Panama.

Since Its emancipation from Spain, Europeans

had considered Hispanic America a promising market for
their goods.

However, speculators overrated the buying

power of that market, and over-production caused a great
number of economic and commercial losses in Europe In
1845.

By then#the American continents had savored

certain luxuries which they were reluctant to give up,
and thus, they continued to create a demand that had not

^Carles, A 150 Anos. 19*20; Moscote and Arce,
Justo Arosemena. 107-111; Sosa and Arce, Compendlo.

224-225,
When Pineda became governor there were only five
schools functioning In the province. He increased the
number to twelve by opening schools In Macaracas,
Penonome, Parlta, Natgt and Antan for boys and in La
Chorrera and La Villa de los Santos, for girls.
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been there before, and which to some degree Increased
commercial exchange between the Old and the New

W o r l d s . ^3

This period, though short, was one of hope and enthusiasm
on the Isthmus,

The interest that Pineda took in the

improvement of institutions, and the new interests In
navigation and transoceanic possibilities that were
apparent, led to order and peace.

The Isthmians forgot

momentarily their grievances against the Central
Government and Instead prevailed upon each other to
uplift the economy and positive activities in P a n a m a . ^
To supply commercial and mail service between
England and the West Indies, the Royal Mail Steam
Packet Company was founded in 1839.
ary

By 18*1-6 the itiner

came to include the Isthmus. Connections were made

with the steamers of th Pacific Navigation Company
(chartered in England

in 18*1-0 as the result of the

efforts of William Wheelwright, an American businessman)
using a canoe-and-mule line across the Isthmus.

Thus

the city of Panama on the Pacific and the town of Chagres
on the Atlantic began to show signs of a modest economic
life, perhaps even

something of a commercial

renaissance.

37

35Berthold Seemann, Hlstorla del Istmo de Panama.
trans. Santiago D. McKay (Panama, 19597t”59-90.
^Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 11*1-.
^John Haskell Kemble, The Panama Route. 18*1-8-1869
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 19^3» 3» Seemann. falstorla del Ist
mo de Panama, 90; Sosa and Aroe.Compendlo. 225-226.
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President Mosquera named Tomtfs Herrera governor
of Panama in 1845, and he continued in that position
until 1849 through part of the administration of Mosquera's successor, General Hllarlo LCpez.^®

On the local

plane, Herrera paralleled LOpez's liberal national
reforms.39
It was during Herrera*s administration that the
rush to the gold fields in California began.

Consequently,

serious negotiations were undertaken for a railroad that
would accommodate the potential number of passengers

3®Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 226. Pineda was re
placed temporarily in 1845 by Jos5 de Obaldfa who in turn
was replaced for seven months by Joaqufn Marfa Barrlga.
Ibid.
39-rhe years 1849 to 1857 saw the Liberals in con
trol of the government. Inspired by the European revolu
tions of 1848, the Liberals succeeded in electing General
JosS Hilario Ldpez to the presidency. L6pez*s reforms and
anti-clericalism began with his exiling of the Jesuits.
He continued his anti-clerical measures by making the
bishops and clergy responsible to the ordinary tribunals,
not only in criminal and civil cases, but also for failure
in their religious duties. Further, he made civil ser
vants out of the clergy, which henceforth would be paid
and supervised by the government. Any member of the
clergy who protested would be exiled. Such strong mea
sures led to several Conservative revolts which in turn
led to stronger anti-clerical measures. Finally, Church
and State were separated in the Constitution of 1853.
Gibson, The Constitutions of .Colombia. 191-194; Henao
and Arrubla, History of Colombia.455-468: Kirkpatrick,
Latin America. £57.
During L6pez*s administration, the contract with
the railroad was signed, and work began for the railroad
of Panama; together with the Gold Rush to Californa, it
precipitated shady land speculation in which some high
officials— even ex-president Mosquera— were involved.
Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 177-179*

through the Isthmus to and from the West Coast.

Herrera

increased the port facilities and available methods of
transportation, bettered school and hospital facilities,
and in general was notable and admirable in his efforts
to combat the problems that assailed the Isthmus with
the influx of such vast numbers of people as the Gold
Rush brought to Panama.

Among these problems were the

serious epidemics of cholera that broke out on the
Isthmus.
When Herrera was named

Secretary of War by

President Lopesi in 18^9. be left the Isthmus for Bogota.
He was replaced by Jos& de Obaldfa during whose adminis
tration detailed plans for the construction of the rail
road (already under way) continued to be discussed,
and slaves were emancipated (1852).^®
THE PROVINCES OP CHIRIQUI
AND AZUERO ARE CREATED

Important administrative changes occurred about
this time in the interior of the Isthmus.

The canton

of Alanje was separated from the Province of Veraguas
in 18^9 to form a new political entity— the Province of

^°Castillero R,, Hlstorla de Panamd. 91-92;
Carles, A 150 aflos. 20; Moscote and Arce, Justo Arose
mena. 31” Pena. Tomgs Herrera. 96-97; Sosa and Arce
ftompendlo. 227.
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Chlriquf.

In 1850, the new

province of Azuero, made

up of the cantons of Parlta, Los Santos and district of
Santa Marla of the Province of Panama, was legally recog
nized.

The first governors of the new provinces were

named by the National Executive Power, but after 1853 the
governors of every province were elected by popular
vote.^

Each new province was allotted seven dlputados

to the national congress.

Of the four provinces that

now made up the Isthmus, the most convulsive was Azuero;
its disorder resulted from the plays for power and
influence of two powerful families in the province,
families separated more by personal antagonisms than
politics.

Because of the scandalous political behaviour

in the Azuero province, the Granadine Congress eliminated
it in 1855 by adding a major part of it to the territory
of Veraguas.
ADMINISTRATIONS DURING THE
BUILDING OP THE RAILROAD
Since the history of the railroad will be dealt
with in the next chapter, and the experiences of the

^Ernesto Castillero R..Chlriquf (Panama,1968), 39;
Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 232. Santiago Agnew, first pop
ularly elected governor of the Chlriquf was great great
grandfather of the author. With the Isthmus as a Federal
State, which became a reality in 1855* Chlriquf had four
dlputados, among them Juan Nepomuceno Venero, great grand
father of the author.
^Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 232.
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Forty-Niners in the following one, it suffices to say here
that the civic and political necessities of the Isthmus
were locally bound to those two circumstances.

Attempts

were made by governors Bernardo Arce Mata (sometimes
spelled Arze de Mata) and Doctor Salvador Camacho Rold&n
(both appointed in 1853) to improve the safety of towns
and thoroughfares by providing better policing and public
lighting in the streets of Panama City and elsewhere.
In order to alleviate the long and costly processes of
the law, Judges were requested to expedite their cases so
that innocent people would hot have to suffer unjust and
long imprisonment before their trials.

Not only the

traveler, but also cargo, was to be protected,-and
assassins and robbers whose imprisonment needed to be as
secure as possible were sent to Jail in Cartagena.

The

Isthmus was suffering from the depravations of numerous
bands of criminals who robbed and murdered to such a
degree that there were daily scenes of blood on the
Cruces Trail, especially during the early years of the
Gold R u s h . Previously in 1851, Ran Runnels, an
energetic Texan with knowledge of ’'border town" Spanish,
had been brought to the Isthmus.

He was supported by the

Railroad Company, some maritime enterprises and several

^ I b l d . . 233, 235;

Alba, Cronologfa. 1?7*

6k

prominent Panamanian citizens In his organization of a
police guard— a sort of vigilante group which became
known as the "Isthmian Guard".
the Isthmus of bandits.

Its objective was to rid

The police guard caught, Jailed

and even hanged some of the bandits.

On March 1, 1855#

when the Government of Nueva Granada was again able to
protect life and property on the Isthmus, this vigilante
group was abolished.

JLlJLl

Although foreigners were to be forced to obey the
laws, they were also given consideration.

Many humble

but necessary conveniences were created for their use,
such as the construction of public toilets.

The National

Guard had been reorganized to serve as an auxiliary force
to the police of the province, and school buildings were
repaired.

The canton that included the city of Panama

had to bear the heaviest share of the cost of provincial
administration because of expenses incurred publicly in
behalf of the great number of travelers through the city

Aj-Zj.

For dates used, sees Joseph L. Schott, Ralls
Across Panama (Indianapolis, 1967), 93. Sosa and Arce
Compendlo. 235. A careful analysis of the dates used or
implied by Sosa and Arce reveals conflicting statements
and dates. With the railroad finished in January of 1855.
why would there surge crime afterward on the Cruces Trail
and why would the Railroad Company expend such energy in
protecting it? Obviously, Ran Runnel*s group was formed
much earlier. Thus, we accept the dates used by Schott.
It may be noted, also, that according to Schott, Runnels
was still on the Isthmus in I856.

65

at this

t i m e . ^5

Since after 1853. governors on the Isthmus were to
be elected rather than appointed, Arce Mata, the governor
who had been In office In Panama, ran for election In
185*4-.

Though Arce Mata had been an effective governor,

he was the candidate of the Conservatives and lost to the
Liberal candidate, JosS Marfa Urrutla Afllno, partly
because he did not use hl3 position as governor to enhance
his campaign.^

Unfortunately for the Panamanians, they

made an unwise choice in this election.
ADMINISTHATION OP URRUTIA ANINO

Urrutla Afflno began his governorship on January 1,
1855*

Shortly thereafter, in the same month, the

railroad was basically completed, an event which gave
much hope to the Panamanians.

However, the problems of

maintaining law and order on the Isthmus had become very
serious.

Troops which would ordinarily have been used to

suppress crime, were instead deployed in the central
provinces of Nueva Granada to supress the 185*4— 1855
4-7

*

Melo Revolt. '

When the garrison in Panama left in 1855

*j.«r

•'Carles, A 150 affos. 21;

Sosa and Arce, Compendlo.

23**.
^Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 23*4-.
^?More will be explained about this revolt and its
effects on the formation of the FecLeral State of Panama.
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to put down the Melo Revolt, the Isthmus suffered even
more deparavations at the hands of criminals;

Thus, the

vigilantes under the leadership of Ran Runnels were neces
sarily quite active, Urrutla Affino was later blamed for
this situation because he had spent several weeks with
his family in Natfi and had made it impossible, according
to his critics, for the wheels of Justice and public
safety to turn effectively.

For this reason he was

removed from his position by the then vice-president
of the Republic, Doctor Manuel Marfa Mallarlno.

ilR

THE FEDERAL STATE OF PANAMA

The agitated state of affairs during the Gold Rush
as well as the philosophical ideas of the times seemed to
favor the yearnings of many Isthmians for an autonomous
life for the territory.

The failure of separation

attempts in I83O and 1840 had not stamped out these
desires.

The philosophical history of federalism, an off

shoot of European philosophies of the times, was exempli
fied on the Isthmus in the thoughts of Justo Arosemena,

^Carles, a 150 aflos. 21; Pefla, Tomgs Herrera.
Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 235.
Probably the Melo Revolt, related to President
JosS Marfa 0bando*s disregard of the Constitution of
1853» had bearing on the upsurge of crime on the Isthmus,
because surely troops from Colombia could not be spared
to keep law and order on the Isthmus.
123;
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the promulgator of the theories which Justified the
federal state In

P a n a m a ,

and which he expressed In

writing In his famous pamphlet El Estado Federal de
Panama.

His point of departure was within the framework

of a scientific or positivistic approach which consi
dered the Interests of society and Its freedom the
basis of all government.

To achieve this, Arosemena

argued, sovereignty was undeniably necessary, for the
closer freedom was applied to the atom of society (the
individual) the truer the freedom achieved.Compeared
to other federalist philosophies in which the national
unity superceded federal rights, and In which secession
was intolerable, Arosemena*s Ideas might have seemed

^That we may better grasp the notability of
Justo Arosemena's part In the history of Panama, it may
be well to note that the best national writers and
historians of Panama, of all Inclinations and tendencies,
have written many pages concerning his work: Ricardo J.
Alfaro, Octavio Mendez Pereira, Eusebio A. Morales,
Guillermo Andreve, Jose de la Cruz Herrera, J. D. Moscote,
J. I. F&brega, Enrique J. Arce, Diggenes de la Rosa,
Catallno Arrocha Graell; and of the younger generation
of mature wirters: Carlos Manuel Gasteazoro, Rodrigo
Mlrg, Ismael Garcfa S., Rlcaurte Soler and Alfredo
Castillero Calvo. Jorge Ffibrega P., ed. El estado
federal de Panama by Justo Arosemena (Panama, 1965)« lx-x.
^^Ricaurte Soler, Pensamlento panameffo y ooncepolgn
de la naclonalldad durante el slglo XIX (Panama■ 1971).

radical;^

gdlgota

and Indeed he was a vocal member of the

faction-extreme Liberals— who now considered

decadent the Liberal party led by such men as Obando.^2
Arosemena had developed his Influences and esteem through
his dedicated work as a member of the House In Bogota.
When he was elected Speaker of the House In 1852, he
felt that his persuasive powers were at their highest
level and that the time was ripe to Introduce his project.
Thus In 1853 be Introduced a proposal for the creation
of the Federal State of Panama.

Although impressive,.

this proposal created much debate.

Those who opposed

him, including some members of his own family, felt there
were several reasons for turning down such an Idea.

The

reforms In the Constitution of 1853 were felt to substan
tially increase the local voice of the Panamanians in
their government, thus limiting negative Influences from
Bogotfi upon their way of life and their economy.

Others

felt that setting up an independent bureaucracy would not
only be expensive, but It would make elections difficult
to control and keep honest, and there would not be enough
qualified and enlightened Panamanians to fill the
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We could perhaps make a contrast to Abraham
Lincoln's insistence upon unity later In the United States
^2Soler, Pensamlento panameffo, 85;
Arce, J usto Arosemena. 105-187.

Moscote and
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necessary bureaucratic positions.^3

The popular masses,

for psychological-social causes, were not In favor of
cih,
statehood.-'
However, Arosemena had some powerful sup*
porters, Including General Tomgts Herrera

who, In spite

of previous personal antlpathj.es, was not a petty man and
struggled for Ideas rather than for personalities.
too, as time passed

Then

new personnel in the Isthmian legis

lature turned in favor of Arosemena*s stand, for in spite
of its liberal measures, the Constitution of 1853 was not
totally satisfactory to them.
Unfortunately for Justo Arosemena* a coup d*6tat
in 185^ delayed further consideration of his plan in
Congress, and caused him to lose the valuable support
of Tom5s Herrera who died during the uprising.

This

coup d*6tat shook the entire nation on the 17th of April,
185^ while Josd Marfa Obando was still president.
led by General JosS Marfa Melo.

It was

Obando, as well as

other more traditional Liberals had manifested disapproval
of. the 1853 reformed constitution-^

and had refused to

53Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 198-199*
Rlcaurte Soler, ed., prologue, Teorfa de la nac 1onalldad
(Panama, 1968), 13.
cZl

FSbrega, El estado federal de Panama, viii.

55Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 218-219.
^Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia. 191-19^i
Henao and Arrubla. History of Colombia. 455-458: Kirk
patrick, Latin America. 257.
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fire Melo who was Involved In a criminal tiral.

Melo

declared himself a dictator when he could not convince
Obando to take on such a dire responslbllty himself*

Tom&s Herrera, who was In Bogota at this time, escaped
and hid until the Vicepresident, Jos£ de Obaldla, had
had a chance to find asylum In the legation of the
United States.

Then Herrera went north, talked the

people Into supporting the legitimate government and
later received the support of many of Melo's own officers. r

Nevertheless, Herrera was killed trying to

squelch Melo's f o r c e s . I t is possible however, that
Herrera's perennial heroism may well have continued to
influence the impulse favoring statehood for Panama
long after his death.
After the defeat of Melo and the capture of
Bogota, and because of the Inability of the different
wings of the Liberal Party to get together lastingly, a
Conservative, Doctor Manuel Marla Mallarlno, was elected
president in 1855»

Mallarlno, however, not having full

control and realizing that the Radicals had helped restore

57Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 218-219;
Peffa, Tom£s Herrera. 123-1*17.
5®PeKa, Tomgs Herrera. 1^6-1*17.
The legitimate forces prevailed, however, and Melo
was exiled. Obando was deposed as president but acquitted
of treason by the Supreme Court. Henao and Arrubla,
History of Colombia. *171-^72. See: Moscote and Arce,
J_usto Arosemena. 228-230, for a partial account of Obando's
trial.
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the government, formed a coalition government.

Because

several provinces under Conservative control wanted
statehood during this time, the Conservative Party became
federalist.

It has been

claimed that the former central

ists became federalists because the Conservatives were
dissatisfied with the separation of Church and State in
the Constitution of 1853 and wanted local autonomy in
order to afford a safe place for the "victims 11 of
liberalism.

However, Conservative adoption of federalism

was more a matter of expediency than of principle.

By

supporting federalism, the Conservatives hoped to get
*5Q
control of the government.--'7 All these attitudes, fanned
by the brilliant arguments In Congress of Justo Arose
mena before Melo's uprising, were the beginnings of the
new federalism soon to be diffused throughout Nueva
Granada.
For the moment, the political struggles and the
absurdities of the military to which he was entirely alien,
had dejected the spirit of Justo Arosemena, who was a
senator by now, and he declined to return

(only for the

time being) to his representational duties when the Melo
rebellion was over.

Thus, he himself abandoned temporarily

^^Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia. 217-221;
Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia. 4&7-U72.
6°Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 2^1.
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his great project.

However, In 1855. when the military

revolt of Melo ended, the political climate in Bogota
was temporarily refreshed.

All factions renewed with

great vigor their attempts to legislate positive benefits
for the Republic.

Mallarlno, who had assumed the presi

dency even during the revolution, did so with a concilia
tory spirit.

Even leaders of the uprising seemed to

prefer peace— at least for the time— -to the shedding of
blood in trying to contain ideas that were overpowering.

By the time Justo Arosemena did return to his work in
Congress, the proposals regarding the Federal State of
Panama had been confused and mauled and modified, so that
he then published his clear and philosophically convincing
pamphlet— El Estado Federal de Panamg. which could be
considered the summation speech in the defense plans of a
brilliant attorney.

So Impressive was it indeed, that its

allegations convinced Congress and on February 27, 1855.
it created the Federal State of Panama.^
The Isthmus assumed its new sovereignty with
legislative powers in all fields except those relating to

6lIbld.. 219-221, 224, 227-228, 231; Sosa and
Arce, Compendlo. 236.
There appear various discrepancies in several
historical works as to the exact date the pamphlet was
actually published.
The Estado Federal was abolished in I885 by
Rafael NCtftez, then president of Nueva Granada. Correa,
Apuntes de hlstorla patrla. 140.
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foreign relations, the army, navy and war, national pos
tal matters, national debt and the naturalization of
foreigners.

The new laws specified that laws regulating

Import duties on the Isthmus were not to be proclaimed
62
without the approval of the state legislature.
Elec
tions were held with great civic pride, and on July 15
the Constitutional Convention of the State was called
to order in the capital.

Even though the majority of

the members were Conservatives, they elected Justo
Arosemena, champion of the federal system, as Superior
Chief of the State,

The Convention further divided the

state into seven departments:

Cocl6, ColtSn, Chlriquf,

F£brega, Herrera, Los Santos and Panamef.
of these departments respectively were:
David, Santiago, Pesd, Los Santos and

The capital
Nat£, Coldn,

Panam

£.^3

Thus,

the Federal State was Inaugurated under auspicious skies
and the Panamanian people were ready, it seemed, to
begin anew.

^Fdbrega, El estado federal de Panam^, vii;
Mir6, Ijarlano Arosemena. 21-22; Sosa and Arce, Compendlo.
237-238^
^Sosa

Arce, Compendlo. 237-238,

CHAPTER III
THE PANAMA RAILROAD

Panama, because of its isthmian geographic position
midway between the northern and southern hemispheres,
creates a logical culminating point for the world*s com
merce.

Men of various civilized countries of the world

have seen this gift of nature and have dreamed about some
form of inter-oceanic communication in Panama.1

One of

the first countries to realize the advantage of Panama*s
geographical position was Spain.

Ever since the Spaniards

first came to explore Panama, this tiny country has not
lacked a mode of communication across its narrow isthmus.2
The men from Spain, following King Ferdinand*s order to
establish forts across the isthmus, came upon a small
fishing village in November of 1515» which the natives
called Panama.

While at the village, the Spaniards,

under the command of Antonio Tello de Guzman, were told
by the natives that the shortest and best route across
the Isthmus was a trail that ran northward from the village

Fessenden N. Otis, Illustrated History of the
Panama Railroad (New York, l66l), 15*
2Ira E. Bennett, History of the Panama Canal
(Washington, 1915)» 86.

7^

75

of Panama to Porto Bello. ^ Guzman told Pedro Arias de
Avila or Pedrarlas Dfivila, a noble from Segovia appointed
In 151^ by the king of Spain as governor of Castilla del
L
Oro,
of the discovery of the village of Panama and of
the trail from the village to Porto Bello.

Pedrarlas,

after waiting some months to see If no better route from
sea to sea could be found, ordered Gaspar de Espinosa, who
has the dubious honor of being the first European to tran
sit the Isthmus of Panama on an ass, to build a road
across the isthmus.

But instead of building a paved

roadway from Porto Bello to Panama, Guzmfin built the
road, which averaged three feet in width, from Nombre de
Dios to Panama.

In 1502 Columbus founded a small

settlement at Nombre de Dios which he had had to leave
because of trouble with the Indians.

Thus, the settle

ment founded by Columbus became the Atlantic terminal of
the first cobbled roadway across the Isthmus of Panama.
The revived Nombre de Dios, for almost a century to
follow, had the honor of being the oldest active Europeanfounded city on the mainland of the Americas.

This dis

tinction officially lasted until 1597 when by order of
King Philip II of Spain it was abandoned.

The honor was

3john E. Mlnter, The Chagres (New York, 19^8), 87•
^Ibld.
Castilla del Oro was the name given by Columbus to
Panama. Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 480.

then transferred to Panama.

The paved roadway from

Nombre de Dios and the road from Porto Bello joined
together near the Rfo Boqueron which Is more than
halfway from the Pacific to the Atlantic.^

Over this

system, for more than three hundred years, treasures and
merchandise passed on their way to Spain.

But soon

the time for a cheaper, faster system that could handle
larger amounts of traffic on the Isthmus of Panama
became inevitable.^
One of the first attempts to negotiate the build
ing of a better system, this time a canal, was under
taken by Cclonel William Duane, a relative of Benjamin
Franklin and a personal fried of the first minister from
Colombia at Washington.

With the blessings and oapital

of some United States citizens. Colonel Duane visited,
Bogotfi, the capital of Nueva Granada, from 1822 through
1823*

He presented proposals In Bogota for a canal

across Panama.
ed.

7

However, these proposals were not accept-

Another attempt to build a faster roadway took

place between the years 1827 to 1829 when a British
engineer by the name of John A. Lloyd and Captain Maurice

^Minter, The Chagres. 38-40j 87-90.
^Bennett, Hlstor.v of the Panama Canal. 86.
?See: Colonel William Duane, A Visit to Colombia
in the Years 1822 and 1823 (Philadelphia, 1Q2&), iv.
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Falmarc, a Swede, surveyed the Isthmus of Panama for the
possibilities of a railroad with the encouragement of
President Bolfvar of Colombia.

The two men submitted a

report that showed the practicability of a railroad from
Chagres, located on the Atlantic, to Panama.

However,

Bolfvar*s dream of a railroad across Panama never mater
ialized beyond Lloyd*s and Falmarc*s report.®
The plan of the Panamanians at this time was to
create completely free ports as soon as an interoceanic

^Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 86 .

Mr. Lloyd had served for some time before on
General Bolfvar*s personal staff. He received from
Bolfvar the special commission to survey the Isthmus of
Panama "in order to ascertain the most eligible line of
communication across it, whether by road or canal."
House of Representatives. Report No. 1^5. 30th Cong. 2
sess., p. 455. There appears here in this report a sec
tion entitled "Notes Respecting the Isthmus of Panama:
by M. A. Lloyd."
According to Arosemena, Aountamlentos hlstfirloos.
161-162, this survey occurred in 1&25« However, several
other sources, one of which quotes the writings of Lloyd
himself say the dates are from 1827 to 1829, which actu
ally seems more reasonable in view of the fact that Bolf
var was so busy with the independence movement and fight
ing in 1825• See: Parks, Colombia and the United States.
182; Gerstle Mack, La Tlerra Dlvldlda. trans• (Panama,
1971). 135-137.
Regarding the correctness of sources in reference
to this period, in general, and to dates used, John Has
kell Kemble, The Panama Route, and the source Kemble uses,
Ernesto Castlllero R.. Historla de Panama_ are not always
correct. The author has found that this last source is
not entirely reliable for details. It appears as though
Castillero writes from memory without cross references
or original documents perhaps.
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route was c o m p l e t e d T h u s , they were eager to encourage
capitalists to build.

In 1835 a decree gave Charles,

Baron de Thierry the privilege of digging a canal through
the waters of the Rfo Grande, the Chagres and the Bah£a
de Lim6n.

The Baron was to have the canal under complete

personal control for 50 years, at which time he would
turn It over to Nueva Granada.1®

But delays In the con-

structIon made the Panamanians aware of certain disad
vantages In granting single concessions of that type.
Therefore, a decree In 1836 announced that the privilege
of opening an interoceanlc route of any kind would be
granted— should Thierry not meet his deadline— to any
persons who

offered the best advantages to Nueva Granada
11
and whose plans appeared most feasible.

^Already In 1835» a North American, nr. J.H. Gibbon
had stated that a Free Port In Panama would activate world
commerce and especially that of the United States whose
citizens were already owners of 60# of all the commerce on
the Pacific, or so it was believed. Angel Rubio, Ig, ciudad de Panam (Panama, 1950), 51; Juan Antonio Susto, ed.,
2 relaclones de vla.les al Istmo de Panama en 1835: UJ. H.
Gibbon*1 trans. by Ricardo J. Alfaro (Panama, 19617, 15-16,
hereafter cited as Susto, 2 relaclones.
^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 252-253; Chong, Hlstorla de Panam£. 150• Thierry was English-born, but of
French parents. According to J.H. Gibbon, his title was
doubtful (or so he implies in his diary or travel logue)
and he was a little "touched"; his contract with Nueva
Granada would have never been acceptable to any truly
great capitalist, wrote Gibbon. Susto, 2 relaclones. 21-22.
^Arosemena, A puntamlent os. 257*
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Previously, in 1835. Senator Henry Clay had
introduced a resoltuion in the United States Senate,
requesting the President to negotiate treaties, tooth with
Central America and Nueva Granada for the protection of
the citizens of the United States who might attempt to
establish a mode of communication between the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans.

In May, 1835» Charles A. Biddle,

brother of the famous financier Nicholas Biddle,12 was
appointed by President Andrew Jackson as a special agent
to “visit the different routes on the continent of Amer
ica best adapted to interoceanic communication and to
report theron with reference to their value to the com
mercial interests of the United States.Ifl3

Biddle arrived

in Panama in the latter part of 1835 and remained there
several months.

Accompanied by Don JosS de Obaldfa, who

was a member of the Congress of Nueva Granada and also to
be associated with Biddle in the project to build across
the Isthmus, Biddle left for Bogota where he arrived on
March 13, 1836.

While at Bogota, Biddle negotiated for

rights to build a transisthmian route.1** Doctor Francisco
Sota, Secretary of Treasury of President Santander spoke

^Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 86; J. Fred
Hippy, The Capitalists and Colombia (New York, 1931)» 38*

1^Rlppy, The Capitalists, 38; Senate Document No.
429, 59 Cong., 1 Sess. (Ser. 4919), 4.

^Ibld.
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in the Senate in favor of the concession, pointing out the
contribution to the economic welfare of the Isthmus that
this canal would make.

He pleaded for a brotherly rela

tionship between the "mainlanders" and the Isthmians in
order to consolidate the Isthmus more closely to Nueva
Granada.

He predicted that without policies of sympathy

and understanding the Isthmians would continue attempts
to separate themselves from the Granadine nation, and would
succeed sooner or later.^5

Finally a decree from the

Government of Nueva Granada granted to Biddle and his
associates a formal concesssion in accord with the con
gressional act of June 6, 1836, to build an interoceanic
route under the company name of Biddle, Azuero and Asso
ciates.

Biddle had actually not been authorized by

President Andrew Jackson to acquire such a power, so
Biddle then proceeded to the United States in 1836.

How

ever he died on December 21, I836, before he was able to
prepare his report for President Jackson.1^

"In this man

ner he escaped a severe reprimand from the irate Jackson
who had no intention of overlooking Biddle*s flagrant mis
use of his mission.

The concession went to the grave with

the man who had obtained it."-1-?

Ira Bennett claims that

^Castillero R., Hlstorla de Panam&. 85-86.
^Arosemena, Apuntamlentos. 257; Rippy, The Capi
talists, 38.
17Rippy, The Capitalists. 39•

For a detailed
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Biddle*s Idea of a railroad could have worked but that it
came at an inopportune moment— the Panic of 1837
In 1838, the right of building a railroad, highway.

account of the proceedings relating to Charles Biddle*s
mission see: House of Representatives. Report No. 145,
30th Cong., 2 sess. Title of Report is: Canal or Rail
road Between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans•
For an account of the instructions by the United
States Government to Charles Biddle, see pp.241-244.
Concerning the ill-feeling created by Biddle
because of his violation of the instructions, see pp.

269-324.
See letter of Charles Biddle to John Forsyth, stat
ing his views: pp. 271-277* Here Biddle mentions that
confidence in Thierry*s plan was destroyed, that the feel
ing was that his scheme was impracticable.

In a note from Robert McAfee, charg£ d*affalres of
the United States, to Lino de Pombo, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Nueva Granada, McAfee states that Biddle put
up $1 million as a guarantee for completion of a road to
be opened across Panama. See p. 268.
Biddle*s own note, in defense, received November 15,
1836, states that the stock of the company which was
granted the concession would be divided as follows: H*Twothirds of the stock is the property of Charles Biddle and
such citizens of the United States as he may associate
with him; the remaining one-third is the property of the
Nueva Granadians. The office of the company is to be in
Philadelphia, and all installments are to be paid there;
and the number of directors is to be in the same porportion as the quantity of stock.n ' See p. 273*
Such entering into a contract by a diplomatic repre
sentative of the United States was prohibited. John For
syth expresses it in a note from him to Robert McAfee
dated Sept. 23, 1836. See pp. 269-270.
Charles Biddle had the support of the Society of
Friends of the Country, which was made up of prominent
citizens of the Isthmus. (Arosemena, Apuntamlentos . 278)

In a letter to Biddle on Dec. 4, 1835, the signatures
appearing are of Bias Arosemena, Mariano Arosemena, and
Jos6 de Obaldfa (in a later letter, the name Tom&s Herre
ra appears. (See pp. 278-280, 310 of Report No. 145). They
state that Thierry's scheme for a canal was not practical
and that they believed a railroad would fulfill the dream
of the Isthmus, p. 278. The fact that many such prominent
persons of the Isthmus were actually members of the com
pany, standing to gain financially in the event of success
ful completion of the railroad, may well lead to the
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or canal or a combination of all three across Panama m s
granted by Nueva Granada to a French company known as
Augustin Salomon et. Compagnie (Salomon had been an asso
ciate of Thierry)• However, before the company could
begin work, Panama and Veraguas had declared themselves
an independent state (El Estado Libre del Istmo, 1840),
and, as referred to in Chapter II, the situation on the
Isthmus and in Nueva Granada was precarious and not at
all conducive to solid business achievements.

By the

time Panama rejoined Nueva Granada (December, 1841) the
Salomon concession was very unpopular in Panama and in
Bogota, apparently due in part to anti-semitic feelings
as well as to recurring frustration of the Isthmians upon
observing that those who were granted concessions, even
very generous ones, were not achieving any real success.
Notwithstanding such disappointments, the desire
in Panama and Bogota for a transit

system, owned and

controlled by the government of Nueva Granada and financed
by foreign loans, motivated the government to instruct
minister Manuel Mosquera, who was in Europe, to attempt
to get loans and to receive a joint neutrality guarantee
of the Isthmus from the governments of France, Great

supposition that their patriotic motives were at least
partially questionable,
■^Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 86,
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Britain, and the United States.

However, his attempts did

not receive great attention, and in 18^2 the Bogot/ Con
gress declared all transit concessions terminated.

The

following year it specifically mentioned the Salomon
Company.
The Salomon interests refused to accept this ter
mination.

Their representative in France appealed to the

French Foreign Minister, Francois Guizot, to support their
claim (even while Mosquera was seeking the neutrality
guarantee).

Guizot, although willing to have a canal

constructed either by private means or by the government
of France, Great Britain and Nueva Granada, refused to
support Salomon and Company without new and complete sur
veys of.the route.

Therefore, in September of 18^3. he

sent Napoleon Garella, an engineer, to study and report
on the feasibility of a canal across Panama.

Garella re

commended a canal that would go from the Bay of Boca del
Monte, Which is located twelve miles west of Panama, to
Lim6n Bay, which is the Atlantic terminal of the presentday canal.

But the lack of necessary capital caused the

idea of a canal and other related projects to be aban
doned.

■^Arosemena, Aountamientos . 282; Bennett .History
of the Panama Canal. 86-87: Gerstle Mack, The Land
Divided (New York. 19^*0, 127-130; Mlnter, The Chagres.
89; Parks, Colombia and the United States. 19^-200;
House of RepresentatIves. Report No. 1^5, 30th Cong.,
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Panamanians were disgusted with the inability of
promoters to secure financial backing, and many of them
felt that lack of encouragement from the centralized govern
ment in Bogota was partly to blame.

Such was the sad

economic condition of Panama. (It was at this time that
Ruf ino Cuervo wrote his graphic message about the condi
tion of Panama to his friend.)

The disillusion of the

Isthmians resulted in the support of the federalist
20
cause and in the attempt for independence of 1840.
In 1845 Captain W. B. Liot, a representative of
the British navy, suggested either the construction of
a railroad from Porto Bello to Panama or the building
of a macadam highway across Panama.

This plan was never

carried beyond the suggestion of Liot.2!
THE BIDLACK TREATY
On December 12, 1846, during the Mexican War,
Benjamin A. Bidlack, United States chargS d*affaires

2 sess.; regarding Salomon and Company, see p. 454; con
cerning practicability of a ship canal, see pp. 70, 73.
509, 590. Garella received aid and help from Colonel
Anselmo Pineda, Governor of Panama, see p. 509*
20Alba, Cronologfa. 159; Arosemena, Apuntamlentos
282-289; Chong, Hlstorla de PanarnJ, 151•
21Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 86. Cap
tain W. B. H o t was the colonial superintendent of the
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company which had a cargo, mall
and passenger service between England and the Caribbean.
Mack, The Land Divided. 131*
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at Bogotfi, and Manuel Mar£a Mallarlno, Secretary of State
for the government of New Granada, signed the Treaty of
Peace, Amity, Navigation, and Commerce.
this

Article 35 of

treaty stated that
the Government of New Granada guarantees to the
Government of the United States that the right of
way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon
any modes of communication that now exist, or
that may be hereafter constructed, shall be
open and free to the Government and citizens of
the United States. . . /which/ also guarantees
• . • the rights of sovereignty and property
which New Granada has and possesses over the
said territory. . . *22

Without any specific instructions, and on the initiative
of Nueva Granada, "which had become suspicious of the
intentions of Great Britain and France, particularly

See: W. B. Hot, Panama. Nicaragua and Tehuan
tepec: or Considerations upon the Question of Communi
cation Between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. London,
18^9 •

22Diogenes A. Arosemena, Documentary Diplomatic
History of the Panama Canal (Panama, 1961), 35? Bennett,
History of the Panama Canal. 87; Robert R. Russel,
Improvement of Communlcatlon with the Pacific Coast as
an Issuedln American Pontic's. 178^-185^ (Cedar Rapids,
19^8), 54.
Benjamin A. Bidlack was apparently moved by a
letter from Secretary of State James Buchanan which
requested him to use his influence with Nueva Granada
to prevent it from granting privileges to any other
nation, privileges which might prove injurious to the
United States. See document No. 1818 in: William R.
Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States:
Inter-American Affairs. 1&31-1860 (Washington. 1935)•
357-365. See also: Eugene I. MoCormac, James K. Polk:
A Political Biography (Berkeley, 1922), 709? j7 Fred
RiPPy* The Caribbean Danger Zone (New York, 19^0), 60-61.
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the former, in the Isthmian region*"2^

Bidlack signed

the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of the Isthmus of
Panama, a treaty under which the United States would
intervene militarily fifty-seven times, many of these
at the request of the central and even the local govern2 |i

ment. ^

It goes almost without saying that m o d e m Pana

manian historians view this treaty as another "pragmatic"
tactic of the colossus of the North to Insure for itself
future concessions and influence at the expense of the
Isthmians whose attempts for independence would henceforth
be constricted*

This attitude is reinforced by the later

events in which Great Britain and the United States
entered into the Clayton Bulwer Treaty (1850) to guaran
tee accessibility of the Isthmus for themselves, as though
Panama and even Colombia were but their own colonies over
which they must watch and decide issues— issues which
would have direct bearing on the Isthmians themselves*25
President Polk reluctantly accepted the Bidlack
Treaty because of "the departure from established policy
which the guarantee of neutrality and sovereignty would

2^Russel, Improvement of Communication.
22fAlba, Cronologja. 170; Arosemena, Documentary
Diplomatic History. 31* John E. Pagg, Latin America (New
York, 1963), 53^; Hussel, Improvement of Communication.

5^.
25Alba, Cronologia. 171»
PanamA. l60-l6l*

Chong, Hlstorla de

2£\
involve .',<i0 When Polk submitted this treaty to the Senate
in February of 18^7, he argued that
such a departure was Justified by the urgent
importance of communication with the Pacific and virtual
indispensability of such a guarantee to the construction
and operation of a reailroad or canal in the Isthmian
region. The object of the treaty, he said, was commercial
not political. It was not exclusive, for it secured to
all nations the free and equal passage of the isthmus•
Any other nation might make a similar guarantee if it
should choose to do so.2 '
However, the Senate, afraid of debate, postponed consider
ing the treaty until the next working session of Congress.
Then, probably influenced by British activities around
Nicaragua and the failure of the United States to get
transit rights across Tehuantepec at the end of the War

^Russel, improvement of Communication. 5^-55•
There is no doubt that the acquisition of Califor
nia was to Polk the most important objective of the expect
ed war with Mexico. William Brandon, The Men and the
Mountain: Fremont's Fourth Expedition INew York, 1£55)»
22. George Bancroft, Polk's first Secretary of the Navy
said that Polk’s ambition was to acquire California.
Norman A. Graebner, Empire on the Pacific: A Study in
American Continental Expansion (New York, 1955
2?This could be shown to be not wholly true from
Buchanan's letter to Bidlack. Manning, Diplomatic
Correspondence. 357* For an overall effect of the Bidlack
treaty on relations between the Isthmus and Colombia and
Bidlack*s own initiative see the following books: Jules
Dubois, Danger Over Panama (Indianapolis, 196^, 21-39;
Sheldon B. Llss, The Canal: Aspects of United States
Panamanian Relations (South Bend, I967T, 11-^1•
For an excellent study of relations between the
United States and Panama see: Lawrence 0. Ealy, The
Republic of Panama in World Affairs 1903-1950 (Phila
delphia, 1951) and William D. McCain, The United States
and the Republic of Panama (New York, 19&5) •
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with Mexico, the Senate ratified Bidlack*s treaty by a
large majority on June 8, 1848.
Secretary of State James Buchanan, following Polk*s
statement that Bidlack*s treaty was not exclusive, asked
the British minister in Washington, John P. T. Crampton,
to find out what Lord Palmerston thought about the neutral
ity guarantee of Panama.

Palmerston never answered.

John

M. Clayton, Buchanan*s successor, formally requested
Great Britain to make a treaty, similar to Bidlack*s,
with New Granada.

The British did not do this;

however,

in a clause of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which was signed
on April 19» 1850, the British agreed to protect, Jointly
with the United States, any mode of communication across
Panama, Tehuantepec and Nicaragua.29

2®Dubois, Danger Over Panama. 22;
Improvement of Communication. 5*1— 55.

Russel,

29Russel, Improvement of Commnn1catIon. 55*
The Clayton-Bulwer treaty of April 19, 1850, was
to bind the United States not to acquire any territory
in the region of possible ocean to ocean transit or to
erect fortifications there or to obtain control exclusive
ly over any area. A partial repudiation of the aobve
obligations took place in 1856-1857 and 1869-1870. After
1880 the attitude of the United States towards the ClaytonBulwer treaty was one of open defiance.
In 1856-1857. after the so-called "Watermelon War",
Secretary of State William Marcy stated that the United
States had to land marines because Colombia had failed
to protect the transit of passengers. As we shall see in
Chapter V, he demanded indemnity. Furthermore, he attempt
ed to acquire the island of Taboga and other islands in
the Bay of Panama. What he really wanted was the transfer
to the United States of all Colombia*s rights as defined
in the charter of the railroad and to create two quasi
independent government, one at Col6n and the other at
Panama. Parks, Colombia and the United States. 194-262;
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Meanwhile, the Bidlack Treaty did not discourage
the French, who again since 18^5 attempted the construc
tion of a railroad across Panama.

In 18^7. the govern

ment of Nueva Granada awarded the first formal contract
for the building of a railroad across the Isthmus of
Panama to Mateo Klein, an agent and lawyer for the
Compagnle de Panama, actually the same basic organization
of Salomon and Company.

This contract was granted to the

French company for a period of ninety-nine years, with
the sole rights for the building and maintenance of a
railroad across Panama, provided that it be completed
within six years.

But because the Compagnie de Panama

failed to raise the necessary capital (due to the revolu
tionary outbreaks in Europe), the provisions of the con
tract expired in June, 18^8.30

failure by the French

company to construct a railroad in Panama ended for the

Rippy, The Caribbean Danger Zone. 60-65.
But the best example of violations can be seen dur
ing the Thousand Day's War in Panama, which will be dealt
with in the last chapter of this work.
It is obvious that the United States, faced with
three different treaties (Bidlack, the Railroad Contract,
and Clayton-Bulwer) would choose and interpret the treaty
and in a manner most convenient to it at a given time.
30joseph B. Bishop, The Panama Gateway (New York,
1913)» ^5* Frederic J. Haskin, The Panama Canal (Garden
City, 1913). 102; Kemble, The Panan5"RouteT'I1&8-1869
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 19^3), 176.
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time being, French efforts In Panama.

The blow to the

Isthmians must Indeed have been cruel, for in mid 1847
the worst decline of a depression which had encircled all
of Nueva Granada assailed the Panamanians.^

They began

to search desperately for those who would lift
Isthmus to the calling of its destiny
the two oceans.

their

as bridge between

At this opportune moment, entrepreneurs

and pioneers in the United States were anxious to have a
railroad built across Panama.
THE NEED FOR THE RAILROAD
AND ASPINWALL'S PROJECT
In 1846, the

question concerning the proper

boundary of Oregon was settled.

The Mexican War had

ended by 1848 and Mexico ceded, by treaty, upper Cali
fornia to the United States.

All this new territory

awaited settlement by people from the eastern part of the
United States.

There were three routes by which these

easterners could get to the newly-opened lands.

The

first route was by land across 3,000 miles of deserts,
prairies, rivers, mountains, and Indians.

The second

route was by way of water around South America, and then
up the Pacific coast.

It took at least ninety days to

•^Alba, Cronologia. 169*
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cover the distance of some 12,000 miles.32

The third

route was Vanderbilt*s transit system across Nicaragua.
This tiresome route was not a favorite
from the East.33

one of pioneers

Whatever route the emigrants to Cali

fornia chose, they encountered hardships never before
experienced by them.

It was only natural, because of the

difficulties of reaching the Pacific coast, that the
desirable class of settlers, farmers and their families,
were not enthusiastic about going West.

Also, the desired

emigrants were hesitant about pioneering in an area where
the administration of law and government faced diffi
culties caused by the tremendous distance and slowness
of communications between the seat of the National

32Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 87;
"Panama Railroad in Second Century of Service," Illinois
Central Magazine. XXXXV (November, 1956), 10.
See: Two Years Before the Mast, a novel by Richard
Henry Dana, Jr., published in 18^0 and which revolution
ized the treatment of seafaring men. Dana was only nine
teen when, in 183^, he left Boston aboard a trading brig
for the long, difficult voyage around Cape Horn, but his
book remains today a thrilling tale of life under the sail.
33fjjarl Harding, The Untold Stor.v of Panama (New
York, 1959). 1.

One reason for the undesirability of the Nicaraguan
route during the years 1855-1857 was clue to the filibuster
ing activity of William Walker in Nicaragua. Rippy,
The Capitalists. 39*
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Government

an d

the

Pacific

C o a s t . ^

The United States saw fit to find a faster, less
costly, safer and easier route for its

own citizens in

order to enable them to settle the Pacific territories.
Congress, on the recommendations of the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Postmaster General, by an act of March 3»
18^7, authorized the Secretary of the Navy to make con
tracts for postal services between New York, Savannah,
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^Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 87;
Otis, Illustrated History. 16.
^ Illinois Central Magazine. 11; Russel, Improve
ment of Communloatlon. 55-56•
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California.

Nevertheless, at the time he had assumed the

mall contract, Aspinwall had in mind a railroad across
Panama.3^
Prior to that time, the only method of going
across Panama was from Chagres up the Chagres River by
native boats to Gorgona or Cruces, which were located
roughly midway across the Isthmus.

From here one either

walked or rode mules or horses along a road to Panama
City.

This mode of communication was extremely difficult

and usually took from four to five days in the rainy sea
son.

In view of the hardship and time involved in crossI
ing the Isthmus of Panama, Aspinwall hoped for a railroad

that would grant him and his associates huge profits and
that would shorten the traveling distance from four or
five days to a matter of hours.

The associates of Aspin

wall involved in this scheme were Henry Chauncey, a New
York capitalist

and John L. Stephens.

Stephens, a

graduate of Columbia College of Law, had gone to Central
America in 1839 as charg£ d'affaires at the request of
President Martin Van Buren to study the different
routes that had been proposed for a canal connecting the

^Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 87; Kemble,
The Panama Route. 178-179•
James Marshall discovered gold in upper California
on January 24, 1848.

Atlantic and Pacific Oceans*3?

His search led him to

Panama where he became so enchanted with the Chagres
River that he built a cottage on its banks some few
miles above Bohfo and recommended to President Van Buren
that the Chagres River area was the best route of all he
had seen.

Stephens came back to Panama in the early part

of 1848.

This time he came for the sole purpose of making

studies for the railroad of which Aspinwall dreamed.

Along

Along with an engineer named James L. Baldwin, Stephens
expected to sight a line for the railroad across the
Isthmus of Panama which would not cross any ridges over
600 feet.

How excited he must have been when, together

with Baldwin, he

found a pass not over 337 feet above

the level of the sea.3®
Stephens reported the good news to Aspinwall and
Chauncey.

These three men presented to the United States

Congress on December 11, 1848, a memorandum which pointed
out to the

American nation the significance of a rail

road in Panama in terms of naval and military purposes as
well as the encouragement such a railroad would provide

37stephens* exploration of the Mayan ruins of
Chiapas in Yucatan reflected his love for archaeology
which prompted him to wrtie two volumes on the subject
which are still important works. Sees John L. Stephens,
Incidents of Travel in Central America. Chiapas. and
Yucatan, ed. Flchard L. Predmore (New Brunswick, 194-9) •
3®Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 87-88;
Kemble, The Panama Route, 179; Winter, The Chagres. 255-
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for Latin American and Pacific coast

trade*39

They made

it clear that they could not attempt such a tremendous
project without some form of government grant.

But this

aid, the three men told the Senate, was not to be in the
forma of an outright grant.

Instead, Aspinwall and his

associates wanted the Secretary of Navy, who at the time
1+0
was John Y. Mason,
to grant them the authority to draw
up a twenty year contract to be put into effect as soon
as work on the railroad was finished.

The Proposed con

tract would allow the transportation of all munitions,
troops, army and naval supplies, United States mails,
and United States public agents across the Isthmus of
Panama on the planned railroad.

The price for all this

transportation would not exceed $750,000, which was the

^^Their. memorial entitled "Memorial of W. H. S
Aspinwall, John L. Stephen, and Henry Chauncey, in refer
ence to the Construction of a Railroad across the Isthmus
of Panama," was presented before the 30th Congress, 2nd
session. Congressional Globe, 30 Congress, 2 Sess.,
20-21; Kemble, The Panama Route. 179-283; Elena Ronan,
"All Aboard," Americas. Ill (January, 1951). 25; Russel,
Improvement of Communlcation. 56.
The need to overcome the vast distances between
the East and the West and to hold the West together in
the Union was a pressing factor to the Americans during
the 18^0-50*s. The answer, according to the expansion
ists was a transcontinental railroad. The railroad would
bring economic and military power to the United States
over the Pacific Ocean and throughout the world. Graebner,
Empire on the Pacific. 90-100.
^®John D. Hicks and George E. Mowry, A Short His
tory of American Democracy (Boston, 1956), xv.
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sum paid by the United States to the Collins Line for
carrying its mail from New York to Liverpool.**1

Aspin

wall *s memorandum was referred to the Senate Committee
on Military Affairs;

and on the 1^ of December, 18^8,

the chairman of the committee, Thomas H. Benton of
Missouri, introduced a bill in the Senate that contained
all the points that Aspinwall wanted but limited the
price to $500,000f**2 (which was two-thirds of the amount
paid by the United States to the New York-Liverpool line)*
Benton*s bill also stated that no amount of money would
be paid by the United States until the whole transit of
Panama could be made under the power of steam*

Stated

also in the bill was the condition that the construction
of the railroad in Panama was to begin one year after the
contract between the Secretary of Navy and Aspinwall*s
associates, and was to be finished within three years
from June 1, 18^9•
Benton*s bill met tremendous opposition from
George Law, the holder of the mail service between the
Atlantic ports of New York, Savannah, New Orleans and

^ Congressional Globe. 30 Cong., 2 Sess*, 20-21;
Kemble, The Panama Route, 179-181.
h.O

Ibid *
Thomas Benton, father-in-law of John
Charles FrSmont, was one of the most powerful men in
Washington. He was also one of the leaders of the expan
sionist group in Congress— devoted to the cause of turn
ing the eyes of America to the unopened and undeveloped
West. Brandon, The Men and the Mountain. 1^-15•

Chagres, because he wanted the contract.

In view of all

the opposition to the bill proposed by Benton, Thomas B.
King, member of the House of Representatives and also a
member of the Committee on Naval Affairs, presented to
the House on January 16, 18^9* Aspinwall's memorandum with
the exception that the amount of the contract be $250,000,
instead of the half a million dollars as proposed by
Benton.

**3

Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois on

January 29, 18^9, in the Senate proposed a substitute for
the bill introduced by Benton.

Douglas' bill stated that

the amount of the contract should not go over $250,000 a
year.

The bill also included rates for freight and

passengers over the proposed railroad.

The rates, which

were scaled downward as the years progressed, were to be
as stated in Douglas' bill, $8 per ton for freight and $8
per passenger for the first five years of railroad opera
tions.

At the end of ten years the rates designated for

freight and passengers in Douglas' bill would stop being
mandatory.

The bill was approved by the Senate.

The agreement, however, did not stop the debate of
opposition to the bill.

Most of the objection came from

the senators representing the Western And Southern states.

^Kemble, The Panama Route. 180;
ment of Communlcatlonr 56.

Russel, Improve

^Congressional Globe. 30 Cong., 2 Sess., 382;
Kemble, The Panama Route. l&Os Mack, The Land Divided.1^9.

98

The senators from the West, with the exception of Douglas,
objected because they feared that the proposed contract
would hinder the development of a trans-continental rail
road across their states.

The Southern senators also

protested because they wanted the Tehuantepec route to be
chosen for any such mode of communication from sea to sea.
The Tehuantepec route would place the southern port of
New Orleans in a more favorable position.

The only area

that did not object to the Douglas bill consisted of the
New England and Atlantic-seabord states.

The senators of

this area, including Daniel Webster, supported the bill
loyally.

Even though Webster was actually in favor of the

Tehuantepec route, he considered it unavailable in view
of Mexico*s attitude.

Actually, the most heated debate

opposing the bill for the railroad through Panama came
from the group of senators who preferred the Tehuantepec
route.45

Nevertheless, Jefferson Davis,who opposed the

bill, had this to say:
If that people £*on the Pacific Coast7 are to be
bound permanently to the Union, if it is to be made
their interest in all time to come to remain a
portion of the United States, then I say it is
necessary that a ready and accessible means of
communication must be continuous; towns, villages,
and hamlets, must extend along the communication,
from the seat of the General Government until we
stand upon the shores of the Pacific. This must
be our ulterior object, and all other measures in

Congressional Globe. 30 Cong., 2 Sess., 398-402,
411-415, 457-463; Kemble, The Panama Route. 180-181; Honan,
•'All Aboard," 25; Russel, Improvement of Communication.59.

99
reference to the subject must be considered as
temporary expedients only.*™
Many senators were opposed to the bill because they
thought it was helping a monopoly.

The Douglas bill was

shelved and on February 6, 184-9. the Senate turned to
different business.

The fact that the Senate did not

definitely act on any of the proposals having to do with
a railroad in Panama caused Aspinwall to write a friend
the following:
. . . I have to thank you for your interesting
private letter from Panama which reached me in
Washington where I have lost much time this
winter in trying to Induce favorable action on
the part of the Government towards a railroad
across Panama; but President making and slavery
were too engrossing to admit of attention being
bestowed on this or any other matter of interest
to California— and we shall therefore limit our
selves to improving the transit in a more
economical way— so that by next year at this time,
it may be accomplished in 10 or 12 hours from sea
to sea. • . .47
FINANCING THE COMPANY
Aspinwall had, however, made informal negotiations
with Nueva Granada for a railroad in Panama, prior to
December 11, 1848, when he and his associates introduced
the Memorandum calling for a railroad across the Isthmus
before Congress.
Klein*s

When the Compagnie de Panama, Mateo

outfit, forfeited the contract for a railroad •

^Russel, Improvement of Communication. 58-59*
^Kemble, The Panama Route. 180-181; Ronan, "All
Aboard," 25*

across Panama in June, 1848*

48

the president of Nueva

Granada authorized the Colombian minister in Washington to
transfer the right for a railroad on the Isthmus to any
organization which could guarantee the completion of the
long-planned railroad•

Immediately after the informal

negotiations, and while the debate on Aspinwall^ Memorial
Memorandum was going on in Congress, Aspinwall and his
associates were proceeding with the organization for a
railroad company*

They announced on December 13* 1848

that subscriptions for capital stock for the Panama rail
road would be taken at the Bank of the State of New York
within a few days, and that the Trustees were to be
Cornelius W. Lawrence, Samuel Jandon, Matthew Morgan,
C. A. Davis, William Kent, and General Winfield Scott.^9
On December 28, 1848, in Washington, Aspinwall and asso
ciates began formal negotiations for the Panama railroad
with the minister from Nueva Granada.^0

On April 7» 1849,

the act which incorporated the Panama Railroad Company
<1
passed the legislature of the state of New York.
This
act stated that the capital stock for the railroad was not

^Bishop, The Panama Gateway. 45*
^Kemble, The Manama Route. 180-183*
5°Ibid.. 181;

Rippy, The Capitalists. 39*

^Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 88;
The Land Divided. 149; Minter, The Chagres. 256.

Mack,
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bo be less than one million dollars nor more than five
million dollars.

The value of the shares would be one

hundred donga's each, with the beginning of construction
to take place as soon as a half a million dollars of
shares were sold. ' The New York Legislature in its act
incorporating the railroad gave the power of constructing
the Panama Railroad to W. H. Aspinwall, John L. Stephens,
Henry Chauncey, Governor Kemble, Thomas W. Ludlow,
Joseph B. Vamum, Prosper M. Wetmore, Horatio Allen,
Cornelius W. Lawrence, David Thompson, Samuel S. Howland,
Edwin Bartlett, and associates.

The legislature also

gave these men the right to operate ships to and from
Panama.

On June 28, 18^9. capital stock for the rail

road was issued in the amount of one million dollars.
The shares were sold so rapidly, due chiefly to New York
capitalists, that by three o*clock of the same day all
of the planned capital stock was subscribed.

On July 2,

18^9, stockholders elected Thomas Ludlow president of the
Panama Railroad Company and
president.
afterwards.

John L. Stephens vice-

Stephens succeeded Ludlow as president soon
Colonel A. J. Center was then made vice-

president of the company.^2

They and their associates

^Kemble, The Panama Route. 183; Mack, The Land
Divided. 1^9-150; The Panama Canal. Twenty-Fifth Anni
versary (Balboa Helgts, 1939)\~^0; Ronan, "All Aboard,"
25.
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proceeded to complete the organization of the company*
MORE SURVEYING AND A NEW CONTRACT
Meanwhile, during the early part of 1849, Colonel
George W. Hughes of the United States Army Topographical
Corps was appointed chief engineer in charge of surveying
the Isthmus.

Hughes and thirty eight military and civil

engineers lef t New York on January 22, 1849, to begin
their search for a lower pass over the mountains.
found one which was only 275 feet above sea level.

They
This

was 140 feet lower than the one found by Garella in 1838
and even lower than the one that Stephens had previously
found.

This 275 foot pass over the mountains was proved

later to be
Divide.

the lowest existing pass in the Continental

When news of the discovery of the new gap was

heard in New York, in June, 1849, the future of the rail
road seemed promising.

The original plan for the route

of the railroad was first to begin work near Gorgona in
the highlands, some thirty miles from the Atlantic so
that the company could operate steamers carrying passen
gers from Chagres on the Atlantic to Gorgona*

Money from

passenger fares would pay for the construction of the rail*53

road from Chagres to Gorgona* ^

53Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 88;
Rippy, The Capitalists. 40.
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On June 12, 18^9 (about the time that news of
the low pass reached New York) Stephens, partly because
of his knowledge of the Spanish language and temperament,
completed the negotiating of a highly favorable agreement,
and the Nueva Granada Legislature by decree accepted the
contract for the railroad proposed by Aspinwall and his
associates.

The contract was signed on April 15, 1850,

by John L. Stephens (representing the Panama Railroad
Company) and Victorlano de Diego Paredes (Secretary of
Foreign Affairs of Nueva Granada). ^

This same Colombian

later created an irkscme situation between Panamanians
and North Americans when he publicly proposed at the
official inauguration of the city of Col<5h (already
accepted under that name by the legislature in Panama)
on February 27, 1852, that the city be named Aspinwall.
Panamanians and other

Colombians resented this name so

much that the postal department was forbidden to deliver •
any mail with that name on it.

In this way the Panama

nians forced the world to recognize the name of the city
as Colon, the name in Spanish of Colombus, the discoverer
55
of America.^
•5^Chong, Historia de Ranam£. 161; Kemble, The Pana
Minter, The Chagres . 256.

ma Route . 181;

•55castillero R., Historia de PanamS, 97-98. The
argument is reminiscent of a contemporary one regarding
the Bridge of the Americas, across the Panama Canal. The
Americans have named it the '‘Thatcher Ferry Bridge" and
the Panamanians insist it should, by its very nature, be
called the "Bridge of the Americas", in Spanish: El Puente
de las Americas.
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The contract between Nueva Granada and the Panama
Railroad Company was ratified by the Nueva Granada Con
gress on May 29, 1850.
(1)

Its principal provisions were:

The Panama Railroad Company was granted the

exclusive right of building and operating a railroad
across the Isthmus for a period of forty-nine years. .
However, the New Granada government was to have the
privilege of purchasing the railroad (a) at the end of
twenty years for five million dollars, (b) at the end of
thirty years for four million dollars, and (c) at the end
of forty years for two million dollars;

and it was to

notify the company at least one year before the termina
tion of whichever option it chose.56
(2)

The railroad was to be completed from ocean

to ocean within a period of six years from the date of
ratification of the contract.^7
(3)

The railroad was granted exclusive rights for

forty-nine years to use the ports situated at both ter
minals *

These were to be free ports, and the Company was

to set tolls which it might think proper.^®

Ibid..: Otis, Illustrated History. 397-398.
Article II is in the appendix of this bookwhere there is
a translation of the origianl contract.
5?otls, Illustrated History. 398-399* (Article V
of the contract.)
^ I b l d . . (Article IX of the contract).

(4) The Company could use any means It deemed
necessary for the construction and operation of the rail
road on which trains could cross the Isthmus in twelve
hours or less.

59

(5) The Railroad Company was granted land for a
right of way, for Its terminal cities, hotels, wharves,
warehouses, dry docks and other facilities, the Island
of Manzanillo on the Atlantic and permanent title to
250,000 acres to be seQected from any public lands on
the Isthmus.^0
(6)Any legal problem arising between the railroad
and New Granada would be settled in courts of New Gran
ada.

(This was eighteen years before Carlos Calvo pub

lished the "Argentine Jurist" (1868), doctrine that alien
investors have no recourse beyond the courts of the nation
to which their capital has migrated.)^

59lbld.. (Article XIV of the contract)•
6°Ibld.
Involved in the land speculation which unfor
tunately erupted on the Isthmus were people as admired and
important as the- ex-president of Nueva Granada, TomSs
Cipriano Mosquera. He was heavily censored on the Isthmus
by his compatriots for his part in such dishonest acti
vities. Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 155» 1?7-1?8»
Seemann, Hi storla del Istmo de Panam£,
.
^Kemble,
Panama Route. 182; Harold F. Peterson, Argentina and the United States. 1810-1960 (New York,
1964), 258.
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(7)

The Railroad Company would carry NuevaGran

ada^

mail free of charge across the Isthmus.

Also, it

would

pay Nueva Granada five per cent of all money

received from other mail contracts.06
(8)

The Company would pay to Nueva Granada three

per cent of the net profits
(9)

The railroad would carry all troops of
Nueva Granada free of charge across Panama. 64
(10)

The railroad would be exempt from all taxes

by Nueva Granada for a period of twenty

y e a r s . ^5

The Panama Railroad Company announced on July 14,
1849, that it was ready to accept bids from contractors
for construction of the Gorgona-Chagres section of the
railroad.

George M. Totten (called Colonel even though

he had no military rank) and John C. Trautwlne were the
successful bidders, perhaps because they had had exper
ience in tropical engineering.

They had built El Dique,

a canal from Cartagena to the Magdalena River.

Totten

and Trautwine arrived in Panama in January, 1850;

and,

with great enthusiasm, set up their headquarters and

^Kemble, The Panama Route. 182;
trated History. 405•

Otis, Illus

^winter, The Chagres. 257*
^Kemble, The Panama Route, 182.
^5Joseph L. Schott, Ralls Across Panama (Indian
apolis, 1967), 12.
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began work on the railroad.

66

THE ACTUAL BUILDING OF THE RAILROAD—
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES
However, they soon found the Jungles and marshes
of Panama damping their enthusiasm.

The spruce and pine

lumber they Imported for buxldlngs and railway ties
decayed in the hot, wet climate of the tropics as rapidly
as It was placed on the ground. At the same time thousands
of prospectors coming through the Isthmus on their way
to California caused such a tremendous drain of the labor
supply that it was almost Impossible to hire workers.
As if this were not enough trouble, Totten and Trautwlne
found that the Chagres River at low water was not at all
navigable, and at high water even the flat-bottomed
steamers operating in the river carrying supplies from
Chagres to Gorgona proved to have too deep a draft for
the navigation of the river.

Faced with all these prob

lems, Totten, in February, 1850, wrote New York stating
that he was unable to carry out the contract for the
building of the railroad.

He recommended, however, that

instead of Chagres as the Atlantic terminal for the rail
road, the Company should select a terminal at Navy Bay on

^Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 88; Kemble,
The Panama Route. 184; Mack, The Land Divided. 151; Minter, The Chagres. 259; Oran, "Tropical Journeyings,"
Harper»s New Monthly Magazine. XVIII (January, 1859)» 148.
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the Atlantic where supplies could be unloaded directly
from the ships.

On March 12, 1850, the Company decided

to follow all of Totten*s suggestions, and to retain him
and Trautwlne as engineers In charge of the construction.
In May of 1850 Trautwin, Baldwin, a small group of
assistants and a dozen Indians landed on a narrow coral
reef which ran around Manzanillo Island, the place cho
sen as the Atlantic terminal for

the railroad.

Manzan

illo was 650 acres of sunken swamp with crocodiles play
ing in smelly mud and mosquitoes looking for blood.

Tot

ten had missed this trip because he was in Cartagena
recruiting workers for the

clearing of the island.

Work

ers on Manzanillo were constantly falling sick with mal
aria and other tropical fevers.

Because of these casual

ties the company kept agents busy recruiting workers
throughout the Caribbean Islands and imported some from
China.67
Thus, the men who helped to build the Panama
Railroad were of many nationalites and races.

Jamaicans

proved to be the best, but close behind them were Cubans,
Cartageneans, Irish from New Orleans, French and Haitians.
The thousand or so Chinese laborers were soon overcome
with a suicidal mania because their drugs had been taken
away from then*.

6?Ibld.

Many Chinese strangled themselves, others
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threw themselves on their machetes and even weighted down
their clothes and then Jumped Into the Chagres.^®
People In the Canal Zone and in Panama, even today,
repeat the legend "that every tie of the original Panama
Railroad cost a llfe."^9

However, an employee of the

railroad in i860 walked the entire length of track during
his vacation and counted 94, 326 ties, and there were not
that many martyrs. The actual number of deaths was about

,

12 000.70
To put an end to rumors in New York and elsewhere
not only of the ihigh death rate but also of bad manage
ment, the company built better houses and facilities for
its workers, and by March of 1852 it had built seven miles
of tracks— all on piles.

This was necessary because of

extensive swamps the road traversed.

Unexpected relief

from the bad situation that the railroad was in came
from travelers on their way to California.

They began

to use the few miles of track, the company hastened to
build more, and the public in New York readily bought
more stock.7^

^Bennett, History of the Panama Canal. 90; RubSn
D. Carles, Crossing the Isthmus of Panama! (Panama. 1946),
28-30; Minter, The Chagres. 27I-27S.
69chong, Historia de Panama, 165; Mlnter,The
Chagres. 273.
70lbld.; Schott, Ralls Across Panama. 173*
7^Russel, Improvement of Communlcat1on. 60.
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Notwithstanding the'prosperity which seemed
Inevitable for the Isthmians, they suffered another
economic crisis in 1851. right on the heels of the one
felt in 1847.

This crisis was due to the greed and

corruption of persons high in the Central Government who
had deprived Panamanians of their import duties1

they

claimed, however, that it was to stamp out any ideas
Isthmians might have about gaining independence.

The

Bidlack Treaty had its own m y of hamstringing Panamanians,
who because of the treaty, could not successfully revolt
against the unjust measures of the Central Government.
Only after long legal struggles in the Congress of
Nueva Granada were the Isthmians to be granted statehood
and thus, more control of their local economic situa
tion.72
When two parties of workers, one working from the
Atlantic to the Pacific and the other vice versa, met on
the rainy midnight of January 27, 1855* the first trans
continental railroad in America was temporarily oompleted.

72Alba, Cronologfa. 169, 175. I8I-I83. This
source does not elaborate the situation concerning import
duties. Apparently, Import duties were still being col
lected, but the Panamanians were not receiving their fair
share. Of Course, the idea they had been fighting for,
at least in some circles, of a free port was not being
carried out; thus they were not getting the advantages
of a duty-free port, for the idea of not charging duties
vreis to stir up more commercial traffic in the area. It
must have been a frustrating situation for Panamanian
businessmen indeed.

Ill

The actual completion took another two years and 2 million
dollars more.

When completely finished, the railroad had

cost more than $9,000,000, or close to $170, 000 per
mile.73
For many years to come the Panama route, and there
fore the railroad, had almost a complete monopoly in
the transportation of mail, gold, emigrants and travelers
who did not wish to attempt the other routes to California.
However, the largest amount of freight for the railroad
did not come from the California trade as expected, but
came instead from South and Central America.

Out of the

original capitalization of one million dollars, the rail
road^ average dividend from 1853 to 1881 was

16#.7^

Truly it was a dream come true, not only for Aspinwall
and associates, but for the generations that were to use
and be grateful for the Panama Railroad.
Nevertheless, many Panamanians were bitter because
of the price they had to pay in the long run, for the end
of the construction meant practically the end of pros
perity for many workers, even though the railroad was

73sennett, History of the Panama Canal. 88-100;
Haskin, The Panama Canal. 9&; Winter, The chagres. 272;
Ronan, "All Aboard," 46; Russel, Improvement of
Communication. 61.
7^Rippy, The Capitalists. 43; Russel, Improvement
of Communication. 61; Senate Document. No. 429. 59 Cong..
l“ SessT7”TserTT919), 237^------------
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fully exploited thereafter by Panamanian commercial groups,
by the United States and by other foreigners• Panamanians
who had been lured away from the long range progress that
had begun in a small way in the interior of the Isthmus
during the years before the construction found themselves
deceived, corrupted and without future or immediate pros
pects of improving their lot.?->

Rogelio Sin5n, a dis

tinguished contemporary author and poet of Panama, referred
to the drain of manpower from the basic and longer lasting
improvements of rural economy when he wrote:
Toda esa savia viva que es el campesinado se
volc6 ingenuamente sobre la encrucijada de los
metales. Hombres, mujeres, ninos, atrafdos por
la loca sirena, abandonaron lo que consideraban
su estatica tristeza rural para cambiarla por una
miserable alegrfa urbana. En las ciudades de la
zona de tr£nsito estos fantasmas del mafz van
amoldSndose a una vida de afan y de sudor apinados
en cuartos malollentes y suclos hasta que, reslgnados a su suerte, se dejan devorar por la urbe
cosmopolita e Insaclable.7°

^Chong, Historla de Panam£, 165-166.
^^Rogelio Sinfin, MRutas de la novela panamena,"
Letras de Panama (December 1, 1957)» ?•
The negative aspects of Panama*s fate in her deal
ings with the North American flares the imagination of many
other contemporary Panamanian writers. One of the most
vehement complaints is that of Rodolfo (FIto)Aguilera, Jr.,
whose protagonist in Historla de una vida vulgar (Panama,
n. d. ) unleashes momentarily his anti-American feelings 1
"Recuerdo, cuando veo a un gringo, el Canal de Panam£, que
rompitf cruentamente, cruelmente, sin una reparacltfn consciente, la virginidad de nuestro Istmo. Me parece verel
falo gigantesco ardiente del saj6n y colgante de $1. el
himen desgarrado sangrante de mi pobre tierra." p. 64.
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The terrible depression of 18^7. however, encouraged
many Panamanians to look favorably upon the construction
of the railroad and its availability afterward for the
expansion of commerce and resultant uplifting of the econ
omy.

This and the treachery of the Central Government

toward her step-daughter, Panama, in taking from her the
import duties in 1851 fanned the flaming desires of many
Isthmians to be recognized as a state within Nueva Gran
ada in order to manage more effectively their own econ
omic growth.

Finally, in 1855 when its state-hood was

recognized and the railroad was completed, Panamanians did
sense the beginning and the promise of a new era;

an era

that, as it turned out, would tragically disappoint their
dreams and hopes.

CHAPTER IV
THE FORTY-NINERS THROUGH PANAMA

On January 2^, 18^8, James Marshall discovered gold
on the American River in Upper California.

This dis

covery came at an opportune moment, for the Mexican War
was over and men who were unwilling to settle down were
looking for new excitement.

Furthermore, the 1840*s,

a period of hard times, had left the East in a financial
crisis.

Mortgages had spread to almost every phase of

commercial and private life.

It is no wonder, then, that

the communities of the East, in order to alleviate the
financial straits in which they found themselves, were
ready to send their young men West in search of gold.1
Doctors, lawyers, professors, mechanics, thieves, gamblers,
murderers, clerks and clergymen sold, abandonee or mort
gaged what was not already mortgaged (their farms, prac
tice, homes or anything they had established) in order to
go West in search of the gold.

p

^•Kemble, The Panama Route. 33; Steward Edward
White, The Forty Nlners: A Chronicle of the California
Trail and El Dorado (New Haven, 191$), 55 •
^Octavius Thorndike Howe, Argonauts of *^9: History
and Adventures of the Emigrant Companies from Massachusetts.
Igfe-lB'SO (Cambridge. 1923), 901; Julius H. Pratt,
"To California by Panama in ,49," The Century Illustrated
Monthly Magazine. XLI (1891), 901; White-, The Forty-Niners.
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-^Kemble, The Panama Route, 33? White, The FortyNiners. 96 •
^Gerstle

Mack,

The

L a n d

D i v i d e d . 136 .

^Castillero R., Hlstorla de P a n a m £ .
96 ; J o h n
H a s k e l l K e m b l e , " T h e G o l d R u s h b y P a n a m a , 1848-1851."

The Pacific Historical Review. XVIII (19^9). ^5; Mack.The
Land Divided. 136; William D. McCain, The United States
and the Republic of Panama (Durham, 193777 8-9•
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port of embarcation, setting a new record for the run, and
it reached Callao, Peru, on December 2?, 1848.

Stories

of the tremendous amount of gold in California had reached
Callao before the ship docked.

The desire for a share of

this wealth encouraged many Peruvians to board the almostempty California for San Francisco.

The ship set sail for

Panama on January 10, 184-9, where she arrived a week later
to find a port wild with gold-seekers. They had been
brought there by a small steamer, the Falcon and six other
7

v e s s e l s •’

While the California was sailing around Cape Horn,
the United States Mail Steam Line chartered the Falcon to
carry passengers to Panama, where it was to make connec
tion with the California. The Falcon left New York on
December 1, 1848, with only twenty-nine passengers for
California. Most of these were government employees and
missionaries.
Orleans.

The Falcon^ next port-of-call was New

By the time it left New Orleans on December 18,

1848, it carried one hundred ninety-three passengers.

The

A r g o n a u t s o f *49. 17; K e m b l e , T h e P a n a m a
33; M a c k , T h e L a n d D i v i d e d . 138-139*
Meanwhile, the California's two sister ships, the
Panama and the Oregon had left New York. The Panama left
New York on December 1, 1848, but was forced to return
to port because of engine trouble. She again set sail,
this time on February 17. 1849. The Oregon sailed on
December 9. 1848, arriving in Panama on February 23, 1849.
?Howe,

R o u t e .,
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news of the discovery of gold In California had spread
over the United States, and everyone was trying to get
to the gold fields• Of the one hundred ninety-three
passengers that boarded the ship in New Orleans, some
one-hundred fity southern backwoodsmen, carrying pans,
pots, axes and whatever kind of equipment they thought
necessary for digging gold, boarded the ship.

The Falcon

had berths for only one hundred additional passengers.
However, the ramlnlng gold seekers refused to leave the
ship.

The captain of the Falcon threatened to use force,

but backed down when the backwoodsmen spat tobacco Juice
on the deck and brandished their revolvers.

Finally,

the captain had to place bunks in the hold and in the
dining room.
The Falcon arrived at Chagres on December 27, 1848.
She was followed two days later by the John Benson, which
had left New York on December 11, 1848.

By the time the

California arrived at Panama on January 17. 1849, five
more vessels had arrived at Chagres, loaded with potential
prospectors.

When the California was ready to sail north

ward along the Pacific the following month, some ten
additional vessels had arrived at Chagres.

These seven

teen ships had brought in a total of 726 passengers.

This

great number of Argonauts created a problem for the
California, which only had been built to carry two hundred
fifty passegners• To make matters worse, when the
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Callltamla arrived at Panama, there were some seventy
Peruvians on board.

The Americans in Panama were infur

iated over the fact that Peruvians were taking up space
that they thought was "rightfully" theirs and they were
determined to put them ashore.

However, the whole affair

was finally settled when extra berths were constructed
outside in the open space for the South Americans.
the ship finally sailed for the gold fields, she

When

carried

some three hundred sixty-five passengers plus a crew of
thirty-six.

Over four hundred people sailed on a ship

that originally had been built for only two hundred fifty
passengers. The California was not the only ship to face
this problem.

Throughout the first few years of the Gold

Rush there existed a shortage of ships on the Pacific
Q

Coast.
Meanwhile, on the Caribbean side of the Isthmus
of Panama, after an average sea voyage from the East Coast
of eight days, ship after ship arrived, filled with
anxious, impatient gold-seekers usually wearing red shirts,
a slouch hat, and carrying a bowie knife and a revolver.
Ever since Porto Bello on the Atlantic (ea^t of the presentday canal) had been closed toward th'‘ end of the colonial

®Kemble, The Panama Route. 33-35; Mack, The Land
Divided. 138-140; Minter, The Chagres. 202.
Bonifacio Pereira Jimenez suggests that Minter*s
work authentically describes the Chagres of the Gold Rush.
B1ografia del Rio Chagres. (Panama, 1964), 89.
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period, ships on the Caribbean anchored at sea about one
mile from the town of Chagres.

This was necessary because

the water over a sand bar at the mouth of the Chagres
River had a depth of only thirteen feet.

Passengers had

to disembark into small native boats which carried them
to the town of Chagres located near the mouth of the
river on the south slde.^
CHAGRES

In 1848, according to the travelers, Chagres was a
dirty, smelly hole with a few mud huts with thatched
roofs.

Daniel A. Horn, a traveler from Alabama to Califor

nia via Panama in 1850, in a letter to his sisters and
mother, wrote the following description of native Chagres:
The houses are only hovels that, in the States,
would not even do for Negro quarters or even for a
respectable cow house. The whole town does not look
near so well as the quarters on a Southern planta
tion. They are built by planting four posts in the
ground, about 10 feet high, for the corners: Rafters
rafters /are7 made of cane or bamboo, forming a
very steep roof and covered with cocoa or palm
leaves, though when properly put on they make a
very tight roof, but do not last probably more
than a very few years• Many of them are not en
closed at all at the sides, and those that are have
only cane put upright and daubed with mud. . . •
They are filled with filth, have no beds, but /the
occupants/ either sleep in hammocks or have

9"A Yankee Trader in the Gold Rush: Letters of
Walter Gardner, 1851-1857," ed. John Walton Caughey,
Pacific Historical Review. XVII (1948), 4l6; White,
The Forty-Niners. 97.
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cowhides on the ground. They have no tables or
chairs, and the only cooking utensil I could see
was an earthen Jar something in the shape of a pot,
in which they cooked their food. They had no
dishes, forks, or spoons, and only a butcher*s
knife and a shell. • • for a spoon.1°
The impression of North Americans traveling across
the Isthmus at that time was probably the same as Horn*s.
Some insurance companies considered Chagres "the most
unhealthy place in Christendom," for which reason many
travelers had to forfeit their insurance polcies when
they stayed overnight at the town.
of the natives was 20 years;

The llfe-expectancy

the situation was aggravated

by the cholera brought in from New Orleans and New York
only to flourish in the heat of the tropics.

The first

outbreak killed one fourth of the native population.-1--1To make matters worse, between 1852 to 1855. chaos

ruled in Panama.

The Isthmians, led by Justo Arosemena

and General Tom&s Herrera, were trying to get approval
from the central government for statehood.

This would

enable them to be part of Colombia while still tending
to their own local problems with more interest and power.
These negotiations,rebellion against the reforms of the
Constitution of 1853. and political tensions, with their

10"Across the Isthmus in 1850; The Journey of
Daniel A. Horn," ed. James P. Jones and William Warren
Rogers, The Hlspanio American Historical Review, XLI
(1961), 3 ^ - 3 5 3 ^ --------------------------- ^George W. Groh, Gold Fever (New York, 1966), 36.
Kemble, The Panama Route,”lS7.
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sequel of violence, brought upon the Isthmus the curse of
instability and innumerable governors— some for a few days
only— which together with old and continual economic
problems some of whose roots went as far back as its fight
for independence from Spain, created an intense air of
insecurity, poverty and chaos.12

These manifestations

of total disintegration had muoh bearing on the unfavorable
able opinions of many a forty-niner in Panama.
Horn, in describing Chagres in 1850, said that
about half of the natives in Chagres were full-blooded
Negroes.

The remainder of the population was made up of

Indians, Spaniards and a mixture of all three.

The

natives spoke a combination of Spanish and African dia?lects which made it difficult for travelers, even those
who spoke Spanish, to understand them.

Their appearance,

according to Horn, was not as respectable as that of
Negroes in his home state of Alabama.

Their dress, Horn

wrote, except for few cases, would be termed indecent in
the United States.
than the men.

However, the women dressed better

They were fond of gaudy laces and other

types of ornaments, but lacked "taste" in the way they
dressed.

In total, according to Horn, the natives were

a little better off than s a v a g e s . ^

12Alba, Cronologfa. 176-180.
13"Across the Isthmus in 1850:

The journey of
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The climate of Chagres, according to some, caused
the natives to be lethargic*

It also made the Americans,

especially those who were In a hurry to get to California,
angry and, In some cases, brutal.

As soon as the Impatient

travelers got off the ships, they would ask the natives
how to get to Panama City.

The natives would point to

banana boats on the river which they called bungos.

These

boats were hollowed out from single logs and were about
twenty-five feet In length and about three feet In width.
They were covered with a palm-thatched roof to protect
bananas from the sun.

The Americans would then ask to be

taken to Panama City Immediately.

Of course, "Immediately"

was too soon for the natives, who would answer, "manana."
The Americans would reply, "*manyana hell.
right now.*"

We vamoose

The travelers would then drag the natives

toward the bungos, shouting and threatening them with
bodily Injury.
However, with the beginning of emigration to Cali
fornia, the area around the Chagres River underwent a
change.

In January, 18^9, when the Orus. the first

steamer to go up the Chagres River, arrived, the need for

Daniel A. HomJ' 535; Bayard Taylor, Eldorado or
Adventures In the Path of Empire (New York, 1931?)» H *
Actually, the natives probably dressed in appro
priate style for the climate of Chagres whloh was consi
dered to be the most unhealthful and uncomfortable on the
Isthmus.
lh
Minter,. The Chagres. 202.
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a permanent population of steamboat crews and mechanics,
express agents, bartenders, innkeepers, gamblers, waiters,
barbers, cooks and prostitutes.
Between the years 184-9 to 1851 at least three
dozen guidebooks

for traveling to the gold fields appeared

in the United States. One of the better guidebooks for
the Panama route was written by George Alexander Thompson
in 18^9.

Thompson included material from official reports

written by United States agents.

He also described

conditions to be found along the Isthmian route.

But

probably the best of the guidebooks was the one written
by Joseph W. Gregory, owner of an express company operating
between California and the Atlantic coast.

Gregory had

made the trip across the Isthmus several times.
By the end of 184-9, the new Chagres had four frame
hotels. The two main hotels were the Crescent City and
the Californian.

They were two-story wooden buildings,

with porches around each floor.

The rooms of these

hotels were huge barrack-styled chambers, filled with cots
which were rented at $4-.00 per night.

When the hotels

were overcrowded, hammocks were swung between posts and
rented out for $2*00 a night.

The hotels usually reserved

one room for women travelers.

But again, if the hotels

were pressed for space, women were placed in the same

•^Kemble, "The Gold Rush by Panama," 4-7, 4-9;
Minter, The Chagres. 236-237*
I

126

rooms, separated from the men by only a screen made of
palm leaves, blankets or sheets *3-® Some hotels were
merely tents at first;
tents.

furthermore, they were crowded

One Chagres Inn lacked a coffee grinder, as one

goldrusher discovered when he ordered coffee.
asked to wait while a fresh supply was prepared.

He was
Presently,

he glanced out the window only to see a native girl
squatting on the ground, chewing coffee beans and spitting
them into a pot.

The traveler decided not to have any

coffee after all.^9
Since refrigeration was impossible, the menus of
the hotel dining-rooms and the Eagle Cafe and Restaurant
in town included dried meat, bread, beans, fruits and
coffee.

The price for meals at these establishments

was much more reasonable than the prices for sleeping
quarters.

Because of the Black Swamp, which was located

behind the town, the eating places were usually filled
with cockroaches.20
Besides the bars of the four main hotels, there
also many others,including the Silver Dollar Saloon.
Liquid refreshments at these bars cost anywhere from one
dollar up. They were about seven times as expenisve as
drinks were in New York.

But the high cost of liquor did

18Minter, The Chagres. 238. 3-9Groh.Gold Fever.33.34.
20«Across the Isthmus in 1850x The Journey of
Daniel A. Horn," 535-536; Minter, 'Efce Chagres. 239.
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bitterly comments on the moral pains, the silent consequen
ces of those wild, and wooly days:
• • • nadie respetaba a nadie. Aventureros y
soldados norteamerlcanos llegaban a Fanam£ pensando
y creyendo que aquf no habfa que respetar vidas
ni haciendas. • • • Se imponfa el fuerte, el que
llevaba un revolver o un rifle. Violaban impunemente a las doncellas, ultraJaban a los ancianos;
los transedntes penetraban a las residencias con
clnlsmo imperdonable. Luoanares y cantinas eran
como minas sembradas en la mitad de la ciudad.
Tugurlos para el Juego y los vicios de las mfis
bajas especies. La danza del oro corri6 paralelamente con la macabra danza del delito. El pueblo
. . . sufre las depravaciones de inaleantes irresponsables. • • asimlla dolores que van dejando cica
trices en sus entrafias.• • oculta sus tristezas
•

•

•

•

23

Chagres, with all its wild pleasures and hardships,
was short-lived.

By November, 1851* the Panama Railroad

had built about ten miles of track inland from Aspinwall
and east of Chagres.

This advantage was discovered

accidentally by the ship Georgia that had been prevented
from docking at Chagres because of a storm.

After that,

travelers on their way to California would go to Aspinwall
and then ride the train inland as far as possible• All
the money extractors followed the travelers to Aspinwall
oh.
(Colon), and Chagres died.

23pereira, Historla de Panam£. 265-266.
2^Minter, The Chagres. 243, 266;
ment of Communication. 6o.

Russel, Improve
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T HE

R O U T E

FROM

CHAGRES

The original fees charged for going up the Chagres
had risen, before the Aspinwall "discovery," from ten
dollars per passenger to forty and fifty dollars, but
then declined by 1852 to about four dollars per passenger*
Even before the new facilities were available, natives at
Chagres had discovered that the Americans were not to be
so easily cheated, for
25
to be swindled.

by 1851 they had learned how not

During the dry season, from December until April,
the travelers' destination from Chagres was Gorgona, a
small village some forty miles from Chagres and about
twenty miles from Panama City.

During the remainder of

the year, the rainy season, forty-niners could go as far as
Cruces, another village located about five miles up the
Chagres River from Gorgona, and some fifteen miles from
Panama City.

The boat trip from Chagres to Gorgona took

about three days.

This, of course, depended upon ho

skillful the native boatmen
ness of the river current.

were and also upon the swift
During the rainy season,

native boats would usually travel at night, between the
hours of midnight and sunrise , the reasons being that it

25»Across the Isthmus in 18^+0: The Journey of
Daniel A. Horn," 536; Joseph Henry Jackson, Gold Rush
Album (New York, 1959). Ill; Kemble, The Panama Route.
1&9; Taylor, Eldorado. 12.
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usually rained In the daytime and the current of the river
would be too swift.

Layovers during the trip were ordin

arily at native villages along the river.

During the dry

season, travelers would hang up hammocks, if they had any,
for the night.

Some of the natives of the villages would

rent out space under roofs and sell food to the travelers
at outrageous prices.

Then at Gorgona and Cruces, native

towns of some five hundred inhabitants, there were some
hotels and saloons operated by Americans. °
From Gorgona or Cruces, the forty-niners would hire
mules and horses for the one-day trip to Panama City.
Baggage and other personal affects were usually carried
by the natives on their backs.

Some persons even rode In

chairs that were strapped to the heads of Negroes and
Indians.
problems.

For women, the journey to Panama City presented
In order to escape male abuses, many women wore

trousers and dressed like men.

Some women, however, wore

long skirts which made it difficult to ride the horses or
mules along the narrow, washed-out, muddy trial to Panama
City.
As the number of travelers using the Panama route
increased, various companies were formed to handle the

"Across the Isthmus in 1850: The Journey of
Daniel A. Horn," 538; Kemble, "The Gold Rush by Panama,1'
51-52; Kemble, The Panama Route. 169-172; Minter, The
Chagres. 223-229; Pratt, "To California by Panama in *49,"
901; Taylor, Eldorado. 12-19.
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transportation of freight across the Isthmus.

One such

company was Wells Fargo, famous freight company of the
West.2?
PANAMA CITY
After about a one-day ride, or two-day walk, and
after being exposed to cholera and other diseases, the
gold-seeker would arrive In Panama, which had a population
of about ten to twelve thousand.

Panama City, according

to an English vice-consul there, In 1856 was not a bad
looking city;
rather elegant.

and the inner walled area was actually
The arrabal'1 or outer city was populated

by colored peoples and animated by bustling dally activities
and colorful sights and smells— some not 30 pleasant.^8
There were few hotels in Panama at first, but facilities
continued to increase.

Panama became more and more Amer

ican in its ways as immigrants filled the city.

A news

paper, founded by an American in 1859, advertised the
American Hotel, the French Hotel and the Oregon Hotel, as
well as bars and restaurants, which were owned primarily by
Americans.

In the spacious dining hall of the American

Hotel, Protestant religious services were held each Sunday.

2?Jackson, Gold Rush Album. 116-117; Kemble, The
Panama Route. 171-172; Minter, The Chagres. 244;
Taylor, Eldorado. 19-20.
28Angel Rubio, La cludad de Panamg (Panama, 1950),

55.
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Some social functions, as well, were enjoyed by both
cultural groups on the Isthmus, the Panamanians and the
Americans.

Good relations existed between businessmen of

both groups, and advertising in the paper was done in
both languages.^9
After the long trip across the Isthmus at an average
cost of three hundred eighty dollars, the travelers expected
expected to leave immediately for California.

However, in

Panama they were usually faced with a delay, sometimes as
long as two months.

This meant spending additional money

on food and lodging.

Some travelers had bought through

tickets for the trip to California before they had left
New York, but many had to wait in Panama for their ship
to arrive• Others arrived on the Isthmus with no tickets
to California and had to depend on their luck for accom
modations • Many of there were at the mercy of speculators
who would buy up the tickets and then resell them at

^Eugene R. Huck and Edward H. Moseley, "The FortyNiners in Panama: Canal Prelude," Militarists. Merchants
and Missionaries (Univ. of Alabama, 1970), 59; Kemble,
"The Gold Rush by Panama," 53*
The first press to arrive in America*s new western
territory, which stands today on dispaly in the office
of the Independent, of Independence, Inyo County, Califor
nia, passed through Panama, It was brought by Judson
Ames of Baton Rouge, who arrived at Chagres in January of
1850. He formed the Panama Herald to keep other Americans
who were delayed in Panama informed. He later sold his
paper to the Panama Star and later the two names were
united to form the Panama Star & Herald which today is
Panama*s leading newspaper (and*"also has a Spanish edition)..
Minter, The Chagres. 214.

13**
huge profits.

30

These long delays in Panama City caused many
problems.

Riots and near-riots were not uncommon in the

city during the long periods of waiting.

Even after the

railroad was temporarily completed in 1855* chaotic
revolutionary activities in Bogotfi regarding the final
stages of General Melo*s revolt and the death of TomSs
Herrera had forced the garrison stationed in Panama to m
march to Cartagena.

The governor of Panama, Jos5 Mar£a

Urrutia Anino was spending much of this governing period
with his family in Nat£.

His lack of responsibility in

this regard and the absence of an effective police force
resulted in the even greater insecurity of the town.

Por

these reasons, the Railroad Company and navigation enter
prises had to depend on the "Isthmian Guard" under the
direction of Ran Runnels, for which even the Panamanians
were g r a t e f u l N e v e r t h e l e s s , ill-feeling, brought on by
boredom, impatience and the hot climate, caused much
trouble between immigrants and Panamanians.

Other causes

of trouble between the two groups were the landing tax of
two dollars charged by the local government and the
unhealthful environment in Panama.

Malaria and epidemics

3°Jackson, Gold Rush Album. 118-119; Kemble,
"The Gold Rush by Panama," 5**-57; Minter, The Chagres.
208; Taylor, Eldorado. 2**.
31see Chapter II.
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of cholera, which threatened to wipe out the Isthmian
population in 1849 and 1850, caused the death of many a
Forty-Niner.
Cholera had been brought to the Isthmus on the
Falcon and had spread voraciously over all the Isthmus.
The

coincidental

presence

of

General

Jo s6 D o m i n g o

Esplnar (see Chapter I) who was a military doctor also,
was a blessing, for he risked his life and sacrificed his
pay in trying to combat this epidemic.
wiped out finally in August of 1850.

The cholera was
So desperate were

the travelers because of their lamentable situation in
Panama that some would set out for California even in
32
canoes.-'
The Panama route, during the period between 184-8
and 1869, saw the transit of some 375.000 persons.

About

one-fifth of the total number of emigrants to the gold
fields between 184-9 and 1859 went across Panama.

From

1859 until 1869, nearly half the emigrants used the Isth
mian way.

Generals, naval officers,

finaciers and judges,

gamblers and women of 111-repute— all types of persons
bound for the new country— used the Panama route.

The

travelers via Panama were very significant in developing

3 2 A l b a , C r o n o l o g f a . 178-179;
Castillero R.,
H l s t o r l a d e P a n a m ^ t . 96-97:
J a c k s o n , G o l d R u s h A l b u m . 119;
K e m b l e , " T h e G o l d R u s h b y P a n a m a , " 53-55;
Mack, The
L a n d D i v i d e d . 146-14-8.
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materially the region of the Pacific Coast, and Panama,
with its narrow isthmus, once more proved to be the road
way for gold, for bustling activity and for commerce—
the Crossroads of the World.^3
Yet, its potential wealth remained in the hands of
others who did not sympathize with the internal problems
brought from elsewhere to the Isthmus.

The Isthmians

continued to suspect that Colombia was using the Isthmus
as a colonial source of wealth for the national govern
ment;

these suspicions arose from the favoritism shown

the United States on every issue (see chapter II) and the
fear of Colombia to take a stand in favor of Panama lest
it should lose financial benefits it could reap by "selling"
the Isthmians to the powerful commercial nation of the
north.

The sacrifices made by most Panamanians were not

sufficiently recompensed;

they were not the masters of

their destiny, even though there was a sense of unity, a
feeling of belonging apart from the rest of Colombia.

It

continued to appear that Isthmian sacrifices were for the
benefit of two foreign nations— Colombia and the United
States•

33iCemble, The Panama Route. 206-207.
One of Panama*s mottos is: Puente del Mundo.
Corazfin del Unlverso. which means, Bridge of the World,
Heart of the Universe.

CHAPTER V
TRANSITION, TURBULENCE, AND
TURMOIL:

1855 - 1898

From the completion of the Railroad and the esta
blishment of the Federal State of Panama In 1854 until
independence in 1903, the

Isthmus was plagued by inter

national, national and internal problems*

Rapid politi

cal change stemming from the clashes of Liberals and
Conservatives in Colombia, the withdrawal of powers of
local self-government by a centralist Colombia, violence
associated with those changes and with racial and eoonomic
problems on the Isthmus, and inflammatory rhetoric, all
intensified local grievances.

One estimate summarized

this turmoil as 40 different administrations, some 50
riots and rebellions, five attempts to secede from
Colombia, and at least thirteen interventions by the
United States.

Nothing seemed to bring internal peace,

not political change, not foreign intervention, not even
the optimism engendered by the French Canal project.
But one certainty did emerge in the minds of Panama's
leaders:

They became more certain than ever that Panama's

interests required the attainment of local self-govern
ment.

In 1898 they believed that this might be possible

within a Colombia ruled by the Liberal Party.
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By 1903
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they had decided to seek independence in name as well as
fact.

The second half of the nineteenth century is thus

the story of how Colombia drove Panama to seek an inde
pendence toward which her internal political and economic
development had long pointed and in which international
forces, especially the United States, had vested inter
ests
ORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL STATE
Justo Arosemena handled the organization of the
Federal State from July to September of 1855 with vigor,
logic and dedication, inspiring new attitudes and the
confidence that great things could be accomplished.

He

adpated laws which his experience in the National Govern
ment and abroad had shown were useful, and refused to let
reactionary forces implant obsolete and even cruel laws
(as for example, a bill to revive

debtor*s prison).

Nevertheless, some of his serious suggestions, like the
establishment of an Income tax, were considered so radical
that when they did get written into law they were hardly
enforced.
Despite his great energy and the amount of work
which Arosemena did in organizing the wheels of government,
he only remained two and a half months (July to September

ICastillero, Historla de Panamg. 76-130;
Colombia and the United States. 2l£.

Parks,
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of 1855) as head of the State.

His resignation was

effected under a personal mood of deception and some
bitterness.

A critical issue which helped create Arose

mena 's feelings dealt with the fees which the state hoped
to collect for itself and which were relentlessly attacked
by foreign commerical enterprises, including the Railroad
Company, and by some members of the Isthmian community.
Arosemena felt that such laws were fair.

In the past he

had argued that a trans-isthmian route which would go
straight through would not enrich or even stimulate
greatly the economy of the Isthmians.

Apparently he

supported the tonnage fees as a means of insuring that
Panama would profit from its position as an Isthmian and
commercial entity and get some good from having the rail
road exist in its midst.

However, pressure was brought

to bear on Amrosemena when opposing elements not only
published criticisms in the Star and Herald, but also
appealed to the Bogota Government to annul the laws
regarding tonnage.

This the Bogota Government did al

though not until after Arosemena had resigned.
Arosemena had foreseen this response of the Bogota
Government, because he knew full well the great pressure
exerted by the railroad interests.

He had prompted a

law in order to mitigate such conflicts of authority and
to make it possible for the Isthmian government to retain
some semblance of dignity when faced with similar dilemnas

and conflicts.

Arosemena*s law was essentially a pro

vision that the execution of any state law could be
suspended by the governor in the event that conflict over
it arose between the national and the state authorities.
Thus, absolute showdowns could be more gracefully
resolved than otherwise would have been possible.

2

The leaders of Panama were already aware, then,
at this early stage following the completion of the
railroad, that their relationship with the United States
was potentially dangerous, and that the advantages their
geographical blessings promised were illusory and disap
pointing.

Economic interventions, supported by strong

military threats, were foreseen as frequent events by men
like Justo Arosemena;

the realization of such probabili

ties also made its bitterness felt among other Panamanians
who, like Don Justo, had hoped for far greater benefits
for their country.
Francisco de FAbrega, the vice-governor, replaced
Justo Arosemena as governor.

FAbrega named a conservative

like himself, BartolomA Calvo, to the post of Secretary
of State, an important ministry at this time because it
was during Fabrega's administration that the Infamous

2Pablo Arosemena, Esorltos. Vol. I, ed. Nicolas
Victoria J. (Panama, 19307T^5¥T” Chong, Hlstorla de
PanamA. 174; Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. llo117', £ 50- 255 .
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Watermelon War took plaoe.

The riot (as It essentially

was) was the culmination and the foous of many problems
facing both North Americans and Panamanians during this
the epoque during and after the construction of the
Railroad.

The incidents leading up to the riot and the

its denouement are particularly important in attempting
to show to what depths communication and mutual respect
between the two groups had degenerated within such few
years.

As typical (though on a larger scale) of action

stemming from attitudes which had been developing on the
Isthmus, the WatermeLon War desrves to be examined closely.
Furthermore, a detailed account is essential in any
effort to familiarize the historian with the spirit of
those bines in Panama.
THE WATERMELON WAR
The events that began the afternoon of April 15»
1856, were consequences of attitudes and reactions which
had been building up since the arrival of the Fortyniners.

As we have already seen in Chapter IV, a great

number of these Americans were of undesirable character.
Many of them were brash, rude, and topped their faults
with an air of arrogance which was difficult for the
natives to ignore.

Such insults to the local culture as

the Forty-niners lighting their cigars with the candles
in the churohes were taken as evidence of the disdain

lM r2

which the Americans felt for everything that did not
pertain to their own culture or creeds.

Since many

people carried firearms and knives with which to protect
themselves from abuse, It was Inevitable that clashes
would occur.

One such clash was the racial-cultural riot

which Is known as the Watermelon War, which ended In the
death of sixteen to eighteen

persons and the wounding

of several Americans and Panamanians.
The riot began near the railroad station or ter
minal building In Panama City near a district which had
been built up by American business men to cater primarily
to the Americans who were stopping In Panama before going
across or who had Just crossed the Isthmus and were wait
ing for their ocean vessels.

By the mid 1850-s, American-

run business places had almost all disappeared from the
Inner city, and passengers usually went no farther than
those hotels, saloons and brothels owned by Americans and
other whites, which had sprung up along the beach between
the railroad and the walled city.

The railroad terminal

Itself was situated along the beach, three-eighths of a
mile north of the walled city of Panama.

The station

building was a split-level structure of plain pine boards.
The lower floor, seven feet off the ground, was primarily
a freight room, with a baggage room and a railroad and
ticket office at the eastern, or beach, end of the build
ing.

On the second floor on that end were three more

14-3

offices and a telegraph room.

There was no waiting room*

The ticket office opened on to a wide platform on the
north side of the building where passengers filed past to
buy their tickets.-^
On Tuesday, April 15. 1856, at about 5*30 p.m., a
drunk California-bound traveler, Jack Oliver, and some
companions left a saloon some 200 yards from the railroad
station.

Oliver decided he wanted a piece of watermelon

which was being sold by a mulatto fruit vendor— Jose Man
uel Luna.

Oliver took the piece of watermelon, ate part

of it but refused to pay.
ing his money.
bother me.

Luna followed the drunk demand

Oliver became insultive with a "Don't

Kiss my arse."

Luna warned him that they

were not in the United States— to pay and get it done with.
Oliver drew his pistol, saying that that was his payment.
Luna drew his knife.

Friends of each tried to intervene.

One of Oliver's companions offered to pay but was ignored.
Probably things would have settled down if a light-colored
Peruvian Negro, Miguel Abraham, had not snatched Oliver's
pistol which went off but did not hurt anyone. Oliver and
his friends gave chase, threatening to kill the Peruvian.
Abraham was able to lose them,and the Americans brazenly
continued to a saloon to celebrate and boast about the

3John C. Kennedy, 11Incident on the Isthmus,"
American Heritage. XIX, No. 4- (June, 1968), 66.
^Ibid., 67•

incident*

News of the disturbance spread, and mushroomed

the incident out of proportion.

Suddenly, the bells of

the Church of Santa Ana began to peel, followed by another
round closer to the area involved •-> Crowds began to surge
from the city through the Cl£nega (a crowded slum of
shanties between Santa Ana and the railroad station,
stretching beaohward as far as the saloons and hotels).
The mob was after Oliver.

It entered the American busi

ness sector, breaking things, looting and demanding Oliver,
but Oliver had already left.

Those Americans in the sec

tor who could sought refuge in the railroad station,
where they found danger, not security.
About 950 persons, more than one half of them women
and children, had arrived earlier in the day from Col&i to
board the John L. Stephens which was anchored in the bay.
Some had already boarded the Taboea. which was to take them
to the Stephens. but since it was low tide the Taboga
was temporarily stranded in the mud at the foot of the
railroad wharf.

By six o*clock in the evening, about 600

individuals had been processed and most of them had

^Apparently someone had heard "fireI" and even
though mass was being celebrated, the church bells of Santa
Ana (not too near the Ci£nega) rang as was the custom.
Clifford A. Hauberg, "Economic and Social Developments in
Panama, 18^9-1880" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of
Minnesota, 1950), 207; Parks, Colombia and the United
States. 219•

boarded the Taboga» However, there still were more than
300 to be processed*

Another crowd in the yard consisted

mainly of passengers who had arrived from the West Coast
and were to take the train to Col6n*

As the riot continued

in the American business sector close by, the travelers
inside the station became almost desperate with fear, for
they lacked an adequate number of firearms and ammunition*
Railroad officials tried to reassure the crowds of passen
gers with reminders that the power of the Railroad was
held in awe by the natives and that a message for protec
tion had been sent to the police chief*

A group decided

to leave the station and go to one of the hotels to rescue
some stranded women and children from the terror of the
natives.

However, they were driven back and then fired

upon from within the compound.

The danger of the situa

tion became more and more apparent to the passengers at
the station and the superintendent of the Railroad handed
out the last few arms left.^
Meanwhile, the United States consul, Colonel Thomas
Ward, who was actually not too popular with the American
residents of Panama because of his outspoken and blunt
manner, sent his secretary to fetch Governor Francisco

^Kennedy, "Incident on the Isthmus," 66, 67, 6s ;
Sosa and Aroe, Compendlo. 240-241. Actually, the only
weapons left were a double barrel shotgun, a pair of
pistols, a sabre, and a rusty 14-year-old Flintlock
musket. Kennedy, "Incident on the Isthmus, 69.
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FtSbrega, who had by this time arrived at La Cl£nega to
try to calm things down.

Fdbrega found, however, that

the riot had taken a new direction and was aimed at
destroying all whites, not only Amerioans. Being white
himself and representing socially the white native
element of the population, F£brega was afraid that action
to curb the riot against the Americans might further
drive the rioting people against the white Panamanians J
Nevertheless, F^brega so resented the arrogance of the
consul in sending for him, the governor, that he refused
to meet with him until arrangements were made to meet
each other half-way.

But Ward and the Governor missed

each other ithe Governor got fired at Instead In the very
area where they were supposed to meet.
through his hat.

A bullet went

Ward*s secreatry, who was with the

Governor, was wounded.

The Governor then ordered police

to take the railroad station;

mob and police both

wanted to control the railroad terminal and the Americans
resisted, but the mob finally overran the station;

the

mob attacked men and women, looting and destroying.
Outside the Immediate circle of the turmoil, Ward
Q
and some railroad officials found the Governor and

7Kennedy, "Incident on the Isthmus," 69; Sosa and
Arce, Compendlo.241. The mob ran down the streets orylng:
"hueran los blancosl" Hubert H. Bancroft, History of
Central America. Vol. 3 (San Francisco, I 8S 7), 5 2 0 .

Arce,

^Kennedy, "Incident on the Isthmus," 70; Sosa and
Compendlo.241-242. The officials were Captain Allan
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reminded him that the United States would no doubt send a
warship, and who could answer for what might follow?
Though the Governor felt he could not oontrol the looting
and destruction, he was able to prevent the shooting which
the blacks had Intended to do with a canon from the
Taboga.

Governor F5brega reminded them that there were

two Panamanian women aboard the vessel and that they would
be killing their own people.

By thus appealing to the

reason of some of the more influential men among the
negro populace, he was able to avert further destruction
and loss of life.

Passengers were allowed to leave the

station and board the Taboga. The police chief and rail
road officials had their hands full trying to keep the
natives from shooting and the police from bayonetting the
passengers.

The riot was over.

About sixteen passengers

had been killed, and some mutilated;

about sixteen were

injured.

The natives lost one or two lives and had some
9
fifteen injured.
There was an official inquiry, headed by Amos Corwine, a former United States consul.

The findings of

McLane, the Pacific Mail agent; Alexander Center, Super
intendent; and William Nelson, railroad employee. The
Police chief was colored. Ibid.
^Bancroft, History of Central America. 521;
Kennedy, lfIncident on the Isthmus, 72; Sosa and Aroe,
Compendlo. 242.
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this group was that the riot was the result of Abraham's
"rashness*"

Corwine recommended that the United States

take over and occupy Panama.

This option and version of

the situation were popular in the United States.^-®
A few months after the Watermelon incident, Pablo
(nephew or cousin of Don Justo) published an analysis of
the investigations held by the North Americans.

Among

other things, he discredited through logical arguments
the accusations of a certain consul that the affair was
premeditated

In doing so, Arosemena showed the many

faults in the gathering of testimony (such as the language
barrier between investigators and witnesses) and such
careless assumptions on the part of some witnesses as
that of stating that the church bell of La Cienega (where
there was not one church) might have been a signal to
others.

He also referred to the lack of cooperation of

the American consul when the Panamanian public interpreter
was sent by the Governor of Panama at the request of the
consul himself to copy the testimonies of the North

Corwine relied on the testimony of four employees
of the Railroad who had been near the scene of the actions
which started the riot. They said the incident concerning
the watermelon occurred at 6*30; that Luna spoke English
and was using bad language, cursing; that Luna followed
Oliver with a knife; that Oliver then drew his pistol, but
put it back at the request of passengers near by; at that
moment a light-colored negro grabbed it, fired it, missed
Oliver but hit Dennis Shannon (one of the four witnesses);
that no shots were fired by the passengers at the natives
but that Luna and Abraham left for the Ci6nega and returned
with three other natives armed with machetes and threaten
ing the Americans• Then the mob that had welled attacked
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Americans.11
In spite of these protests, the United States
demanded compensation.

After long negotiations and armed

intervention, the North Americans received about $400,000
1?
in gold.
This payment was made with great reluctance,
for the Colombian Government felt that the United States
had no legal claim to any payment whatsoever.

The Colom

bian Government conoeded that the police force was not
present in sufficient proportion to humanly control the
riot.

Nevertheless, it did not agree with the claims of

the United States that the Colombian Government should
pay in this case any more than the United States had
paid in common criminal oases of brutality perpetrated
continually by American passengers of the lower class
upon the Panamanians;

that is,to pay nothing.

In the

view of the Colombians this outrage was similar to
those perpetrated on Panamanians except that it had reached
notorious proportions.

As to the claims that foreigners

the hotels and bars looking for Oliver. Hauberg, "Econo
mic and social Developments in Panama, 1849-1880," 204-205*
Pablo Arosemena, Escrltos. 159-210.
^Correa, Apuntes de Hlstorla Patrla. 138; Sosa
and Arce, Compendlo. 242. In Kennedy, "Incident on the
Isthmus," 72, the sum is said to be $160,000. Alba, Cronologfa. 184, says the sum paid was 584,603 pesos oro.
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should have the rights of protection from the Government
of the host country, the Colombian ministry of Foreign
Affairs was In complete accord.

However, this prlnolple

was argued further, qualifying the rights as well as the
obligations of foreigners everywhere to abide by the laws
. of the host country:^
El extranjero no tlene nl puede pretender
para s£ mayor protocolfin que la que se dlspensa a
los cludadanos: el extranjero tlene tamblfin el
deber de respetar y obedecer las leyes del
Estado en que reside; y si con sus desacatos a
la autorldad del pals, y con sus contlnuos acto
de brutalldad contra los naturales, provoca
desfirdenes y represallas, no tlene razfin para
culpar por ello al pals nl a su Gobiemo, no
deblendo culparse mas que a si mlsmo.14
Several conclusions were reached concerning the
causes of this the worst racial riot of Panama up to
that time, among them the following:
(1)

Importation of Negro labor during the cons

truction of the Panama Railroad had added a disorderly
element to the population;
(2)

Many Immigrants, passengers, and some

undoubtedly desperate characters, were a disturbing fac
tor, for many had strong convictions concerning the place
the Negro should ocoupy In society, and their resultant

13Pablo Arosemena, Escrltos, 219-223; Alba,
Cronologla. 184, feels that the United States claims were
unfair considering the culpability of Jack Oliver and
other Americans through the years.
l4
Pablo Arosemena, Escrltos. 222.
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air of superiority could only lead to confrontations
between the two groups;
(3)

Deep political suspicions had been engen**

dered in the minds of officials and the people by the
operations of the filibusters and William Walker in
Nicaragua and by the annexation resulting from the
Mexican War (18^5-18^8)•

The popularity in the United

States press of the idea of taking over the Isthmus
justified the fears of the Panamanians.1^
Justo Arosemena, though not directly Involved in
this disaster, had strong feelings about it and explained
the roots of the tragedy thuslys
Los Estados Unldos excitan la cod^cla. • • y
de aqul viene que, de tlempo atr&s, los hombres de
la raza yankee^que pasan por el Istmo o se
establecen en el, se afanan por suscltar difloultades de todo genero a fin de hacer imposible en
el Estado todo gobiemo que emane de los naoionales, y preparar y justificar asi, lentamente, un
movimiento que de por resultado algtin dla la
absorci&n del Istmo entero por los Estados
Unldos.16
Arosemena's opinion probably had been encouraged by the
pressures he himself had had to resist when he was trying
to organize the Federal State and was defeated by the

l^Alba, Cronologfa. 185; Hauberg, "Eoonomic and
Social Developments in Panama, 181*9-1880," 202; Rippy,
The Capitalists and Colombia (New York, 1931)* ^5*
On the matter of fear of war between Colombia and
the United States over Panama, see; Pablo Arosemena,
Esoritos. 230-236•
l6Quoted in Chong, Hlstorla de Panamg. 175*
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power of the United States Government operating on behalf
of the Railroad.
More reoent opinions tend to see In the Watermelon
War the results of economic pressures felt by the masses
after the end of the construction of the railroad, aggra
vated by the already common superior attitudes of Ameri
cans and long years of oppression of the colored peoples
many of whom had only recently been freed from legal
slavery.^7
INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND THE FEDERAL STATE
The Isthmus was beset by other problems besides
the race riots, but while enemies of the Federal State
were blaming It for the fiscal troubles of the Isthmus
(which were actually Inherited from previous mismanage
ment and expenses), and while many criticized Its policies
Io

as supportive of oligarquical groupsxo

the wheels of

?See: Kennedy, "Incident on the Isthmus," 66;
Alba, Cronologfa. 18^; Chong, Hlstorla de PanamA. 175*
Slaves were freed in 1852* Justo Arosemena had
been a chief promulgator of that law. Pereira, Hlstorla
de Panama. 27^*
Perhaps if Justo Arosemena had still been governor,
his public reputation far racial compassion might have
enabled him to mitigate the riot by influencing the
rioters. By that time, however, he had left the country
for the United States where his children studied* (He
eventually remarried a North American lady after being a
widower.)
^According to the biographers of Justo Arosemena,
his father Mariano did take advantage of his son's pres
tigious positions to try and enhance his own personal
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government kept turning*
The first regualr elections for Governor of the
State and for diputados to the asamblea under the
Constitution of 1855 were held early in 1856.

Many

candidates for governor were proposed, among them Justo
Arosemena, Bartolom€ Calvo (Secretary of State under
Fdbrega), Manuel Marfa Dfaz, Rafael N&ffez, Tomds Cipriano
de Mosquera, SalvadorCamacho Rolddn and Pedro Alcfintara
Herrin.

However, for many reasons, the first three

remained candidates as long as Arosemena did*

Arosemena

had resigned form the governorship under such circumstances
as to lead the public to believe that he no longer wanted
to govern.

His family was opposed to his candidacy.

His father feared that if Justo won the election the
prestigious positions which many members of the family
held would be J e o p a r d i z e d . j ) 0n Justo himself wrote the
following with regard to this situation:

situation. It was difficult for people to make distinc
tions between close members of a well-known family group.
That is why Don Justo was also inoluded in crltiolsms
such as this situation incited. Moscote and Aroe, Justo
Arosemena. 258-260.
It should be noted that Don Mariano had previously
considered that the oligarchy would take advantage of
power in a federal system, but had considered that the
oligarchy was composed of families like the F£bregas and
not his own. Mir<5, Mariano Arosemena. 21.
However, for whatever reason (probably due in part
to scarcity of competently trained administrators)
Fdbregas and especially Arosemenas held many Important
posts in the government.
^■9Alba, Cronologfa. 181; Moscote and Aroe, Justo
Arosemena. 264-267? ^osa and Arce, Compendlo. 242-244.
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Yo pertenezco a una fami 11a. • • extensa de
la que varios mlembros sirven o servir&n despu^s
empleos muy importantes; y un goblerno ouyo Jefe
en el ramo ejecutivo se hallase llgado poor
estreehos vlnculos de parentesco a las personas
que slrvlesen bajo sus ordenes o encabezaran los
otros ramos del poder pfiblico, merecerfa con
sobra de raz6n el calificatlvo de ollg&rquico.
Nuestra conclencia podrla estar y se hallarfa, en
efeoto, del todo tranqulla, si s6lo atendl^semos
al flel oumplimiento de los deberes; pero el
pueblo, celoso de una libertad ouyo valor es
lnapreclable, mlrarla con Justa desoonflanza
semeJante estado de oosas.20
The Conservative BartolomS Calvo won the election,
but the Liberal party was able to capture a majority of
the seats of the asamblea. Calvo was not a native of the
Isthmus, but he had the support of even some Liberals like
Pablo Arosemena and Gil Colunje whose prestige was already
on the rise.

He also had the support of Ffibrega, under

whom Calvo was Secretary of State.

This led some comment

ators to the opinion that F^brega was merely ruling
through Calvo.

Passionate but petty rivalries In the

asamblea resulted In such spiteful actions by opposers to
Calvo suoh as boycotting the asamblea and not forming a
quorum in

order to prevent certification of the new

governor elect.

Inflammatory newspapers and other

pressures finally led Ffibrega to arrest and deport two
dlputados considered to be the most vocal and ardent
members of the Liberal Party, Jos6 Marfa Goytfa and Pedro

20 Moscote and Aroe, Justo Arosemena. 266.
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Goytfa.

Fdbrega was hard-pressed to Justify or explain

this arbitrary action (diputados enjoyed immunity) but it
did restore some calm to the state congressional activi
ties, and it prevented a rebellion called for by members
of the Liberal Party.21
Perhaps more conducive to the stifling of the
rebellion were the two warships, the Independence and
the St. Mary1s which the United States sent to the area.
Commodore William Mervine landed about 160 men and
occupied the railroad station on September 19, 1856, be
because of the danger of civil war posed by the political
arguments between Liberals and Conservatives in the
asamblea.

The United States was ill-disposed to allow

the recurrence of Watermelon War deaths because of
indadequate forces.

22

In order to offset the effects

of negative propaganda, Calvo secured favorable conditions
for foreigners and was successful in demonstrating the
ability of the Isthmian government to guarantee security
of the transit area.

He was able to restore the treasury

(which was and had been constantly under the strain of
foreign debt) in two years, through wise and well

21Ibld.■ 26?;

Sosa and Aroe, Compendlo. 26?•

22Parks, Colombia and United States. 224.
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administered fiscal policies.

A sales tax was levied,

certain properties or holdings of the government were .
sold, more care was exercised in the effectiveness of the
tax collecting system, certain taxes were moderately raised
raised and others were more fairly and evenly distributed;
and finally all government employees, from the governor
to the last public employee, suffered salary decreases.
When Calvo resigned in 1858 to accept the post of
Procurador General de la Nacifin, the second in command,
don Ram6n Gamboa took over until new elections.
elections were won by Jos5 de Obaldfa.
resented Obaldfa;

The

Some Liberals

many held that his lack of vigorous

campaigning In the national elections campaign of 1854,
during which he had run as vice-presidential candidate,
had allowed the victory to fall in the hands of the Con
servatives.

In spite of that resentment, in the 1858

gubernatorial elections on the Isthmus, he was again
launched as a Liberal candidate.

This time he won,and

the asamblea unanimously elected Doctor Rafael Nfinez as
vice-governor.2-^

23Alba, Cronologia. 185-186;
Compendlo. 245-247.

Sosa and Aroe,
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TENSION IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AFFECTS PANAMA
Because the Liberals In Colombia were again spilt,
the elections of 1857 brought a Conservative triumph In
congress and In the presidency, to which Doctor Mariano
Osplna Rodriguez was elected.

The statehood of Panama of

1855 was followed by similar legal arrangements to form
seven other states (Antloquia, Santander, Bolfvar, Boyac&,
Cundinamarca, Cauoa and Magdalena) In 1858;

Its state

hood was safe from abolishment In spite of the Conserva
tive victory, for It was no longer the Liberals who were
ardently advocating the formation of these states.

The

Conservatives were upholding Federalism, not from point
of principle, but for convenience, In the hope that they
could gain local autonomy In certain states where they
could consider their beliefs safe from outside Inter
ference.

The Liberals, on the other hand, felt that only

through some stronger voice In the federal government
could they hope to regain the power they had lost In so
many states.

Consequently, they chose not to Intensify

support of the sovereignty of the states, the majority
ok

of which were In the hands of the Conservatives. ^
In 1859 trouble again flared In Colombia.
2k

The

Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia. 217-221,
2^7-249; Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia. 467-^72;
Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 275^277.
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Conservatives, with a majority In congress, passed several
laws.

One reduolng the size of the standing army infur

iated not only the army but also the moderate Liberals,
groups which had been supporltng each other for years.
(Possibly, the desire on the part of the Liberals to gain
back control of the government made them prefer to have
at least the alleglence of available Federal forces in
the event of insurrections from Conservative states.)
Another law increased the governments control of the
states1 militias.

The law that most enraged the Liberals

gave the government great powers of intervention in state
elections.

Since Conservatives were in power in the

federal government

such intervention would tend to be in

favor of the Conservatives.

One important and very irri

tating law dealt with the special post of Intendente
created to defend the territory of Panama and to assure
the safety of foreigners and their Interests in accord
with international agreements.

The law later was extended

to other states, in spite of protests from the Isthmus
that the Intendente was abusing his extensive powers.
The wide range of powers which the new Intendentes had,
created conflicts with the powers of the various govern
ments of Cauca, Magdalena and Santander and led to the
civil war which followed.

In Magdalena furthermore,

where elections had given the vote to extreme Liberals
(Radicals), Conservatives revolted but were crushed.
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However, the President of the Republic (Osplna) gave
Important positions within the federal government to the
leaders of this revolt, and they In turn accused the
Liberals of being anarchists, Immoral and tyrants.
Liberals In Magdalena were Indignant.

The

Realizing the

danger they faced, they made an alliance with the state
of Santander In order to defend their sovereignty and
political existence.

The Conservatives, however, acually

had some basis to orltlceize the state of Santander, for
such extreme laws were promulgated there that even Liber
als were not pleased with some of them.2-*
The atmosphere of tension created by all these
laws and subsequent distrust and disagreements between
the two parties led to Conservative as well as Liberal
revolts throughout Colombia.

General Mosquera was made

'•Supreme Director of the War” by the Liberals In i860.

Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia. 247-249;
Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia, 467-472, Moscote
and Aroe, Justo Arosemena. 281-288; Sosa and Aroe,
Compendlo. 247.
Some of the Radical laws were: Only civil marriage
was considered valid and oould be dissolved by only one
partner; a man and woman were to be considered married
If they had lived under the same roof for over one year;
Illegitimate children were to be admitted Inot the same
home, at the same table and to equal Inheritance rights
with legitimate children; violation of women over twelve
years of age was not to be considered a crime /the author
believes this may refer to statutory rape/; persons
Instigating or taking part In the violent overthrow of the
government were not to be punished, and the government
only had the right to resist. Moscote and Arce, Justo
Arosemena. 285-286.
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Although a Liberal, the governor of Panama, Jos6 de Obaldfa, refused to implicate Panama in the wars

and his suc

cessor, Santiago de la Guardia, a Conservative chosen
through popular election for the term i860 to 1862, also
maintained the neutrality of the Isthmus.

These leaders

felt that it behooved Panama to verbally support the
legitimate forces of Colombia whenever such forces
respected tis statehood and its sovereignty over certain
Jurisdictions.

Since the Conservatives were losing, how

ever, the Isthmians under the leadership of de la Guardia,
declared themselves separate from the Colombian government
the 31 of

March, 1861.

Once the war was practically won

by the Liberals (1861) and peaceful restoration seemed
in order, Colombia proposed that Panama Join what the new
government chose to call the United States of Nueva
Granada.

Panama signed the Convenlo de Coldn of September

6, 1861, in which Colombia agreed to continue to support
its statehood, and in which Panama agreed to again be part
26
of Colombia.
However, this new annexation was not
completely formalized until after a confrontation between
the new federal government and the legitimate state
government of Santiago de la Guardia.
As has been noted, Obaldfa and then de la Guardia

2^Alba, Cronologfa. 190.
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had prevailed on the Isthmians to refuse a'ld to the non
legit lmate forces of Mosquera.

This state of neutrality

and then of Independence on the Isthmus while the Federa
tion was In the midst of war and chaos had serious reper
cussions.

When Mosquera won, he was not at all eager to

please the Panamanians.
Mosquera suspected that Panamanians wanted Indepen
dence.

Though as a whole his suspicions were unfounded,

he felt that de la Guardia might have been moving In that
27
direction.
Thus, he did not heed the Convenlo de Coldn
He felt he was strong enough to get the type of agreement
he wanted without consideration for the wishes of the
28
Panamanians.
To that end he sent Colonel Peregrlno
Santacoloma with troops to Panama In June of 1862.

In

two letters dated the 9th and the 23rd of June of 1862,
on behalf of Governor de la Guardia, Pablo Arosemena (who

^Justo Arosemena later wrote about de la Guardia:
"La adhesidn personal de algunos amigos, fue tomada por
apoyo de todos los istmeffos /by de la Guardia7, sin distinci6n de colores polfticos. Pero en el fondo su mdvll,
de que estol clerto que no se daba cuenta, (y eso sucede
a todo hombre frecuentemente) era la lndependencla.
Quoted in Soler, Pangftmlento panameflo £ conoepoldn de la
naolonalldad durante el Slglo XIX. 110.
Rlcaurte Soler believes that many PanamanlanSfSubconsclously at least, were groping for Independence.
Ibid. 109-111.
28I b l d . .

105-110
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during his career was representative and senator In the
Federal Congress, Diputado In the State asamblea and
President of the State of Panama) voiced the suspicions
which this military Intervention had aroused in Governrment circles in Panama.

The fact that no previous notice,

formal or informal, had been given to Panamanian officials
by Mosquera*s government concerning the landing of troops
on the Isthmus, had fanned these suspicions.

Santacoloma

"explained" the arrival of the troops to Pablo Arosemena,
but the reasons given seemed very weak to the Panamanians
who felt that their sovereignty was at stake.29
In the meantime, Justo Arosemena had been sent to
Bogota to try to enforce the Convenio de Col6n.

He

failed to convince Mosquera or to counterbalance Mosquera's suspicions regarding desires for total indepen
dence on the Isthmus.

When de la Guardia was killed in

Panama on July 25, 1862, fighting against the forces of
Mosquera under Santacoloma in defense of state sovereignty,
Arosemena was blamed for de la Guardia*s death. 30

29Pablo Arosemena, Escrltos. 270-280.
30
J Soler, Pensamlento Pftnamaffo £ conoepclfln de la
naclonalldad durante el Slglo XIX. 109.
Even in some contemporary opinions, Justo Arosemena
is criticized. Rlcaurte Soler compares Arosemena and
de la Guardia in the following way: "Dos opuestas soluciones encontraron los estadlstas istmeffos complicados en
los aconteclmlentos. Arosemena optd por aoeptar provislonalmente la violacidn de la soberanfa en previsidn de
un desenlace impuesto por las armas. Es la decisi8n
lOglca de su temperamento frfo y mentalldad utilitaria.
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THE CONVENTION OP HIO NEGHO
AND REPERCUSSIONS
The vengeful mood of Liberal national government's
activltes In 1861 only helped to widen the gap between
Liberals and Conservatives on the Isthmus*

Delegates for

the Constitutional Convention at Rio Negro were elected
without the participation of Conservatives at all*

The

Convention met In February of I863 and by the 8th of May
proclaimed the new Constitution for Colombia*
Although the alms of the Liberals were in gneeral
of the highest motives and desires, the Constitution's

De la Guardia recurritf a la fuerza y perece en la accidn
de Mata-Palo /jHh&Te he was killed, in the Interior of
Panamg/ a la edad de 33 affos. Es la decision psicoldgica
de un espfritu dionlsfaco y apasionado que sacrlflca su
vlda a 'su deber 1 su dlgnldad, la soberanfa del Estado
1 la legalidad de su Gobierno. *" Ibid.
Nevertheless, Arosemena defended himself after the
death of de la Guardia, showing the reasons why he had
failed in an article entitled "El Convenlo de Ccldn."
This Convenlo had made Panama a part of the Estados Unldos de Nueva Granada during a period of war In Colombia*
When Mosquera*s victory was certain enough to establish
a more permanent Estados Unidos de Colombia, Panama,
according to Mosquera, was incorporated under different
stipulations and with less sovereignty than provided for
in the Convenlo de Coldn* Mosquera's legal argument was
sound according to Arosemena* Moreover, the fact that
Mosquera felt that he could enforce his will regardless
of Panamanian wishes, led to the failure of Justo Arosemena's attempts to have the Convenlo accepted by Mos
quera *s government* Justo Arosemena, "El convenlo de
Colfin," Teorfa de la naclonalldad (Panama, 1968),
especially 4-7-50; Chong, Hlstorla de Panama. 178-181;
Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 292-295*
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authors did not clearly foresee some weaknesses which were
later to cause many conflicts.

The description by Justo

Arosemena of the Constitution five years after it had
been proclaimed, shows that this man, who had actively
participated in the formation of the document, had by
then realized why it was failing in carrying out the jus
tice which the delegates felt they had made possible in
1863*
En la parte de derechos civiles proclam dos,
fue prolija y escrupulosa; pero omitid los medios
de reallzarlos, y, por tanto, si bien confirid
muchos derechos, no dio en realldad nlnguna
garantla. A1 definir los poderes seccionales se
propasd a autorlzar la sedlcldn perpetua, y los
medios de amenazar constantemente los Estados unos
a otros, y todos o alguno de ellos al Gobierno
general. Organizando los poderes naclonales, como
si fuesen unos simples hudspedes tolerados en la
mansldn constltuclonal, quitoles su Indole y su
fuerza proplas, al paso que los hizo infltiles
para la unidn y casi incompatibles entre si. Por
ultimo, sembrd sin plan, doctrlnas tan brlllantes
por su novedad como pellgrosas por su alcance, y,
m&s que todo, por la extrafia lnteligencla que han
recibido.
Tal es el cddlgo de 1863, cuyo menor defecto
acaso no es el de haberse sanclonado por un partido, sin el concurso de represententes del partido opuesto, y que aunque pudiera mejorarse mucho
por leyes complementerlas y explicativas, tendrfa
slempre contra si la mala voluntad, m£s o menos
encubierta, del adversario, cuyo vencimlento le
dio la vida.31
The earlier antipathy of Mosquera toward the Panama
nians, which had led to the death of de la Guardia and to
a sense of loss on the Isthmus, accentuated the criticism

^Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 31A-3I5.
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Mosquera received because of his arbitrary interpretations
of the Constitution of I863

which he had sponsored.

The

writings of Pablo Arosemena clearly show the resentment
which even Liberals in Panama felt against Mosquera.
Though Mosquera was limited by the Constitution as to
interference in state activities of Panama, he circum
vented many laws to keep greater control.

Men like

Santacoloma, who had his moral support, abused the rights
and the treasury of Panama, events which led to Isthmian
uprisings and coup d*£tats in the years following the
adoption of the new Constitution of 1863.-^
For the next twenty-five years, similar political
actions, attempts by governors and presidents of the
state (the title of the governor had changed) to dissolve
the asamblea. revolutionary activities,

coup

d*gtats

and conspiracies characterized politics on the Isthmus,
The state of constant turmoil of the Isthmus aggravated
the poverty of the country by increasing excessively
the costs of the government.

This in turn forced tax

ation of business enterprises on the Isthmus.

During the

■^See, for example, pages 6^-130, of the Esorltos
of Pablo Arosemena in which he dissects with logic and
flourish the decisions of Mosquera, showing how many of
them were outright violations of the Constitution of 1863.
Also, Sosa and Aroe, Compendlo. 251-254.

the adminstration of Gil Colunje (1865 to 1866) for
example, the treasury was so depleted that many public
schools had to be closed for a while;

only enough money

was left to barely maintain civil law and order for the
safety of the citizens.
One of the most serious ••revolutions” occurred
during the state administration of the Liberal Fernando
Ponce.

General Buenaventura Correoso, who had put him

in power with military force on July 5» 1868, again had
to defend this administration because of a very serious
uprising spearheaded by Chiricanos, Conservatives of
Chiriquf.

They intended to launch Amador Guerrero as

candidate in the next elections, but at this point they
proclaimed Santiago Agnew as provisional President of
the State, and Juan N. Venero, as Secretary of State.
The movement spread into Veraguas where the main Conser
vative strength lay. General Correoso defeated the rebels
who were under the command of Aristides Obaldfa, on
October 21, and attacked the Conservatives in Hatlllo,
near Santiago on November 12.

Here the government troops

defeated the Conservatives and took Ajnador Guerrero
prisoner.
This revolution, the most bloody up to then among
the Isthmians, left a deep schism between the political

^■^Alba, Cronologfa. 199-
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parties.J

Subsequently, hardly one President of the

State was elected, or took over, before a challenge was
heard from the other side.

In addition, large scale

revolutions In Colombia like the one In I876 affected
Panamanians, many of whom fought In them.

(Small Inter

ferences from Colombia also had their effects.35)

At Las

Chancas, In Colombia, Panamanian volunteers headed by
General Correoso were Involved;

victory there for the

Liberal forces allowed Correoso to be President of the
State of Panama, a typical reward for military prowess
at this time, and an example of the arbitrary powers which
the Bogota government claimed for itself.

^ Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 297; Sosa
and Arce, Compendlo. 250-259* See also: Gibson, The
Constitutions of Colombia. 291; Henao and Arrubla,
History of Colombia. 487: "The struggle in Colombia,'•
The Saturday Review. XCII (September 1^, 1901), 327.
■^One such occasion was the overthrow of the
President of the State, Gabriel Neira, on April 5> 1873,
when the Supreme Court named D£maso Cervera as State
President. However, when Manuel Murillo Toro, President
of Colombia, found out that Cervera did not sympathize
with the candidacy of Santiago P6rez for President, he
ordered a counter-revolution. After a short bloody
encounter In the streets of Panama City, Neira was re
instated. The many participations of the Colombian army
in the revolts of Panama for political interests of
Presidents of Colombia, which disrupted interooeanic
traffic, gave motive to the United States to land naval
forces. Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 261-262.
The President of the United States, Theodore
Roosevelt, in his State of the Union Message the 7th of
December of 1903# listed at least Jj-8 moments of tension,
revolt or violence related to the Isthmus or to Colombia
which did or might have affected transit of the Isthmus.
See: Alba, Cronologfa. pages 208-210 for the list.
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So violent was the situation on the Isthmus that
not even the transactions which took place in I878
regarding the French Canal project were vigorous enough
to wipe out the plague of insurrection and revolt which
had invaded the Isthmus and the rest of Colombia. ^
The political chaos in Panama reached the point where
there were two Presidents of the State in 188^, each
supported by his own party group--Dimaso Cervera and

3^By 1878, the engineers Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse,
Armando Reclus and Pedro J. Sosa* had formulated the
canal project which was finally accepted. The project
was supposed to be completed in less than ten years.
On December 31» 1878, Ferdinand de Lesseps, the hero
of the Suez Canal and president of the Interoceanic Canal
Company, arrived in Coldn. By the 10th of January, 1880,
the first shovel full of dirt was taken at the mouth of
the Rfo Grande, which was to be the Pacific entrance to
the Canal.
The author feels that this particular canal e n 
deavor has had so much publicity— positive and negative—
in so many qulaified books written or translated into
English so that they are easily available, that he will
merely make comments in this dissertation which might
reveal attitudes of Panamanians toward the French and
their attempt to build the canal. Supporting this
decision to omit the physical and business workings of
the project during the 19th Century is the fact that
the canal was not finished by the French, and that the
sale of the company to the United States did not occur
until the 20th Century. However, the author recommends
certain books which deal in depth with these transactions,
the scandal that invaded the workings of the company,
and the attitudes of various nations before the problem
of continuing the digging of the canal. Among these
books are: Maron J. Simon, The Panama Affair (New York,
1971)» Gerstle Mack, The Land Divided (New York, 19^);
Jos3 C. Rodrigues, The Panama Canal: Its History. Its
Political Aspects, and Financial Difficulties (New York,
I885); Wolfred Nelson, Five Years at Panama (New York,
1889); Alicia Alzamora, "La participacl6n de los
franceses en la oonstrucoldn del Canal Interoce£nlco,"
Thesis, University of Panama, 1952.
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General Benjamfn Ruiz.

The latter was eventually defeated

and Cervera was placed in the presidency by National
troops.

In July of 188^ elections were held for Presi

dent of the State.

Rafael Nttffez, now President of Colom

bia, was blamed for Justo Arosemena*s loss of the election,
election.

Juan Manuel Lambert, candidate of the Indepen

dents (moderate Liberals), won.

But Lambert was not

"approved11 by Nffffez and instead Josd Marfa Vives Ledn
was named by the asamblea to head the government until
elections could be held for the Constitutional Convention
of 1886.37
THE LIBERAL REVOLUTION OP 1885
In 1875 there had developed another split in the
party ranks of the Liberals.

The moderate Liberals formed

a party of their own known as the Independent Party.
These Independents developed a program which called for
amendments to the Constitution of 1863 (Hfo Negro) in
order to correct some of the evils which they felt were
extant in it.
Fortunately for the Independents1 program, finally
in 1883, Rafael Ndffez was elected President.

The Nflfiez

37Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. *H3;
Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 270-271.
3®Pa bio Arosemena felt that the Liberal Party was
split not so much because of differences in philosophies
or principles, but rather by personal hatreds and compe
titions. He also felt that the Independents should either

administration has been named "Regeneration.11 Ndffez
attempted to unite the Liberals and the Conservatives.
His policy was one of moderation and tolerance.

To avoid

an open war with the Radicals, he appointed Eusorglo
Salgar and Santos Acosta, both Radicals and personal
friends, to his cabinet.

Por support of the Conservatives

he likewise appointed members of that party to his govern
ment.

Ndffez wanted to amend the Constitution of I863 In

order to bring peace and prosperity to Colombia, perhaps
by centralizing powers In such a way that they could no
longer be arbitrary, and by making more clear and specific
some of the principles which the I863 constitution merely
outlined or generalized and which even many Liberals
wanted amended.

(A provision which contrasts the two

constitutions concerns the Church in Colombia.

One of

the specific provisions of the new charter sponsored by
Ndffez recognized the Apostolic Roman Catholic Religion as
that of the nation;

public powers were to protect It and

cause it to be respected as an essential element of
social order, but the Church was not to be official and
was to preserve its independence.)

However, Nfinez's

immediate plans were not known.39

unite with other Liberals or simply categorize themselves
as members of the Conservative Party. Arosemena, Escrltos
139-1^0.
^Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia. 305;
Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia. 501-506.
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Rafael Ntfffez had taken over the presidency of the
republic at a very delicate moment in the history of
Colombia.

The financial state of the union was totally

out of control;

hatred between the main parties had

reached unbelievable depths;
only of ways to make
Nanez was heading.

and the Radicals thought

unbearable the government which
Since they had not been able to pre

vent his rise to power, they hoped to dislodge him with
such tactics.

Hailing in all other means, the Radicals

declared war in 1884.

This civil war first broke out in

the state of Santander.

In order to meet the emergency,

Nfiffez united both the Independents and the Conservatives
into the National Party.

This

action led to more vio

lence, which Nfiffez finally put down by declaring a state
of siege and assuming special powers.

The fighting

ended on August 26, 1885.^®
PEDRO PRESTAN
AND THE BURNING OP COLON
On the Isthmus, the most serious consequences of
the Liberal revolts of 1884-1885 were felt in the City of
Col6n in March of 1885.

The city had been drained of

^°Alba, Cronologla, 213; Gibson, The Constitutions
of Colombia. 305» 353; Henao and Arrubla, History of
Colombia, 502-503; Jones, An Introduction to Hispanic
American History. 363; ;Kirkpatrick, Latin Amerca. 261:
Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 4l4. ' '“
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protective guards when the national troops under General
Carlos A. G6nima left on March 16 to help squelch a
Liberal revolt in Panama City led by General Rafael
Aizpuru.

The following day, Pedro PrestSn, a mulatto

Liberal, announced a revolt in Coldn.

He was able to

gather about 200 poorly-armed Individuals; the majority
being foreign men of dubious reputations, they failed
to inspire confidence among the populace.
Preston had ordered arms from the United States.
They arrived on March 30.

The agent of the steamship

company (John M. Dow), following the orders of Gdnlma,
refused to allow PrestSn to have them. Preston, an active
and defiant Liberal, did not passively tolerate this
decision of the agent and kidnapped him, another employee
of the company, the United States consul and two officers
of the United States warship Galena.

He informed the

commander of the ship that he would not free the prison
ers until the arms were delivered, and that he would fire
upon any ship that attempted to land troops.

For any

aggression from the navy against the city, he would make
reprisals on American residents.

The consul ordered the

arms turned over to gain liberty for himself and the other
hostages.

But the captain of the Galena took possession

of the vessels with the arms in the name of the Govern
ment of the United States.

Preston then had the hostages

transferred to Monkey Hill where the revolutionary forces
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had their advance front.
In the meantime, G6nima was able to fcurn his atten
tion to the activities of Preston and dispatched 160 men
by train as far as Mindf from where they marched to the
rebel camp.

The rebels withdrew Into the city of Coldn

and fought against the government troops that attacked
the city.

They managed to withstand the attack for about

eight hours.

By four o'clock In the afternoon of March 31,

1885, the rebels were almost defeated.

Suddenly, a fire

broke out and spread wildly throughout the city, completely
destroying Colon.

Close to 10,000 people were left home

less, without provisions.

The cost of the fire was over

six million dollars and to make matters worse, the Insur
ance Company refused to pay.

Sometime later, on May 6,

the Hatian Antonio Pautrlzelle and the Jamaican George
Davis (Coco-bolo), were tried by the War Council (Pana
manian Conservatives) for setting fire to Coldn.

They

were convicted and hanged.
Meanwhile, Preston had managed to escape to the
state of Bolfvar and attempted to join the revolutionary
army near Cartagena.

However, the leaders of this move

ment refused to permit Preston to join their group until
he could prove his Innocence with regard to the fire In
Coldn which had oaused a deep feeling of repulsion and
horror everywhere.

Preston remained a sort of prisoner

in the camp of General Ricardo Gait£n Obeso until the'

17^
latter was defeated while trring to capture Cartagena.
Preston, now alone, fell Into the hands of Government
troops In Santa Marta and was taken to Col<£n where he
was court-martialled for instigating the fire of Coldn.
The validity of the trial remianed clouded with uncer
tainty and doubt, for among the witnesses and the Jury
there were personal enemies of Preston.

The council

condemned him to be hanged on August 18, I885.

Up to the

last minute, Preston protested his Innocence, but also
Al
declared that he forgave his enemies.
In the meantime, while government troops were
being deployed against

Prestan, the Liberal Rafael

Aizpuru took possession of arms at the railroad station
destined for Central America.

He attacked the head

quarters of the military in Panama and succeeded in
gaining control of the city.

However, his attempts to

establish any kind of government were futile.

On April 8,

at the request of the Colombian minister In Washington,

Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 277-279; 282.
The story of Preston has been dramatized in several
novels of contemporary Panamanian writers, especially in
Pueblos perdldos (Panama. 1962) of Gil Blag Tejelra; in
this novel Preston is actually the protagonist the first
third of the narration. The author presents this man as
one of high ideals but of little patienoe. Here, Preston
feels great bitterness because of the disdain he senses
is held for him because of his race, both by Americans
and other whites. In the novel, Prestdn is framed by
foreign witnesses and the Conservative military court
whose prejudiced remarks condemn him to the gallows.
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United States Naval forces disembarked 1000 men In Coldn.
The purpose m s to protect lives and prevent the atro
cities of fighting within the city which could result, as
it had at Coldn, in great tragedy.

Aizpuru was impri

soned and freed only after he promised not to fight within
the immediate radius of the city.

With this, the foreign

troops returned to their headquarters at the railroad
station.
The Liberals were all but crushed by this time.
Mishaps and insufficient strength, in addition to the
superior United States forces and the power of persuasion
which they exerted, had reduced the troops to less than
one half, through desertions and loss of lives.

Aizpuru

surrendered unconditionally to Colonel Bafael Heyes who
landed April 28 with more than 850 men with instructions
to sustain Colonel Miguel Montoya as Civil and Millatry
Chief of the State while the national reconstruction of
42
the Government of the entire nation began.
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1886
Nfiflez*s overall victory in Colombia cemented his
power as head of the National Party and of the govern
ment.

He knew the time was ripe for writing a new

constitution.

Thus, in September of 1885 he called for a

^2Alba, Cronologfa. 21^, 215; New York Times.
August 8, 1901; Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 21^, 215.

176
constitutional assembly to meet in Bogota on November 11,
1885, to draw up a constitution for what was to be called
the Republic of Colombia.

The eight states each sent

two delegates to the assembly,

and Ndflez advised these

sixteen Conservatives and Independents that they should
draw up a constitution that did not have the evils of
previous documents which had caused political and economic
chaos.^

Unfortunately the 1886 Constitution, like that

of 1863, was written on the heels of bitter contentions,
and resentments were to be expected from the losing party.
In spite of that, however, the 1886 Constitution, amended
almost beyond recognition, is still the Constitution of
Colombia.
The Constitution of 1886 formed a Unitarian repub
lic with the states being reduced to departments.

How

ever, since Colombians resented having a totally unitary
form of government, provisions were made in the Constitu
tion to give the departments some local action.

The

peculiar Interests and geographic position of Panama suscitated special provisions for Panama that made it more
dependent than other departments on the Executive branch
43
Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia. 305-306;
Henao and Arrubla, The History of Colombia. 504-505.
^Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. 415-418.

177
of the Republic, almost as if it were a national territory.
The head of each department was to be a governor, appoin
ted and removed the president.

All antl-Catholic measures

found in the Constitution of 1863 were annulled.

The new

Constitution recognized the Catholic religion as that of
the nation, and all public officials were to protect it
and “cause it to be respected as an essential element
of social order."^

However, the Catholic Church was not

to be the established church and no one was forced to
support or contribute to it.
freedom of choice.

Individuals were allowed

The government, on the other hand,

was to protect the Church, its property, services and
clergy from Indignities.

As further protection for the

Church, the Constitution provided that it should control
public education and that it should run its own internal
affairs.

The Constitution of 1886 also abolished unlimited

freedom of the press, although a “free” press was permit
ted.

It further provided that political prisioners would

hecneforth neither be under international law nor have
the right to possess arms;

it also re-established the

death penalty for political crimes.

In fact, this consti

tution abolished all Liberal and Radical provisions found

^Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia. 320;
Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 285-286.
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in the Constitution of 1863.

46

THE ISTHMUS BEFORE THE
REVOLUTION OF 1895
Immediately after the enforcement of the new
Constitution of 1886, the Isthmus achieved some stability.
Two governors had long terms:

General Juan V. Aycardl

lasted five and one half years until August of 1893» and
Ricardo Arango was governor from 1893 to 1898.

During the

term of Aycardi, because of the enthusiasm of a few
natives like his Secretary General, Santiago McKay, many
advances were begun in Panama.

Telegraph service between

the capital and some Interior towns was inaugurated.
Electric lights were Installed in Panama and Coldn.
lyj
Various public buildings were constructed. ' Such improve
ments probably were the result of the new economic acti48
vitles revolving about the French Canal,
even though

Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia. 311-347;
Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia. 506-507: Jones,
An Introduction to Hispanic American History. 363; Kirk
patrick, Latin America. 261; New York Times. October 28,
1894; New York Times. September 26, 1899.
^So s a and Arce, Compendlo. 286-288.
48
John and Mavis Biesanz, in their study of the
sociological structure and the relationships among all the
peoples who have populated Panama through the years, des
cribe the scenes in Panama during the French construction
and mention the nostalgia of the Panamanians when they
considered the French era: '•'The time of the French' was
a time of free-flowing money and wine, of roulette and
elegance. Paris ruled fashions in social events, language,
and clothing. The French introduced sidewalk oaf6s and
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work on the canal was suspended temporarily in 1889 by
the Canal Company.

The cessation of work on the canal

soon produced grievlous results in the economy of the
Isthmus which reached its greatest economic decline in

A better governor for the Panamanians was the
next one, Don Ricardo Arango.

He was a native of Panama

and tried to place more Panamanians in positions of power.
The economic problems which he inherited were combatted
with vigor.

He was very progressive in trying to encour

age agriculture and industry.

He succeeded in raising

educational levels, by placing efficient and dedicated
men in that branch of public affairs.'*®

the promenade. Latin in culture like the Panamanians,
the French celebrated each milestone of the enterprise
with grandiloquent ceremony, symbolic acts, flowery words,
and copious draughts of champagne. Their lavish ges
tures were greatly admired bt the Panamanians, who were
at a loss to understand the matter-of-fact lack of cere
mony of the successors to the French on the Job.11 John
and Mavis Blesanz, The People of Panama (Columbia Univer
sity Press, New York, 1955)* ^0.
^%osa and Arce,

Compendlo. 290.

^°0ne unfortunate mishap during the administration
of Arango was the terrible fire which broke out in
Panama City in June of 189^. 125 houses were burned to
the ground. The Fire Department, which had been in exis
tence for six years, was not able to control the burning,
and the value of property lost was calculated to be four
million dollars. Alba, Cronologfa. 227-231; Sosa and
Arce, Compendlo. 289-291.
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Fortunately for the alleviation of the depression
in which the Isthmus was submerged, a new Canal Company
was organized with

nough capital to continue the work

on the canal for a few more y e a r s P e r h a p s this new,
though relative, prosperity was the reason for the lack
of Isthmian participation in the Liberal Revolution of
1895.
THE REVOLUTION OF 1895
The revolt of 1895 had been In the making for a
long time.

When Ndffez retired temporarily from government

in 1888, before his term was concluded, Carlos Holguin
had succeeded him as president.

During his term of

office there developed a split in the Conservative Party
which was aggravated during the election of 1892.

At

that time, Ndffez was again a candidate for president and
won the elections.

The Liberals, in opposition to Ndffez

and taking advantage of the Conservative split, once
again began to cause trouble.

In order to remedy the

Conservative split and the attacks by the Liberals,
Miguel Antonio Caro, the vice-president

who was actually

running affairs while Nflffez remained most of the time on
his farm, initiated strong press censorship and imprison
ment and banishment of important opposition leaders.

51I b l d . .
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Nflffez himself had previously ruled with a strong hand and
had Increased the strength of the Church.

He had been

with the Liberals at first and then switched to the
Conservative side to become an Ultra-Conservative.
Financial scandals and Inflation characterized his govern
ment.

Taxation had more than doubled;

oppressive;

duties were made

and the foreign debt had not been paid.

Elections were controlled by the soldiers who guaranteed
the success of the Conservatives.

Liberals charged that .

the government, through misrule, was leading the country
53
backwards.
A great share of the blame was placed by
Liberals on the Constitution of 1886.

Many of the

objections which the radical Liberals had to that Consti
tution were voiced by Justo Arosemena who wrote the
following interpretation of said document:

52Pablo Arosemena bitterly resented Nflffez's con
version to a Conservative pole: he accused him of betray
ing the friends who had supported his candidacy in 187*4- when
he had Just returned from a long residency in Europe (where,
it was rumored, Nflffez had changed his views about govern
ment). If at that time he had disavowed the ideals of the
Liberals, he should have made it known rather than pretend
to continue embracing their cause in order to get their
support. Pablo Arosemena, Escritos, l**-2-l*4-3.
^Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia. 353-35*4-;
Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia. 515-516: S. F.
Massey, "The Late Revolution in Colombia," Journal of the
Military Service Institution. XXII (July-December, 1(597)»
288-311;
New York Times. June 10, 189*4-; New York Times.
October 28, 189*4-.
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Centraliza rigurcsamente el gobierno de la
Repilbllca, suprlme los Estados federales con el
mlsmo derecho con que hubiera podldo someter la
nacldn entera al colonlaje de Alemanla 6 de Rusla;
pues que dlchos Estados carecfan de representacidn
propia, y no habfan renunclado su autonomfa, si es
que de ella puede renunciarse. Slntetlza ese mlsmo
gobierno en el Poder EJecutivo, que entrega a un
Presldente llamado el Gobierno. con perfodo de
sels affos, y casl nlnguna responsabllldad. Pone
bajo su entera dependencla los gobernadores o
jefes de las nuevas seedones o suprlmldos Estados,
renovando el satraplsmo de la antlgua Colombia.
Concddele facultades omnfmodas en oasos de guerra
exterior o de conmocidn Interior tan f£cil de
lnventar o de promover adrede; y, con la anuencla
del Congreso, clertas facultades extraordlnarlas,
aun en tiempo de paz, por causas de conveniencia
pdbllca. Atrlbdyele el nombramlneto de los maglstrados de las cortes supremas y superlores, que,
por prlmera vez en la hlstorla constltucional de
la Repdbllca, lo reelben de por vlda. Permlte la
eleccl6n para el Congreso de los empleados ejecutivos, lo que unldo al veto, m£s eflcaz ahora que
antes, da al Presldente una lnfluencla preponderante en la acciOn legislatlva. Restablece, en fin,
el consorelo de la Iglesla y del Estado, y vuelve
a dar (Art. *H) a la juventud la educacidn reli
giose.
No omltlS clertamente declarer y definlr
garantfas, retrocedlendo no poco en el camlno
andado de la autonomfa individual, cqgio cuando res
tablece la pena capital, que sin retraer, mantiene
la fndole de la barbarie, y el crimen resultado
suyo; y como cuando sujeta de nuevo la imprenta
al caprlcho de autorldades o de jueces incompetentes ahogando asf la Clnlca voz segura de la
oplnidn. . . . Pero la pronta suspension lmpuesta
a los periddicos que no elogian a ese Gobierno, y
la deportaclOn, sin Juicio prevlo, de notables
cludadanos disidentes, bastarfan para calificar de
mero ludibrio la llamada RegeneraclOn colombiana.5^-

^Moscote and Arce, Justo Arosemena. ^19-^20.
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Such suspicions and resentments toward the new
Constitution were also felt by other Liberals who demons
trated their great and violent disapproval of it
first in 1895 and finally in 1899#

On the Isthmus the

revolt of 1895 was hardly felt for it merely involved a
Liberal attack on the police and military headquarters
of Bocas del Toro, the 8th of March, 1895.

Though the

police surrendered without resistence, the fifty soldiers
under the command of Captain Alejandro Ortiz finally
defeated the attackers.

The chiefs of the Liberals died

along with five of their companions.

The Government

lost nine men and had several wounded.

a

similar

outcome occurred in other provinces where the Liberals
revolted.
The causes of the Revolution of 1895 were in no
way mitigated by the elections of 1898.

Manuel A. San-

clemente was elected president with Josd M. Marroqufn as
vice-president.

The elderly Sanclemente, however, was

forced to leave Bogota for

reasons of health, and Marro-

quln took over the reins of government.

Though Marroquln

was a tolerant and conciliatory man and initiated several
progressive laws, when Sanclemente returned to Bogota to
take over his government he did not approve of the reforms

5^Sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 292-293*

that his vice-president had undertaken, and he made It
clear that he would change the policies that had been
begun by MarroquTn.

Sanclemente*s poor health and the

financial troubles in which the government found Itself
led the Liberals to prepare a revolution.

Thus, the

cruelest and longest struggle that Colombia had known since
Independence began in the department of Santander In
1899.-^

Though the revolution of 1895 had not affected

the Isthmus very seriously in terms of bloodshed and ruin,
the basic currents which had provoked the uprising else
where were still vital elements influencing what was to
come to the Isthmus.

Sensing that rumors of an invasion

of Panama by revolting Liberals might become a reality,
a military Governor, General J. M. Campo Serrano, was
named by the Central Government in January of 1900 to
replace Doctor Facundo Mutis Dur£n who had been named by
Marroqufn in October of 1899*

^Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia. 353~35^»
Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia. 516-519; Kirk
patrick, Latin America. 261-262.
5?sosa and Arce, Compendlo. 29^.
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PRELUDE TO THE
THOUSAND DAYS1 WAR
As already mentioned and supported by the opinions
of Justo Arosemena, conditions leading to the revolt of
the Liberals in 1899 were many indeed.

Until 1880 gold

and silver had been the medium of exchange.

The govern

ment withdrew this supply and replaced it with almost
valueless paper money.

Commerce and industry suffered

because of this depreciated money.

Colombia*s treasury

was empty.5®
In addition, prior to 1899, Liberals had been
imprisoned for opposing the Conservative government.

At

Panopticon, the state prison in Bogota, some three thou
sand political prisoners were being held.

Here and in

other prisons throughout Colombia torture was freely used.
Government troops almost daily committed atrocities
against the Liberals.

According to one eye-witness, he

saw "women sawn in halves by rawhide ropes because they
refused to tell where their revolutionist husbands were
hidden.

I have seen children tortured and flogged to

death, and wounded men killed mercilessly on the field

B. Cunningham Graham to Saturday Review,
October 5» 1901, ^30; "The Struggle in Colombia,*1 327;
New York Times, September 26, 1899*
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of battle.
Added to these abuses, the Liberal press had been
confiscated.^0

But perhaps the condition that contributed

most to the Liberal revolution was the gain and abuse of
power by the Church.

Primary education and the establish

ment of a public school system adopted by the Liberals had
been abolished, and the few remaining schools were under
the control of the Church.

The Church not only became

Involved In education, but by siding with the Conserva
tives, It also became Involved In government.

At election

time the polls were usually guarded by "soldiers with
fixed bayonets, and other bands of soldiers paraded the
town, terrorizing the people.

Several priests watched

over the booths, too, and whenever a Liberal came up to
register his vote, they ordered the soldiers to drive him
away, which was done at the point of the bayonet.
The causes of the Liberal revolt In Colombia were
felt on the Isthmus of Panama.

Besides the national

economic problems, the Isthmus of Panama, which had been
a free zone, was now burdened by taxes that were Increased

^Thomas S. Alexander, "The Truth About Colombia,"
The Outlook. LXXV (December,1903), 99^.
^°Cunningham Graham to Saturday Review. ^30; "The
Struggle In Colombia," 327*
^Alexander, "The Truth About Colombia," 993-996.

18?
along with duties.
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The past decades had repeatedly witnessed similar
scenes which had led the Isthmus to experience numerous
riots or rebellions.

A sense of mistrust pervaded the

relations of the Panamanians and the Colombians, whom
many Isthmians felt treated Panama as only a colony
instead of as an integral part of the Colombian nation.
These economic and political sufferings added intensity
to the various political opinions brought on by the
impending revolution.

Understood thusly, it is not

surprising that one of the strongest and most bitter
struggles during the Thousand Days1 War took place in
Panama.

Colombia

Castlllero R., Hlstorla de Panama, 76-130;
and the United States. 219.

CHAPTER VI
THE THOUSAND DAIS' C IV IL WAR
ON THE ISTHMUS

PRELIMINARY BATTLES IN PANAMA
As the year 1898 was coming to a close, the
Colombian Liberal Party was completing plans to commence
another armed revolt against the hated Conservatives.

This

revolt proved to be the longest and most devastating civil
war ever experienced by Colombia in more than eighty
years of i n d e p e n d e n c e T h e main plan called for the
revolt to errupt spontaneously throughout the whole of
Colombia, Including the distant and always-neglected
department of Panama.

Panama m s of great importance to

the Liberal plan because it was geographically isolated
and accessible only by sea.

The Liberals ' strategy also

called for tactics that would divert attention from the
main battle areas in Colombia proper.

.Liberals in Panama

could prevent the soldiers garrisoned there from being
deployed to Colombia and vice-versa.

This, in essence,

m s the proposal presented by General Rafael Uribe Uribe,
a leading member of the Liberal hierarchy in Colombia, to

^Castillero R., Historla de Panam£. 131•
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his comrades on the Isthmus towards the end of 1898.

p

The revolutionary movement began on the Isthmus
in Nata on October 27, 1899*

Amateurish, it did not

forecast the terrible bloodshed in which the peaceful
interior of Panama was to be involved in the years to
come.^ While these minor revolutionary attempts were
taking place in Panama, Doctor Belisario Porras, a
leading member of the Panamanian Liberal Party was in
voluntary exile in Central America.2* With moral support
from tvro members of the Liberal hierarchy in Colombia,
Rafael Uribe Uribe and Sim6n Restrepo, Porras was finally
able to enlist the aid of President JosS Santos Zelaya.
('•the blackest of all the dictators in Nicaragua*s
history,"5) and of General Eloy Alfaro, President of
Ecuador.^

^Rub§n D. Carles, Horror £ paz en el Istmo, 18991902 (Panama, 1950), 7; Domingo S. de la Rosa, Recuerdos
de la Guerra de 1899 a 1902: Cauca £ Panam£ (Barranquilla,
n.dTT, 7-8; Ferriando~Galvis Salazar. Uribe Uribe (Medellin,
1962), 90-96; Manuel Octavio Sisnett, Belisario Porras o
la vocacifin de la naclonalldad (Panama, 1959)* $0.
^Armando Aizpurua, Biograffa del General Manuel
Quintero V. (Panama, 1956), 35; de la Rosa, Recuerdos de
la Guerra. 10-11; Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 5o> Carles,
Horror £ paz. 11-12.
^Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 69-70.

60;

^Harold juavlne, Central America (New York, 1964),
Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 70.

^The Colon Starlet. October 21, 1899; The Panama
Star and Herald. October 20, 1899; Victor M. Salazar,
Memorlas de la Guerra (1899-1902) (Bogota, 19^3)* 39;
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Porras launched his forces at Punta Burlca In the
Province of Chlriquf on March 31» 1900;

here he imme

diately proclaimed himself Military and Civil Chief of the
Department*

This was the same title that President

Rafael Ntlnez had given his agents on the Isthmus*

Complet

ing the revolutionary directive, Porras gave to General
Emillano J. Herrera the title of Chief of Military Opera
tions.

As one of the conditions for helping the Liberals,

Zelaya had Insisted that Porras choose as his Chief of
Military Operations either Herrera or Abraham Acevedo*
Although Porras had origlanlly planned to name a Panamanian,
Rafael Alspuru, he chose Herrera Instead in order to comply
with Zelaya*s wishes*
Notwithstanding evidence of Herrera's Immediate dis
dain for Porras and of signs of disobedience, Liberals
took the city of David in Chlriqul*

This caused alarm

in many quarters, particularly among diplomats and military
representatives of the United States.'

From David, Porras,

Belisario Porras, Memorlas de las Campanas del Istmo. 1900
(Panama, 1922), 30-35; "The Trouble in South America,"
The Outlook. LXVIII (August 24, 1901). 941-942; Conversawith Ricardo J* Alfaro, ex-president of Panama, Panama,
July 12, 1966.
?Hezekiah A. Gudger to David J* Hill, Assistant
Secretary of State, April 3. 1900 and April 10, 1900,
April 24, 1900* Department of State, Consular Dispatches,
microfilm. National Archives hereafter cited as Diplomatic
Dispatches/; W* W* Cobbs, Consul at Col6n, to State Depart
ment, January 14, 1897; June 29, 1900; April 16, 1900*
Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V*. 45-46; Juan Arosemena Q., La Guerra de los Mil Dias (Panama. 1964), 15;
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Herrera and the revolutionary committee planned their
steps on their way to Panama City.

The campaign through

the Interior of Panama was not militarily straining except
that the Liberals found some difficulty in keeping some
of the towns that the Conservatives easily abandoned to
them, and in organizing

local governments in these

Q

places.0
The confusion, during some phases of this campaign
sprang from internal strife among the Liberals spurrred
mainly by personal antagonisms between Herrera and Porras

Carles, Horror jr paz. 16; Porras, Memorlas. 89-100;
Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 3o-44; Sisnett, Beli
sario Porras. 62. EE; Star and Herald. April 11, 1900
(From then on nothing relating to this phase of the war
on the Isthmus was found by the author in the Panama Star
and Herald.): New York Times. July 26, 1900.
The United States citizens had a considerable amount
of investment in and around David. So much so, that Presi
dent Alfaro of Ecuador, along with others, did not think
it was wise for Porras to choose Chiriquf as the place to
begin the revolution. They feared that the United States
might intervene. Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.
37, 44.
^Arosemena, La Guerra de los Mil Dias. 15; Carles,
Horror % paz. 16-18; Porras, Memorlas. 179; Sisnett,
Belisario Porras. 11, 91, 93-9/*» 95; A-izpurua, General
Manuel Quintero V., 50-55*
For example, David was retaken with ease by the
Governor of Panama. Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V..
36-57; Carles, Horror £ paz. 19-20; Diplomatic Dis
patches, May 1, 1900.
^For examples of these encounters, sees Arosemena,
L® Guerra de los Mil Dias. 19-24; Carles, Horror £ paz.
EE-22; Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 10, 97-102; Porras,
Memorlas. 206-209, 219, 2^7-231; Aizpurua, General Manuel
Quintero V.. 56-57*
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Their disagreements,so apparently petty at times, were to
characterize the entire first campaign of the Liberals
on the Isthmus*

These constant personal antagonisms were

affecting the Conservatives favorably, but In spite of
them the Liberals were able to defeat the Conservatives
near Bejuoo, In an area known as La Negra Vleja.
The victory of the battle of La Negra Vleja,
which lasted some eight hours, was a great psychological
boost to the Liberals.

The armaments that the Liberals

had recieved from Zelaya were obsolete and rusty and In
some cases did not even function*

These arms--Remington,

Lebel, Remington Lee, Winchester— were the ones that
Zelaya had In his deposit from previous campaigns.
were of no use to the Nicaraguan dictator*
lation of

They

This accumu

various types of arms led to a mixture of

bullets of different caliber*

With these mixed weapons

and ammunition, the Liberals were able to defeat an army
well-equipped with uniform weapons*^0

With the news of

Porras* victory at La Negra Vleja, volunteers began to
flock to the Liberal movement;

supplies began to arrive

•^Mateo F. Arafiz, Re la tos sobre la 11Guerra de los
Mil Dfas11 ;jr otros articulos (Panama. 193l)» 39-^3 there
after cited as Araflz. Relatos sobre la guerra/*
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from surrounding areas and even from Panama City.

11

How

ever, Porras spent-the whole month of June waiting for the
arrival of Doctor Eusebio A. Morales (his Secretary of
the Treasury) with aid from Nicaragua and Ecuador.12
Finally, on July 4, 1900, Morales arrived at
Porras1 oamp in Chame, accompanied by General

Sim6n

Chaux, Military and Civil Chief of the Pacific Coast in
Colombia, and many other Liberals.

These men broght with

them, in addition to the arms Morales had acquired, some
300 Mausers and 40,000 rounds.

Chaux and his followers

also brought with them a plan to attack the capital from
Chepo with part of the revolutionary army.

Herrera, with

most of the Liberal troops, marched to join this group in
La Chorrera.

He left Porras with only about eighty men

11Some of them were sent by Rodolfo Chlari, future
president of Panama. After the battle of La Negra Vieja,
General Jos£ Marla Campo Serrano, who was the Governor,
left for Colombia to seek more troops. In his place,
after the resignation of his secretary Tomfis Arias, Carlos
Alb£n took over. Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 59;
Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 45.
12Arafiz, Relatos sobre la guerra. 45; Porras,
Memorlas. 257. 259; Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 105-107.
According to the New York Times. June 13, 1900, not
only were Nicaragua and Ecuador aiding the rebels, but
also Venezuela. In a Diplomatic Dispatch, June 18, 1900,
Gudger stated that a gun-boat had left Guayaquil, Ecuador
with men, arms and ammunition to join the Liberals. Gudger
presumed that in the event of fighting which would inter
rupt railroad service, the United States would interfere.
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in Bejuco.1^

The Liberals anticipated bloodshed and a hard
fight in their attempt to take Panama therefore notified
the various consuls in the capital of their Intended
attack.

They also informed them that they would guar

antee free transit of the railroad.1** Meanwhile, on
July 14, 1900, when Porras was preparing to leave the
Chame area for La Chorrera, he received word that
Eusebio Morales (who had gone again to Nlcargua to get
arms) was arriving in San Carlos.

Morales was bringing

600 Remington rifles, 100,000 rounds and one Krupp
cannon.

But the captain of the vessel Momotombo that

was bringing the arms refused to go to La Chorrera and
Insisted on landing at San Carlos.

How were the Liberals

going to transport these arms sixty miles to La Chorrera?
They immediately thought of Victoriano Lorenzo, the
leader of the Indians of La Trinidad, Las Churuquitas,
Cacao, La Plntada and Sor&, for transporting these arms.
Lorenzo, with 200 men, arrived at Bejuco to see Porras.

■^Carles, Horror % paz. 26-27; Castillero, Historla
de Panama. 132; de la Rosa, Recuerdos de la guerra. 60-^7:
Porras, Memorlas. 259-275; Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra.
**8; Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 105-107.
lli,

Carlos S. Mendoza, secretary to Porras, to the
various consulates in Panama, dated Chame, July 1**, 1900;
Porras, Memorlas. 280-296; Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra,
**9-50; Sisnett, Belisario Porras, 10^7 diplomatic
Dispatch, July 19. 1900, stated that the Liberals had
notified their intentions of attacking.
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The two men made a pact to deliver the armaments by way
of the mountains in exchange for certain favors, among
which was the assurance that tithes still Imposed upon
the Indians by the Government would be abolished if the
Liberals should win*

The arrangements concluded, Forras

now left for La Chorrera on July 16, 1900.^
There after many plans for attacking Panama City
had been discussed, at times passionately, the majority
of the officers accepted Porras1 plan to attack from the
hills of Cangrejo, Bella Vista and Perry's Hill*^

In

spite of preliminary serious lack of communication, errors
in Judgement and orders that were disobeyed, once the cam
paign got under way, Emlliano Herrera was able to turn the
17
Conservative forces back from Corozal.
Instead of

General Manuel Quintero V., 59; Arafiz,
Relatos sobre la guerra. 44-52; Carles, Horror £ paz. 27;
de la Hosa, Recuerdos de la guerra. 66-67; Porras, Mem
orlas . 290; Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 108. These arms
never got to Porras. They were to be used by Lorenzo in
a future campaign. Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V..
109-111.
• ^ A i z p u r u a ,

^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V., 60-61;
Arosemena, La Guerra de los Mil Dias. 27-28; Carles,
Horror £ paz. £7-28; Rubin Carles, Vlctorlano Lorenzo,
el guerrlllero de la tlerra de los cholos (Panama. 1966),
25-26; Porras, Memorials 291^2*96: Sisnett, Belisario
Porras. 109-110.
^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 66-68;
Arafiz, Relatos sobre la guerra. 55-57: G. Kennedy Chrystie,
"Personal Experiences of a Colomblai Revolution," The
Living Age. VIII (November 16, 1901), 419-420; Carles,
Horror jr paz. 29; Castillero, Hlstorla de Panam£. 132;
de la Rosa, Recuerdos de la guerra. 68-69: E. A. Hackett,
"A Central-Ameriean Revolution," Harper's Weekly. XLIV
(December 1, 1900), 1134-1135; Porras, Memorlas. 320;
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pushing their advantage, the Liberals sent a 2^-hour
surrender ultimatum to Alban.

Herrera gave as his rea-

for not following up his success the fact that Porras
was a very jealous man, a man who could not tolerate
having anyone else taste the glory which he thought was
rightfully his.

Herrera also claimed that his honor was

at stake, since he had given Porras his word that both
would enter the city together.

However, bitterness

between the two leaders continued.

Herrera knew that the

"Kaiser" (Porras was called by his enemies "El Kaiser de
Las Tablas") had not carried out his part of the plan to
attack Panama; that is, Porras had not arrived in La
Boca as scheduled.
On July 22, 1900, Herrera sent word to Porras
notifying him of the victory at Corozal, asking him for
an additional 200 men and informing him that he would
attack Panama within ZUt hours.

The "Kaiser" was furious.

He felt that his rights as Supreme Chief of the Revolution
had been violated by the surrender ultimatum Herrera had
sent Alb£n.

He thus sent his own peace terms to the

Governor of Panama

and, through pure dislike for Herrera,

informed Alb£n of the disloyalty and lack of morale among

Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 110-111; In a Diplomatic
Dispatch dated July 21, 1900, Gudger advised of the
Governments defeat; Diplomatic Dispatch, July 27,
1900.
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the Liberals.

This aotion was a God-send to the Conser

vatives, for now they were aware of ill feeling and dis
unity among the leaders of the Liberal army.
served to strengthen their own low morale.

It further

At the same

time, Porras sent a message to Herrera congratulating him
on his victory.

Fearing that Herrera wanted the troops

to form one army under his command, Porras advised
Herrera that he would need his own troops because he would
1R
take La Boca the 23rd, no matter what the cost. ° Later,
several causes prompted Porras to abandon the attack on
La Boca, so he sent Herrera the troops he had requested
19
and turned over his command to General Chaux.
At the same time, Government forces were working
day and night building up their defensive position which
extended from La Boca to the bridge over the railroad
entrance to Panama City at Calidonia, where the Government
placed fortifications and barriers, and on to Trujillo

-^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V., 75-81?
Arosemena, La Guerra de los Mil Dfas. 28: Aratiz, Relatos
sobre la guerra. 56; Carles, Horror y paz. 28-29;
de la Rosa, Recuerdos de la guerra. 70; Diplomatic Dis
patch, July 21, 1900; Porras, Memorlas. 32-321; Sisnett,
Belisario Porras. 113 /this last source contains opinions
about Porras* actions that deviate somewhat from other
sources/ •
■^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 82-83;
Arafiz, Relatos sobre la guerra. $6; Sisnett, Belisario
Porras. 113-11^.
Among the reasons that prompted Porras* change of
mind, was the warning by General Chaux that if Herrera
failed on the 24th to take Panama, only he would be to
blame. Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 114.

beach.
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Finally, on July 22, 1900, Alb&i replied to

Herrera*s ultimatum.

His answer read:

Panam£, 22 de julio de 1900.— General Emiliano
J. Herrera.— Son, desgraciadamente, inaceptables
para ml las condiciones contenidas en su nota de
hoy. Estamos, pues, a sus 6rdenes, a la vez que
me suscrlbo de usted atento y seguro servidor,-Carlos Alb5n.21
There were several reasons for Alb£n*s refusal.
Campo Serrano was due back any moment with troops from
Colombia and by now Alb£n felt that the city was wellfortified.

22

An English traveler at the time described

the scene of preparations:
There, upon the railway bridge, stood about
a hundred of the Government troops, who held it
against a strong attacking force of the Revolu
tionists . The position of the Government troops
was a strong one, and they held it easily. Their
trenches extended to the left of the bridge for
some four hundred or five hundred yards, while
two Hotchkiss guns commanded the bridge, and a
third commanded a hill behind the trenches. The
guns on the bridge, I learned, were worked by an
American artillery-man in the pay of the Govern
ment, who had been through a good deal of the
Cuban campaign, and who had fought well at
Santiago. He it was who had conducted the Govern
ment retreat from Corozal; and he it was who,
together with General Carlos Albfin, had been

20Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 58-59; Sisnett,
Belisario Porras. 114.
21

Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 87.

22Aizpurua, general Mannsi ftnlnt9r.o
87-88;
Salazar, Memorlas £e la Guerra. 58; Sisnett, Belisario
Porras. 114-115.
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Instrumental in throwing up these trenches; so
that by the time Revolutionary forces had
advanced frgm Corozal the defenses had been long
completed«z3
On July 22, 1900, in preparation for the assault,
Herrera withdrew his rear guard from Corozal and thus
removed his only route of escape.
quarters on Perry*s Hill.

He set up his head

The rest of the Liberal troops

were to occupy the surrounding hills.

Two of his divi

sions were to attack by way of the beaches Pena Prieta,
Trujillo and Marafl&i.
way of San Miguel.

Two divisions were to attack by

The center, consisting of five divi

sions under the command of General SlmSn Chaux was to make
a direct assault on the bridge at Calidonia.
On July 24, 1900, the Liberals began their attack
on the bridge.

This was one of the bloodiest battles of

the revolution, for the Liberals fell at each wave of
attack.

When Porras heard the gunfire from Farf^in, he

thought the Liberals were victorious and left for
Herrera*s headquarters on Perry*s Hill.

Landing at Boca

la Caja, Porras met some Liberals who had escaped the
battle and who informed him that all was lost.

Porras

arrived at Perry*s Hill to find an army completely des
troyed, depleted and without hope.

What he had feared

(and expressed during one of the military meetings before

Kennedy Chrystie, "Personal Experiences of a
Colombian Revolution," 420.
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the attempt to capture Panama) had happened*
24
would not be taken by way of the bridge.

Panama

On July 25, 1900, through the mediations of the
consuls of the United States, Great Britain and Prance,
a 24-hour truce was called, so that the ambulances of
the British might enter and pick up the wounded and the
dead.

The conditions at that time were best described

by an eye witness:
The dead were uncared for for many days, and
animals in all stages of putrefaction were scat
tered over the road, in the trench and the bush.
It is remarkable that Panama escaped a pestilence.
When the people finally realized the danger from
such a situation, after three or four days, the
bodies of men and animals were burned with
Kerosene in the wreckage of the native huts in
the vicinity of the battlefield«25
Herrera*s strategy of attacking Panama had left
the Liberals isolated on Perry*s Hill.

The road to Coro

zal was in the hands of the Conservatives.

Since the

Liberals lacked ships, the only way out was by way of
Chepo.

This route, however, was out of the question,

for the remaining rebel forces
fatigued to

were too

march seventy-five miles to

hungry and
Chepo.

To

Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 89-92j
Arosemena, La Guerra de los Mil Dias. £ 9 : Carles, Horror
jjr paz. 30-31; de la Rosa, Recuerdos de la guerra. 81:
Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 45: " Sisnett, Belisario
Porras. 115*
Emiliano Herrera, known by a friend of the eye
witness, was said to be a keen, hard-hearted soldier of
fortune to whom personal danger was an unknown quality
and that he was a man quick to avail himself of any
advantage. New York Times. August 26, 1900.
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aggravate matters, on the 25th, Jos6 Marfa Campo Serrano
arrived In Colfin with 1, 250 men.
boat La Boyac£

The Government gun

was also due to arrive soon.

The

situation of the Liberals was completely hopeless.2^
Herrera turned over his command to Carlos A. Mendoza
with Instructions to sign the peace treaty.

At 3*00

p. m. on July 26, 1900, the hostilities In the first
Liberal Invasion of Panama were concluded

2 5Hackett,

"A C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n R e v o l u t i o n , "

1135*

^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V». 92;
Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 60: Sisnett, Belisario
Porras. Il6 .
2?Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 94;
Diplomatic Dispatch, July 27, 1900; Sisnett, Belisario
Porras. 117. For an excellent eyewitness account of the
battle of Calidonia, see New York Times, August 26, 1900.
Generals Emiliano J. Herrera and Chaux, and Jos8 A.
Ramfrez were allowed to leave with all those wishing to
do so. They were also allowed to take with them 1000
rifles, 100,000 shots, 3000 to 5000 pesos, two cannons a
and bank drafts to the value of 4,500 pesos given to them
by Kauriclo Halphen, a businessman of David. Sisnett,
Belisario Porras. 119- Herrera left on July 30, -1900,
aboard the English warship Leander to Ecuador. Aizpurua,
General Manuel Quintero V.. 94. Casualties were estimated
by Gudger to be about fifty percent. Diplomatic Dispatch,
July 27, 1900. Six hundred died or were wounded out of a
force of 1,200 men. de la Rosa, Recuerdos de la Guerra.
84; Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 60; "The Rebellion
in Colombia," The Outlook. LXV (August 4, 1900), 760,
corroborates these figures.
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It Is likely that the invasion of Panama at this
time would have succeeded had it not been for the person
al differences between Herrera and Porras.
with both individuals;

The fault lay

they had created an amateur and

unadmirable example for the lesser officers and had come
to disregard party unity in order to think more of their
own personal gain and glory*
GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES
AND THE INVASION OF DOMINGO DIAZ
From the confusion there arose guerrilla warfare,
led by several individuals, including the picturesque
28
Indian cacique. Vlctoriano Lorenzo.
According to the
surrender terms of July 26, 1900, after the Battle of
Calidonia, the Liberals were to cease all resistance on
the Isthmus.

Most of the participants in the civil war

left the area, but those who stayed, including Vlctoriano
Lorenzo, were expected to give up their arms according
to the clauses of the surrender pact.

The Cholos had

^®In Porras* first campaign, Lorenzo*s attitude to
ward the revolutionists was one of sympathy; he and his men
served Porras* army as cargo bearers and guided them through
the mountains. Afterward, when Porras promised the Indians
liberty and justice if he won, the Cholos participated more
actively. They recognized Porras as the only Liberal chief.
Carles, Horror £ paz. 36-37* Lorenzo was thinking of
sending a delegation to England to ask Queen Victoria for
help in attaining their liberty. Carles, Vlctoriano
Lorenzo.35.
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given up the idea of fighting and were returning content
edly to the mountains to hunt deer with their new rifles •
However, an enemy of Lorenzo told the Conservatives where
the Indian chief had supposedly hidden the arms.

Colonel

Pedro Sotomayor, ordered by Albdn to pursue and capture
Lorenzo, burned huts and committed atrocities against
Lorenzo*s family and friends In his attempt to locate the
arms.

When the news of these happenings reached Lorenzo

In Gatun, he decided to take arms against the Conserva
tives.

The Indian*s cry of war echoed through the moun

tains.

The Cholos, like the rest of the oppressed and

working classes, had felt some attraction to the Liberal
movement, not because they understood the theory behind
the movement, but because they understood the Liberal
revolution as a war of the poor against the rich.^^
Rebellion flared among the rest of the Liberals
when the Government Imprisoned some Liberal soldiers
and sympathizers without benefit of trial or habeas
corpus. Sometimes government officials freed Liberals
upon payment of a ransom, but more frequently they im
prisoned them In Las Bdvedas, one of the most notorious
prisons In Panama.

In addition, the Liberals were required

to make monthly donations for war expenses.

All of these

29Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. Ill;
Carles, Vlctoriano Lorenao. 3 6 : Carles, Horror £ paz.36.

2011acts by the Conservatives served only to rekindle the fire
of rebellion In the Liberals, many of whom had planned to
30
continue fighting anyway.
While the Cholos were waging guerrilla warfare In
the mountains of Cocld, other guerrillas led by Colonel
Manuel Patino began warfare In the areas surrounding Chepo
and Corozal*

At their headquarters In Corozal, the Liber

als now proclaimed General Domingo Diaz as Civil and Mili
tary Chief of the Army. Domingo Dfaz was a strong person
ality and enjoyed the sympathy of many residents of Panama
City, especially among the populace.

His attraction was

further enhanced by the heroic deeds of his son, Temfstocles, who had died at the Battle of Calldonla.

Diaz left

left Patiffo and General Manuel Antonio Noriega In charge
of continuing warfare while he went to Nicaragua to equip
an army consisting of exiled Panamanian and Colombian
Liberals
Meanwhile, Belisario Porras was In Costa Blca
attempting to form a strong Invasion force.

On July 8,

1901, he was confirmed as Civil and Military Chief of the
Department of Panama by General Benjamin Herrera, Director
of the War for Cauca and Panama.

Thereupon, Porras tried

Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 95-102;
Carles, Horror jr paz. 37; Diplomatic Dispatch, Sept
ember 8, 1906; Benjamin Latorre, Recuerdos de Camnana
(1900- 1902) (Usaquln, Colombia, 1939). 60-63; Sisnett
Belisario Porras. 120.
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unsuccessfully to persuade Domingo Dfaz, who was in
Nicaragua, to resign his claims as the leader in

P a n a m a .3^

Porras arrived at Penonom6 toward the end of August,' 1901.
He and his aids were extremely disappointed to find that
almost all of the Cholos had gone to till the soil and
visit their families.

However, Vistoriano immediately

sent emmissaries to the mountains to call his Indians to
re-unite.

In a few days, Cholos from all over the moun**

tains of Cocl£, armed with rifles, shot guns, machetes a
and the will to fight, presented themselves to Porras
At about the same time, on September 16, 1901, and
in spite of lack of cooperation from Porras, Dfaz landed
at San Carlos with an invasion force transported from
-zii

Nicaragua aboard the Momotombo.

On September 29, 1901,

he arrived at La Chorrera where he set up temporary

32Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 112-116;
Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 122-124. On December 16, 1900,
Porras had been appointed to this position by Gabriel
Vargas Santos, the Supreme Director of the war and provi
sional President'of Colombia. Jorge Martfnez Landfnez,
Hlstorla mi11tar de Colombia (Bogota, 1956), 278; Salazar,
Uribe Uribe. 151-152; Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 124.
33carles,
*34

Horror £ £ a z .

51-52.

de la Rosa, Recuerdos de la guerra. 107. Diplo
matic Dispatches, September 23, 1901 and September 30,
1901. The armamentTthat Dfaz was bringing with him from
Nicaragua consisted of some 300 Remington rifles.
With
him came many generals, including Domingo S. de la Rosa.
De la Rosa, Recuerdos* de la guerra. 104-105*
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^Diplomatic Dispatches dated July 29, 1901;
August 3» 1901; August 26, 1901. New York Times dated
August 2, 1901; August 6 , 1901; August 7, 1901; August 8,
1901; August 9, 1901; August 13, 1901. In a Diplomatic
Dispatch dated August 26, 1901» Gudger stated that the
news of a U.S. ship being sent to Panama had had a good
effect. He said that the Liberals had been ordered not
to damage the railroad or interfere with the transit.
3?New York Times. August 8, 1901.
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Nevertheless, Patiflo did not relent, and when the
Conservative Governor Albdn withdrew troops from Col6n for
use elsewhere, Patlffo was ordered to capture the city.
It was not long before Alb£n was Informed of the capture
of Col6n.

He returned and was successful In weakening the

defenses of the Liberals, especially In Buenavlsta very
near Col6n proper*

Simultaneously, the commander of the

Colombian gunboat Pr6spero PlnzSn threatened to bombard the
the city of Col6n If the Liberals did not surrender.
Fortunately

For-

for the citizens of the city, this threat was

not carried out because of the mediation of several Ameri
can, British and French commanders of ships anchored near

by.38
The Liberal commander In Col6n, now General Domingo
S* de la Rosa (Patifio had drowned crossing the Fox River •
during the capture of Col6n), received yet another threat
from Captain Thomas Perry of the Gunboat Iowa stating that
the United States would land troops If any Interruption of
railroad traffic were made.

Perry further declared that

Colombia had formally asked for United States intervention.

3®Carles, Horror y paz. 58; de la Rosa, Recuerdos
de la guerra. 121-127. The British were present becaus^
their consul in Bocas del Toro had requested protection
from his Government for its citizens who were in danger.
New York Times. October 19. 1901. The French were con
cerned over their canal interests. New York Times.
August 26, 1900.
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because Colombia felt at that moment that it could no
longer guarantee free transit across the Isthmus*

To

strengthen further Perry's position, the United States
consul in Panama, Mr* Hezekiah A* Gudger, received on
November 20, 1901, a cable from the Assistant Secretary
of State, David J* Hill, which read as follows:
Notify all parties molesting or interfering
with free transit across the Isthmus that such
interference must cease and that the United States
will prevent the interruption‘of traffic upon the
railroad. Consult with Captain of Iowa who will
be instructed to land Marines if neoessarry for the
the protection of the railroad in accordance with
the treaty rights and obligations of the United
States. Desirable to avoid bloodshed if
possible.39
About 100 marines from the Machlas did land at Col6n to
take possession of the railroad station.

Ao

Faced with the defeat at Buenavista and then with
threats from the Government to the north, the Liberals
agreed to the surrender terms proposed by Alb£n.

On

November 28, 1901, General de la Rosa signed the surrender
document in the presence of the Commanders Thomas Perry
(Iowa), P. Lebrisse (Le Suchet).
Tribune),

A. Galloway (H.M.S.

Francis Delano (Marietta), Henry McCrea

39

Diplomatic Dispatches, November 30, 1901 and
November 21, 1901•
^®de la Rosa, Recuerdos de la guerra. 129-132;
New York Times, November 21, 1901.
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(Machlas). and Carlos Albfin.^
With the surrender of the Liberals at Colfin, the
Conservatives were now free to pursue Porras and Lorenzo
In the province of Cocl6*

From his camp

at La Negrita,

Porras desperately wrote to the Colombian general,
Benjamin Herrera, asking him to send arms and artillery
and Inviting him to Join the Liberal campaign In Panama.
At the same time, Vlctoriano Lorenzo, who had sent his
men home, called them back.

Some 700 men presented

themselves before Porras to report for d u t y A l l of this
activity was In preparation for the next campaign, the
most united and successful, which was to be led personally
by General Benjamin

H e r r e r a . ^

^ d e la Rosa, Recuerdos de la guerra. 135-136, 137;
Diplomatic Dispatch, December 2, 1901; "On the Isthmus,"
The Outlook. LXIX (December 7* 1901), 86l; New York Times
November £o, 1901. Marines landed from the Iowa, the
Marietta and the Machlas to take over the Liberals* arms.
Marines from the Suohet landed on property of the French
Canal Company. New York Times. November 30, 1901. On
December 5» 1901, Domingo Diaz surrendered at Gorgona.
New York Times, December 6, 1901.
Lo
Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 127.
li'i

•'Benjamin Herrera is not to be confused with
Emillano Herrera who participated with Porras in the
first campaign against Panama City.
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THE LAST LIBERAL INVASION
On December 24, 1901, the last Liberal Invasion of
the Isthmus of Panama took place when 1,500 welldiscipllned veterans of battles in Colombia arrived at the
port of Tonosl.

They were led by General Benjamin Herrera

who was designated Director of the War for Cauca and
Panama by Gabriel Vargas Santos, Supreme Director of the
War and Provisional President of Colombia.
accompanied by an able general staff

Herrera was

Liberal command

of three ships along Panama's Pacific Coast further
enhanced the self-assurance of the

L i b e r a l s . ^

After a decisive naval victory on January 20, 1902,
in which the Conservative ship Lautaro. with General AlbSn
on board, was sunk, Herrera advanced his troops towards
his main objectives, Panama and Col6n*

As Liberal forces

approached the cities, however, they were informed that
United States marines, summoned by the Colombian Government,

^Lucas Caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra de los
Mil Dias (Bogota, 1939). 13&-139; New York Times.
December 31. 1901.
^included in his staff were Sergio Perez and Paulo
£• Bustamante, heroes of the battles of Tumaco and Barbacoas in Colombia proper. Sofonias Yacup, Litoral ReoSndlto
(Bogota, 193^). 213.
46
Arafiz, Relatos sobre la guerra, 63; Caballero,
Memorlas de la Guerra. 153-15^. 158; Castlllero, Hlstorla
de Panamg. 1 3 3 - 1 3 ^ ; Latorre, Recuerdos de Campafia. £4-657
5F. Herrera's three ships consisted of one cruiser, El
Almlrante Padilla and two gunboats, El Cauca. and El Panam£
Caballero. MemorTas de la Guerra. 13
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were blocking the entrance of the cities and were
stationed along the railroad terminals of both Panama and
Col6n.

Herrera was Infuriated and frustrated by the fact

that a foreign power was preventing the success of his
47
campaigns• '
I n .order to control the Interior more definitely
and thus be In a better position to bargain with the
United States, Herrera established a stronghold at Aguadulce.

There, he decisively defeated the Conservatives.^®

In order to spare the citizens of the city the horrors of
fighting within it, on February 24, 1902, the Conserva
tives signed an act of capitulation in which they agreed
49
to surrender all of their arms. 7

^Arosemena, La Guerra de los Mil Dfas. 39;
Caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra. 155-1& 7: Sisnett,
Belisario Porras. 129*
^®Arosemena, la Guerra de los Mil Dfas. 39;
Caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra. 2 0 0 -2 0 1 ; Salazar,
Memorlas de la Guerra. T54.
^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 1 4 6 -1 4 9 ;
Arosemena, La Guerra de los Mil Dfas. 4 0 -4 2 : Caballero,
Memorlas de la Guerra. 2 0 7 -2 2 4 ; Carles.Hpr-rn-r Z Paz.7 2 -7 5 .
Latorre .• Rgouerdos de Campana. 7 3 -7 6 ; Salazar, Uribe
Uribe. I86-1S9; Sisnett, Belisario Porras. 129* On their
way to Aguadulce, Herrera and his army camped in the
plains of El Limfin. This was adjacent to the farm of Mar
cos Hobles, grandfather of ex-President Marcos A. Robles
of Panama. Arosemena, 1a Guerra de los Mil Dfas. 39;
Caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra. 2 1 1 . One of the Liberal
generals leading the attack on Aguadulce was the able
General Seraio P6rez. Caballero. Memorlas de la Guerra.
2 1 6 -2 1 7 .
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In the city of Panama the Conservative leaders soon
received news of their defeats both In Aguadulce and
In David, where the Liberals had extended their Interior
campaign*

Fortunately for them, their new Conservative

Civil and Military Chief of the Department of Panama,
«

General Victor Manuel Salazar, arrived at the capital.
Salazar had been Chief of Staff under General Alb£n at
the time of the battle at the Puente de Calidonia during
the first large Invasion of Panama.

Knowing the preca-

rlous situation of the Conservative army, the most
Salazar could expect to do was defend the city of Panama
and await naval reinforcements to combat the Liberals*
ship, the Padilla, and regain control of those ports
and the interior now held by the Liberals.-’0
The Liberals, on the other hand, did not remain
inactive.

Herrera was Informed that the Colombian Govern

ment was preparing a large force to invade Panama.

To

give the impression of being weaker than he was, he
retreated to David, where he expected the enemy would
attack him.”*1

Arriving in David on March 12, 1902,

Herrera, who had not heard from General Manuel Quintero,

^°Carles, Horror £ paz. 77-78;
de la Guerra. 182•

Salazar, Memorlas

-’•^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 150;
Caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra. 225-227*
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In charge of the David expedition, was surprised to find
that he had defeated the Conservatives and was in
possession of the city.

Against the advice of Quintero,

Herrera decided to send troops to Almirante on the Atlan
tic seaboard in order to gain some control on that side
of the Isthmus.

Thus, about 1,250 men departed for Bocas

del Toro and suffered many discomforts and hardships as
they crossed the rain-drenched mountains.

When they

finally arrived at the island of Bocas del Toro on April 18,
1902, the Liberals defeated the Government forces stationed
there after a short, but violent, encounter.^

^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 170; Carles,
Horror £ paz. 78-80; Latorre, Recuerdos de Campana. 8183. It seems that Zelaya encouraged Herrera to occupy a
port on the Atlantic side. This would enable Zelaya to
help the Liberals in Bolivar and Magdalena (Colombia) and
also Ciprlano Castro of Venezuela. Colombia was furious
at the continued aid Zelaya was giving the Liberals. On
June 20, Salazar authorized an expedition to Blue Fields,
Nicaragua, to stop the aid of the Liberals and at the
same time to help a Conservative revolutionary expedition
that was being organized on the Isthmus by a group of
Nicaraguan conservatives. Salazar sent the Plnz6n and
^00 men. However, the expedition was driven back by bad
weather which damaged the Pinz6n. Carles, Horror y paz.
80; Salazar, Memorlas £e la Guerra. 207-21^. Colombia
continued its demands that Nicaragua stop aiding the rebels
and again threatened war. Nicaragua sent diplomatic notes
to the various Central American nations asking them for
assistance in the event that Colombia did declare war.
New York Times. August 30, 1902, and August 31, 1902. It
was felt by the Colombian and U.S. Governments, that
Zelaya was helping Liberals in Panama to keep up the war so
that the United States would choose Nicaragua for the canal
site instead of Panama. Thomas S. Alexander, "The Truth
about Colombia," The Outlook. LXX (December 26, 1903),
993-996.
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When Salazar found out what had happened

It was

not difficult for him to recognize the tactical error made
by the revolutionaries in establishing their stronghold
on an island which could be assailed from all sides.
With ease, Salazar*s naval forces from Col6n trapped the
Liberals, who surrendered almost immediately.

Surpris

ingly, they were allowed to return to Chiriqui completely
<53
a r m e d . A c c o r d i n g to Salazar, it was the intervention
of Captain McLean of the U.S.S. Machlas. who acted as
intermediary at the surrender, which pressured the Conser
vative leader to give such generous terms to the Liberals^
perhaps the only intervention at this time which favored
the Liberals.
While the Liberals were having internal problems,
the Conservatives were concentrating the largest available
force to crush Herrera once and for all.

More than 5»000

53
Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V., 170-171;
Arosemena, La Guerra de los Mil Dias. 232-23^: Carles,
Horror £ paz. 79-60; Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra.
190-198. The surrender of Bocas was the only one by the
Liberals under the command of Herrera up to that time.
Caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra, 23^. While in
Chiriqui Province, Herrera seized coffee crops, some of
which belonged to Americans. H. A. Gudger wrote Herrera
demanding satisfaction. When he did not receive a reply,
Gudger ordered the U.S. warship Ranger to David to "take
such measures, drastic or otherwise, as its captain
/might/ find necessary. "The Colombian Revolution near
Panama," Harper*s Weekly. XLVI (August 23, 1902), 1156.
54
Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 195-196.
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veterans of battles In Colombia and In Panama were to be
led by Salazar and General Pomplllo Gutierrez, who had
been sent to Panama to help him.^5
Herrera was aware of all Conservative moves through
the efficient telegraph service he maintained between
Aguadulce and David*

His maneuvers and tactics which

Included a second victory over Aguadulce (this time a bloody
one) brought success to the Liberals once more.

When it

was all over, four divisions of the best Conservative
soldiers had been defeated.

Thirteen generals, 500 offi

cers, and more than 3*600 men were made prisoners.

The

booty was so great that in Aguadulce the revolutionaries
obtained more armed power than they had had in two years
of combat— one warship, one supply ship, almost 4000 rifles,
600,000 bullets, 5 cannons, a machine gun, 100 tents, and
numerous materials usable for fortification.-56
The siege of Aguadulce, which lasted about four
weeks, proved to be the best-planned military operation of
the war.

The Liberal General Herrera demonstrated there

his natural ability to plan military strategy.

Without

any academic degree and without a mind filled with

55caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra. 239-24-0;
Carles, Horror £ paz. 91*
^Caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra. 292;
Joaqufn Tamayo, I& Revolucl6n de 1899 (Bogota. 1940), 240.
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Inapplicable theories, Herrera was rapidly becoming one
of the finest generals of Colombia.
had been no surprises for Herrera.
foreseen.

In Aguadulce, there
Every detail had been

Behind ditches and wire, the Conservatives had

been trapped.
Meanwhile, In Panama, General Salazar, who had not
heard from General Luis Morales Bertl (the Conservative
In charge of Aguadulce) since the latter part of July,
remained doubtful and worried about the activities In the
Interior.

All contact, Including telegraph service between

between Panama and Aguadulce, had been Interrupted since
July by Victoriano Lorenzo.

The caolaue had been ordered

to force the retreat to the capital of any Conservative
troops remaining In the area from Panama to La Chorrera
and also to prevent any Government reinforcements from
reaching Berti.^®

Salazar knew that if Herrera won, he

^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 184;
Arosemena, La Guerra de los Mil Dias. 43: Bogotfi El
Tlempo. November 21, 1952; Caballero, Memorlas de la
Guerra. 293-294; Carles, Horror £ paz. 98: Latorre.
Recuerdos de Campafia. 91; "Revolutionary Disturbances in
Venezuela, Colombia and Hayti," The Outlook. LXXI
(August 9, 1902), 901. Herrera had the ability of ana
lyze an enemy position and think of the right plan.
Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 248-250.
^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 182-183;
Arosemena, La Guerra de los Mil Dias. 44-46; Caballero,
Memorlas de la Guerra. 288,290-291; Castlllero, Hlstorla
de Panam£. 13^; Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 246-247•
For a copy of the surrender document, see: Caballero,
Memorlas de la Guerra. 295-299. Salazar kept hearing
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could, make an almost unopposed maroh to Panama*
With the surrender of Berti, Herrera planned an
attack on Panama and Col6n.

In order to prepare for this

final assault, Herrera gave Instructions to Quintero to
march to La Chorrera and wait for General Julio Plaza
who was to cross the Continental Divide and joih forces
with him*

Meanwhile, another force was to disembark at a

port close to Panama and await for more exact orders .-59
Even before the Liberal troops left Aguadulce,
Herrera received a note from the United States Consul,
H. A. Gudger, reminding him that his country still would
not allow fighting within the cities of Panama and Coldn
or along the railroad, line.

Herrera did not know what

rumors about Berti throughout the month of August. On
August 4, Salazar received a telegraph from San Carlos
which claimed that some of Herrera*s officers were in
retreat. Panama Star and Herald. August 4, 1902. The
telegram for the telegraph inspector at San Carlos con
firmed the defeat of the rebels at Aguadulce. This report
was based on reports of two Government soldiers who had
escaped from the rebels. These soldiers also reported
that many of the revolutionists were being forced to fight,
and that this was encouraging desertion. New York Times,
August 5. 1902 and August 7 , 1902. All these rumors were
false. The news of the surrender at Aguadulce did not
appear in the New York Times, until September 10, 1902.
On September 11, 1902, the Navy Department received a
telegram from Commander Potter of the Ranger stating that
Aguadulce had surrendered.
^^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 185;
Latorre, Recuerdos de Campana, 105-106; "The Crisis at
Colon," The Outlook. LXXII(September 20, 1902), 148.
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to do.

Even though he controlled the whole Interior with

an army of about 9 t000 men, he feared the consequences of
confronting the United States.

He,therefore, submitted

the consul's note to a general staff meeting for consi
deration.

The majority of the generals, led by Sergio

P&rez, Inspector General of the Army, voted stubbornly
to continue the plans of attack against Panama and Col6n.^°
While this meeting was in process, Herrera received the
following letter, dated September 19» 1902, from Rear
Admiral Silas Casey of the United States gunboat Wis
consin. reaffirming the Consul General's position with
regard to United States intervention:
General Benjamin Herrera.— Dear Sir: I have
the honor of informing you that the armed forces
of the United States are guarding the railroad
line and the line of transit across the Isthmus
from one sea to the other, and that no person
will be authorized to molest or bar in any form
the circulation of traffic and obstruct the route
of transit. No other troops but those of the
United States may occupy or use the line. All
this with the greatest impartiality and without
any desire to intervene in the internal struggles
of the Colombians.—

^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 186; Car
les, Horror jr paz. 101; Velasco, La Guerra en el Istmo.
224. Typical of many zealous Liberal families, not only
General Sergio P&rez, but also his sons Alejandro and
Eladlo fought for the Liberal cause. Arafiz, Relatos
sobre la guerra. 65» 70; Caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra.
3 2 4 , 3SS, 33^; Latorre, Reouerdos de Campafta. 101.
^Caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra. 186. MSeffor
General Benjamin Herrera.— Esiimado Senor: Tengo el
honor de informarle que las fuerzas armadas de los
Estados Unidos vigilan las vlas del ferrocarril y la
linea de tr£nsito a trav6s del Istmo de PanamA de un mar
al otro y que nlnguna persona serfi autorizada para
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Herrera, faced with the threat of United States
Intervention could do little more than stimulate confi
dence and keep his forces occupied

Thus, at length

on the advice of General Quintero, Herrera began to
exchange letters with Salazar with regard to a possible
peace settlement.

These negotiations were unsucessful

because Herrera was in complete control of the Isthmus
of Panama (with the exception of the terminal cities)
and wanted peace on his own terms&
The final blow to Herrera*s tenacity was dealt
when he received a letter from General Rafael Uribe Uribe
in which the latter advised him to end the war*

Uribe

Uribe had lost at La Cl£naga in Colombia and had signed
the peace treaty of Nerlandia after that battle on
October 28, 1902.

He now realized

that no amount of

help to Herrera could overcome American intervention.

t\h,

molestar or estorbar en ninguna forma la circulaci6n de
los tr&isitos y obstrulr la ruta de tr&islto. No hay m5s
tropas que las de los Estados Unidos que puedan ocupar o
utilizar la linea. Todo ello con la mayor imparcialidad
y sin nlngfin deseo de intervenir en luchas intestinas de
los colombianos
^2Carles, Horror £ paz. 102.
^ A l z p u r u a . General Manuel Quintero V.. 187;

"The
Colombia Insurgents Defeated," The Outlook. LXX (April 12,
1902), 898; Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 275-298.
Salazar stated in his memoirs that the Government was soon
to be reinforced by gun additional 10,000 troops from
Colombia. Salazar , Memorlas de la Guerra. 28^.
^Caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra. 288,31^-315*
3^7-350; Carles, Horror £ ~Paz. 103; New York Times.
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He wrote as follows:
• . . finalmente, conocedores de la situacitfn de
Ud. casi en un todo proveniente de la intervenciOn americana, vimos blen que lo que aquf
hicidramos o dejasemos de hacer, ya en nada
mejoraba p empeoraba las condlclones de su
problema.6 *
A few weeks earlier, around September 19, Admiral
Casey had placed marines aboard the trains for the pro
tection of passengers,^

and forbade Colombian

military officers, troops, arms or ammunitions to be
transported across the Isthmus by rail unless
permission had been granted.

special

Conservative General

Salazar had decided to stop the trains for inspection as
they approached Panama and Coldn in order to prevent the

October 13, 1902; October 29, 1902; November 8 , 1902;
Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra, 28^-298; Galvis Sala
zar, Uribe Uribe, 2T7-&28. The Bogota, formerly the Jessie
Jessie Banning, was commanded by Captain Henry Marmaduke,
who had served on the Merrlmac and the Confederate commerce
commerce destroyer Alabama. The Bogota was manned by an
American crew. When Salazar took the ship to the coast
of Aguadulce to demonstrate its power to the enemy, it
was fired upon by a few rebels from the shore. Conse
quently, an American, Richard Kane, was killed. New York
Times, August 28, 1902; September 12, 1902; November 13,
1902. Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 28*f. The Bogota was
not the only Conservative ship which had Americans as part
of the crew. The Chuculto had George B. Parker, H. L.
Goodling, and George Cross aboard as gunners. New York
Times, September 28, 1902.
1
^ C a r l e s .
Horror .v paz. 103:
de la Guerra. 2961

Salazar. Memorlas

6^New York Times. September 19, 1902 and September
20 , 1902.
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rebels from boarding and surprising the cities

As long

as this policing did not interrupt traffic and since
arrangements had been made with the railroad canpany,
Salazar felt that the Bidlack Treaty would not in any
£.o
way be violated by Colombia.
Furthermore, the treaty
assured the sovereignty of Colombia, for according to its
content the United States could intervene when Colombia
69
requested that it do so. 7 Salazar protested that not
only were the actions of Admiral Casey in direct violation
of the passes issued by the railroad company, but they
were also violations of the Bidlack Treaty of 1846.
Salazar accused Casey of immorally and unjustly attacking
Colombia^ rights of sovereignty and property over the
Isthmus.

At the same time, Salazar made it clear that

the Liberals were not to be considered under the protec
tion of the treaty, as they were not the defenders of the
laws of the nation.^®
After this confrontation, Casey received from the
Secretary of the Navy^1 a message ordering him to abide

67
'New York Times. September 19, 1902 and September,
20 , 1902 .
New York Times. September 17, 1902 and September
19, 1902.
^ N e w York Times. August 8 , 1901 and September 27,
1902 /give views on the treaty as applied in 188^7.
?°New York Times. October 6 , 1902.
71 The Secretary of the Navy at that time was
William H. Moody.
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by the treaty as it had been interpreted by Salazar.^
Following orders, Casey allowed the Government to use the
railroad again, but exluded the Liberals.

This exclusion

was in keeping with the Bidlack Treaty, a treaty respected
by the United States and upheld against the Liberals only
so long as it was convenient to the United. States.73 The

exclusion of the Liberals from the application of the
treaty left them no choice but to accept the suggestion
of Admiral Casey to make peaceful arrangements.

Herrera

reluctantly agreed to surrender and meet with the
Government represe

atives.7^

On November 19» the legations met on board the
Wisconsin.

Herrera brought with him from Aguadulce his

Chief of Staff, Lucas Caballero and his Secretary of
Treasury, Doctor Eusebio A. Morales.

Salazar, General

Alfredo V&squez Cobo and Nicolas Perdomo represented the
Government•

Within a quarter of an hour, discussions
'

7*5

were underway on the celebrated Treaty of Wisconsin.'-'
The treaty dealt mainly with peace, arms and

72New York Times. October 7, 1902 and October 15»
19Q2.

73it was disregarded in 1903 when it was not a
convenient treaty, but by then it was too late for the
Liberals.
^Carles, Horror y paz, 104; Castillero, Historla
de Panama. 13^-135» "Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 2832 ^ , “295-296, 306-326.
^^Aizpurua, General Manuel Quintero V.. 188; Bo
gota El Tlem-po. November 21, 19f>2; Latorre, Recuerdos de
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amnesty.

Article seven stated that once peace had been

declared, the Colombian congress was to decide what to
do about the Panama Canal, the elections, and questions
Involving paper money.7^
caused the war.

All of these factors had

Bitterly, Herrera signed the peace

treaty, reflecting that the observations of his friend
and officer, Lucas Caballero, were true:

that the

sovereignty of Colombia, hung precariously at the mercy
of American intervention, which impeded the peoples from
deciding their own destinies in their own territories.77
With the signing of the treaty, all hostilities
ended;

and Panama, which had had a certain relative

degree of prosperity maintained by commerce, agriculture
and cattle raising at the onslought of the war, now
lay in complete ruins, in spite of the new air of
tranquility.^®

Camparta. Ill; New York Times. November 22, 1902; Novem
ber 23, 1902; November 24, 1902; December l4, 1902;
Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra, 327-331; Panama Star and
Herald. November 23, 1902.
^ F o r a copy of the treaty, see: Caballero,
Memorlas de la Guerra. 355-360; Salazar, Memorlas de la
Guerra. 331-333*
77
Caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra. 353-354.
7®Carles, Horror £ paz. 91* For an excellent con
clusion and remarks about the aftermath of the Thousand
Days* War, which actually lasted 1,130 days, from October
18, I899 to November 21, 1902, see: Caballero. Memorlas
de la Guerra. 370- 391,
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RESULTS OP INTERVENTION
IN THE THOUSAND DAYS' WAR
American Intervention In Panama had been foreseen
by many Liberal and Conservative leaders since the
beginning of the revolution.

Porras, for one, had been

Idealistic and felt that the estados poderosos as he
called the powerful states to the north, would feel
sympathy for the democratic (1.e• Liberal) cause, espe
cially If
honorable.

the rebels proved themselves brave and
As to the failure of the United States to

rally to this cause, the suspicion may arise that the
United States foresaw greater cooperation from the Con
servatives In the matter of the future Canal Treaty.

A

crucial factor which can lead to this suspicion Is that
when the United States did support the Panamanian Indepen
dence movement In 1903 in order to make the Canal Treaty
a reality, the officials of the new republic were Con
servatives.
Unfortunately for the Liberal

Ideals, the govern

ment as well as the people of the United States were mis
informed about the real motives behind the revolt.

Public

lack of Interest and Incorrect reporting led the Americans
and even their representatives abroad to regard the whole
affair with scorn and misunderstanding.^

?9carles, Horror £ paz. 109-110;

Perhaps because

Porras, Memorlas.
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of this gap between the government of the United States
and the peoples of Colombia, many of the lesser represent
atives, including consuls and navy commanders, were given
a certain amount of freedom in their relationships with
the rebels.

This may very well explain why United States

naval forces did not intervene substantially during the
00
first campaign of Porras.
There is no doubt, however, that as interest in a

82-84. Examples of the attitude toward the war are best
illustrated by the following articles*: "The Revolution
in Colombia," The Outlook. LXV (May 5. 1900), 8; "The
Rebellion in Colombia." The Outlook. LXV (August 4, 1900)
760; "A Double Revolution," The Outlook. LXVT (Novem
ber 10, 1900), 627-628. One article stated that the
Liberal party was anti-clerical, one of the reasons for
the disturbances. It further stated that no one was
really Interested in establishing a constitutional form
of government. "The Trouble in South America," The
Outlook. LXVIII (August 24, 1901), 941-942. Commander
rtead of the Philadelphia showed his ignorance of the
causes of the war when he met with Porras on April 15,
1900. Porras, Memorlas. 143-144. Rear Admiral Casey
stated he detected no difference in the principles upheld
by either of the Colombian parties, except in matters
relative to the Church. "Admiral Casey and the Colom
bian Situation," The Outlook. LXXII (October 18, 1902),
384-385; New York Times, Ootober 11, 1902. It was not
until later during the war that the true motives became
known in articles in the United States. Some of these
articles were: "The Struggle in Colombia," The Satur
day Review. XCII (September 14, 1901), 326-327; R. B.
Cunningham Graham to The Saturday Review. XCII (Ootober
5, 190i),430-431; Harold Martin, "Venezuela and Colom
bia," The Independent, LII (October 26, 1901), 25272532. "Some Inside Panama History," The Outlook.
LXXV (December 12, 1903), 890-893; Henry Loomis
Nelson, "The Revolution and War in South America,"
Harper*s Weekly. XLV (October 12, 1901), 1040-104l.
®°Carles, Horror £ paz. 110-111;
October 6 , 1902.

New York Times.
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canal across the Isthmus Increased In the United States,
It became more and more convenient for the Americans to
Intervene repeatedly In the Internal affairs of Colombia#
The Bidlack Treaty of 1846 provided the perfect pretext
for many of the aggressive actions (such as the confronta
tion between Admiral Casey and General Salazar) whloh
81
humiliated the governments of Colombia and Panama,
and which prevented the Isthmians from self-determining
their political and economic future#

It became more and

more apparent that the power of the United States was
truly to be taken into account on every important
Isthmian issue#

Once again, the geographical advantages

on which the Panamanians had hoped to capitalize turned
Instead Into lure for foreign Intervention#

^Caballero, Memorlas de la Guerra. 193;
Salazar, Memorlas de la Guerra. 157* New York Times.
October 7* 1902; "The Truth about Colombia," 993-996.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

Even before its independence from Spain, Panama
had been developing what later intellectuals were to call
a "transit” personality, for Panamanians realized that
their most obvious resource was their geographic advan
tage as an isthmus in the center of the New World.'1'
Whether this way of looking at themselves together with
the desire of Panamanians to capitalize on their location
has enhanced or handicapped their way of life is a ques
tion which has been and still is debated by many.

What

ever the philosophical answer, the Isthmus has prospered
materially (though perhaps not spiritually) when it has

^One of the results of this view of themselves is
that, in the opinion of the author, Panamanians have in
the past developed or maintained a "mentalidad de querida"
in addition to the "mentalidad de lugar de transito" and
the "mentalidad de gente asomada al balcon" (expressions
attributed to or coined by Octavio MSndez Pereira and
by Rogelio SinSn respectively). In their desire to
exploit for themselves twhat they sensed was their princi
pal resource, they became increasingly dependent on for
eign elements for their sense of economic security, in
spite of believing that they were actually being exploited
by those elements.
Only recently have Panamanians begun to exhibit
real confidence in their own ability to handle technical
and commercial activity as well as Americans or other
foreigners. See: Daniel Goldrich, Radical Nationalism:
the Political Orientations of Panamanian Law Students
(Michigan State University, 19^2), 6.
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been able to exploit Its possibilities as a route of
transit.

The tragedy of the economic life of the Isthmus

has been that while providing the resource, It has
reaped only crumbs of the wealth that the Isthmians expec
ted would flow from such accomplishments as the railroad;
gains have been meager In comparison with the political
and spiritual consequences they have suffered in terms of
respect from both Colombia and the United States,
Early in the history of the Isthmus as an appendage
of Nueva Granada, the people of Panama (through leaders
like Tom£s Herrera) by trial and error fumbled in finding
a way to exploit their advantage as an isthmus.

Various

opinions regarding the level of independence from Nueva
Granad which would be needed to run their own affairs as
a commercial nation finally led to the relatively stable
political reality of the Isthmus as a state within a
union.

The successful completion of the railroad by

foreigners (who were inspired by the dreams of Aspinwall
and New York capitalists) seemed a promise of success to
come,

Justo Arosemena and others in search of a national

identity as free men tried to raise the level of culture
and education as well as the level of economic prosperity.
For some Panamanian enterprises at least, the railroad
created material wealth, but it also created racial and
cultural clashes between Panamanians and North Americans;
and, at the invitation of the Bogota government, many
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interventions by the United States,

Panamanians felt

that they had been sacrificed, that the prioe they had
paid was too great.
The many so-called "revolutions" in Colombia in
the second half of the Nineteenth Century made revolu
tions in Panama more numerous and complex becc.use of
continuous Colombian interference and resulted in the
cultural desolation of Panama.

These revolutions made

Panamanians want to cut themselves completely from the
horrors of Colombia*s civil wars which wreaked havoc
where such wars had no business to be— namely on the
Isthmus.

Whenever there was an uprising in any part of

Colombia, the new president would send a new governor
with troops and war material for which Panamanians had
to pay the bill.
Panamanians continued to consider themselves as
Justo Arosemena had seen them, as a people apart.

It is

true that they had some goals and traditions in common
with the rest of Colombia, but not enough to justify their
dependency on Bogota and their involvement with her wars.
Panamanians as a whole preferrred at this time to be as
neutral as possible.

Rafael Ntfffez, the Liberal-turned-

Conservatlve, dealt a death-blow to the sovereignty of
Panama as a state within a federation when he reduced
Panama to a suppressed dependency whose governors were
appointed from Bogota.

Thus crippled, Panama suffered
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during fatal clashes between Liberals and Conservatives
through the period of French canal construction and the
bloody Thousand Days* Civil War,
Added to the humiliations that any civil war
brings, was the knowledge that Isthmians— and even
Colombians—

could not forge the destiny of their own

land without interference from the United States,

A

"Black Legend" to the effect that it would have been
impossible for Panama to gain its independence from
Colombia without the aid of the United States sprang up
in Panama and the United States in 1903 and has survived
for many years;

yet the opposite had been true toward

the end of the Thousand Days1 War on the Isthmus,
the United States had not intervened,

If

the independence

that many men of the Liberal Party were dreaming about
2
would have been possible and probable.
The philoso
phies that formed the very foundations of Liberalism,
though they may have become dimmed, faded, or confused
by the end of the Nineteenth Century, had surely not
disappeared altogether.

Sincere Liberal leaders like

Benjamin Herrera would have been the last to turn against
P
In the past, research in this area had not been
very scholarly, not documented sufficiently, and therefore
the credibility of such contentions was sparse in certain
Isthmian circles.
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the Isthmians in the event that they sould wish Indepen
dence.

If Liberal leaders hindered such a move, they

would have been contradicting their entire polltloal
philosophy.

Liberals on the Isthmus did attain an unques

tionably secure military position under General Benjamin
Herrera during the Thousand Days* War, and American
interference at a crucial moment in their campaign
squelched any possibility of flanl success for the Liber
als.

Many Liberals were already hinting and talking about

a movement for Independence from Colombia which would
establish "La Reptlbllca Andina" and which would also
Include the Cauca area of Colombia, another Liberal
stronghold. J

Notwithstanding the lack of greater docu

mentary evidence readily available relating to this
desired secession from the rest of
of Panama supports this possibility.

Colombia, the history
Prom its first ra-

rather emotional attachment to Nueva Granada under the
banner of the hero, Bolfvar, until its final independence
in 1903, Panama has struggled to identify and proclaim
itself an entity with its own set of problems, peoples,
and even culture.

The disputes that prompted Justo

^Conversation with his father, Dr. Alejandro PSrez
Rivas (son of General Sergio P£rez) by Dr. Alejandro
PSrez Venero Sr. as told to Alex PSrez-Venero, Jr.;
letters from his father and conversations with him by
Senator Avelino Pdrez of Colombia^ Liberal faction.
Interview with Senator Pdrez, August, 1966.
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Arosemena to publish his Estado Federal de Pan^mit (1855)
were often related to this particular desire to verify
what Panamanians sensed was their own peculiarly Isthmlan way of life and philosophy.
It is quite possible that history might have
recorded a different story if the civil war in Colombia
had remained only domestic and had not created inter
national effects.

Whatever the outcome, the Thousand

Days1 War left a financial and spiritual scar on the
Isthmus.

The waste and loss which remained at the end

of this bitter war were to further affect the search of
Isthmians for peace and prosperity in the promise of a
canal treaty with the United States.

This new illusion,

in turn, would lead to the final rupture of the Isthmus
from Colombia with the support of United States military
power.

Independent Panama has not escaped its heritage

of suffering.

It continues to suffer deeply in the

Twentieth Century as it did in the Nineteenth Century.-*

^Sees Soler, Teorfa de la naolonalldad. 18-19,
which deals here with similar ideas related to mid
century (19th) political views and philosophies.
^For a well-written and passionate interpreta
tion of the effects of Panama^ historical patterns on
its people, sees Juan Materno VSsquez, Sobre el hombre
cultural panameflo (Panama, 1971), especially pp. 1-6.
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